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Abstract 
Agricultural research projects in developing countries focus on modifying farming systems in order 
to contribute to higher-level development goals such as poverty reduction, food security, and rural 
development. The success of these projects is tied to the expansion of benefits beyond the projects 
themselves, that is, scaling out and up. There is significant pressure on research organisations and 
development actors more broadly to demonstrate the impact of their activities at scale, which is 
driving a preoccupation with scaling of research findings in agricultural research organisations. 
Literature on taking research to scale has largely been concerned with stories of technological 
transfer and spread—identifying which mechanisms best support the dissemination and adoption of 
new practices by farming households, or how to engage with government departments to embed a 
new practice in agricultural extension programs. Consideration of scaling processes has been 
disconnected from broader attention to innovation as a dynamic process influenced by individual, 
institutional, and political circumstances.  
The aim of this research was to explore the concepts and assumptions of taking research to scale in 
agricultural development. The perspective of agricultural innovation systems, which emphasises 
connectivity and its importance for innovation, was the conceptual starting point. However, this 
approach has been criticised for failing adequately to consider how these connections can 
marginalise some actors. Drawing also on political ecology and actor-oriented theory enabled a 
clearer consideration of diversity, power, structure, and agency to complement the frame provided 
by agricultural innovation systems. Within this broader framework, the key themes were: history 
and context; key actors and roles; strategies for scaling research; structure and agency; power and 
knowledge; and scale and networks. Drawing on analytical perspectives from agricultural 
innovation systems, political ecology, and actor-oriented theory encouraged critical reflection on 
how the benefits of new technologies and practices are expanded, and on some of the outcomes of 
these processes.  
Three cases of agricultural technology spread were compared: higher-yielding rice varieties in Laos; 
small-scale agricultural machinery in Thailand; and improved cattle management in Indonesia. 
Cases featured different social and political systems, different types of technology, different degrees 
of ‘success’, and different mechanisms for scaling. The case studies draw on interviews with key 
actors, project documents, evaluations, and reports to explore how the intersection of key actors, 
networks, and events influenced efforts to expand project impact.  
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The cases highlight that the narratives and expectations around scaling are often over-simplified, 
reinforcing a focus on binary adoption of research-driven technology, and are unable to account for 
the complex array of actors, motivations, and ongoing learning processes that underpin efforts to 
take research to scale. Such findings call into question the validity of our expectations and claims 
around scaling. An emphasis on accountability and positive success stories by funding agencies 
may be useful to draw attention to the larger development goals and how research efforts can 
contribute to them, yet can also reinforce narratives of success that simplify complex processes of 
social change. Recognition of this complexity is important and would prompt a reconsideration of 
how agricultural development projects are designed, implemented, and evaluated to reflect the long-
term processes of learning and adaptation that are at the heart of rural development.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Agricultural research for development 
Despite global progress in reducing poverty and improving food security, an estimated 815 million 
people are chronically undernourished—an increase of 38 million people since 2015 (FAO et al. 
2017). Reflecting on the 40 years since its inception, the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research CGIAR (2011a) suggests ‘easy’ productivity gains have been made and new 
approaches are required to respond to the increasingly complex nature of problems facing world 
food systems. Efforts to improve agricultural production must now contend with the impacts of a 
changing and variable climate, degraded (and degrading) natural systems, and a continuing increase 
in global population (CGIAR 2016, Thornton et al. 2017). By contributing to increased food 
production, agricultural research can make a significant contribution to poverty reduction and 
improved food security (Renkow and Byerlee 2010).  
Within this context, and with increasing competition for dwindling research funds, there is 
significant pressure on research organisations to demonstrate the impact of their research and, in 
doing so, demonstrate value for money spent (Renkow and Byerlee 2010). Past preoccupations with 
increasing farm productivity as a mechanism for driving agricultural and industrial growth and 
economic restructuring have expanded to include poverty reduction, food security, environmental 
sustainability, and equity (Byerlee et al. 2009, Feldman and Biggs 2012, Chambers 2003). This 
expansion is reflected in the strategic statements of agricultural research institutions and 
government agencies as well as in the Sustainable Development Goals and their precursor, the 
Millennium Development Goals (e.g., World Bank 2007b, CGIAR 2011b, 2016). 
The term ‘agricultural research for development’ has emerged to describe programs and projects 
that are expected to deliver research outcomes and simultaneously contribute to development goals, 
especially improved livelihoods for poor rural households (Vamsidhar Reddy et al. 2012). It is a 
broad area of applied research that seeks to build a bridge between the generation of research 
outputs and their widespread use (Thornton et al. 2017). Despite the increasing use of the term, 
agricultural research for development is under-theorised (Mbabu and Hall 2012). Questions of how 
or when to balance development and research aims are largely unaddressed, as are tensions in trying 
to contribute to potentially competing development objectives (Byerlee et al. 2009). It is not my 
intention to address these issues as part of the thesis, but to acknowledge the ambiguities of the 
term. In this thesis, ‘agricultural research for development’ is used to refer broadly to agricultural 
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research that seeks to contribute directly to development outcomes in the process of pursuing 
scientific outcomes.  
Harnessing research projects and programs to achieve broad-scale development outcomes is 
problematic. Hartmann (2012, p.2) argues that ‘development interventions—projects, programs, 
policies—are all too often like small pebbles thrown into a big pond: they are limited in scale, 
short-lived, and therefore without lasting impact.’ How to achieve lasting impact at scale, that is, 
how to extend the (beneficial) impacts of research beyond ‘the project’, has become a key question 
for agricultural research institutions (CGIAR 2016). Expansion of impact is framed as a moral 
imperative. Holcombe (2012, p.9) states that ‘innovations … are failures unless they can be scaled 
to make a difference in the lives of many people in poverty.’ If agricultural research is to make a 
significant contribution to such development goals, the impacts have to reach beyond the ‘islands of 
success’ generated in individual projects (Scoones 1997). Though projects may be able to 
demonstrate significant benefits for participating households, these individual benefits are of 
limited significance unless widespread application is possible (Cramb 2000a, Douthwaite et al. 
2003).  
Achieving impact at scale is also linked to aid effectiveness and accountability for public money 
spent. Since the 1990s, a reduction in overall public funding and diversification of funding sources 
has contributed to an increased requirement to demonstrate impact (Ekboir 2003). Sumberg et al. 
(2013, p.79) argue that this emphasis has led to a ‘new and innovative politics around impact 
claims, exemplified by recent efforts to identify, document and disseminate “success stories” about 
agriculture and agricultural development.’ Considerations of the scale of impact inform decisions 
by donors regarding which research to fund, while tallies of the number of ‘adopters’ frame 
evaluations of return on investment (ACIAR 2013). However, the utility of such assessments is 
limited, demonstrating ‘success’ (narrowly defined) rather than informing our understanding of how 
change happens, or informing the adaptive management of projects (Hall et al. 2003). 
The focus on impact has contributed to a reconsideration of how agricultural research projects 
contribute to processes of agricultural change and development, and how to design projects and 
programs to achieve greater impact. Impact in this context is not just about the use of research 
outputs, but also how research can contribute to broader processes of development, resulting in 
increased food security, household wellbeing, or equity in resource access. The impact of 
agricultural research and the extent to which it is able to contribute to development goals is tied to 
the expansion of benefits beyond individual research projects. The CGIAR describes achieving 
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impact at scale as ‘one of the greatest challenges facing the development community’ (CGIAR 
2016, p.24). Despite significant achievements, the uptake of research, whether by farmers, policy 
makers or other actors, has been lower than expected (Thornton et al. 2017, Nyangaga et al. 2010).  
Theories of change or impact-pathway analysis have emerged as alternatives to inform project 
planning for impact. In a theory of change, the links and assumptions between activities and how 
activities lead to impact are made explicit (Vogel 2012). Douthwaite et al. (2003) argue that making 
these links explicit helps to identify what needs to happen, who needs to be involved, and the 
pathways and stakeholders required to achieve impact at scale, while monitoring and evaluation of 
progress against the theory of change supports adaptive management and learning. However, 
Valters (2014, p.1) argues that the pressure to meet the expectations of funders can lead to a 
simplification of change processes, ‘since admitting the unpredictability of change through an 
intervention doesn’t inspire confidence that the programme will get “results”—and in turn get 
[researchers] funding—however realistic and honest that assessment is.’ Programs and projects that 
frame their impact narratives outside these terms risk withdrawal of funding (Douthwaite et al. 
2017b).  
The terms ‘scaling up’ and ‘scaling out’ are used to refer to various methods, plans, and strategies 
to support increased impact. Scaling out typically refers to geographical expansion and 
dissemination through, for example, increasing the number of project sites or partnering with local 
extension services to increase promotion of a new technology. Scaling up typically refers to 
institutional change, such as where research findings inform changes in agricultural programs, or 
where skills and capacity are built in local organisations to continue the work of a project. 
Literature on taking research to scale has largely been concerned with stories of technological 
transfer and spread—identifying mechanisms that best support the dissemination and use of new 
practices by farming households, or ways to engage with government departments to embed a new 
practice in agricultural policies and extension programs. For the most part, consideration of scaling 
processes has been disconnected from broader attention to processes of innovation as dynamic, 
influenced by individual, institutional, and political circumstances (Wigboldus and Leeuwis 2013). 
The procedural focus has been driven, in part, by pressure to ensure research impact, which leaves 
little room for critical reflection of whether research impacts can or should be scaled (Wigboldus et 
al. 2016).  
Many organisations, including governments, research organisations, and funding agencies, are 
contending with how to achieve development outcomes within complex and changing 
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environments. Yet, within the moral imperative to achieve large-scale impact, there has been an 
overemphasis on dissemination and use of technology, and limited attention to the processes and 
strategies that support lasting impact (Wigboldus et al. 2016). This thesis contributes to our 
understanding of the process and impacts of going to scale by critically reflecting on the processes, 
actors, and events.  
1.2 Research objective, questions, and approach 
The objective of this research was to explore the concepts and assumptions of taking research to 
scale. I have used analytical perspectives from agricultural innovation systems, actor-oriented 
theory, and political ecology to critically reflect on the how the benefits of new technologies and 
practices are expanded. The research was guided by the following questions: 
1. What are the different ways in which actors contribute to, shape, or block efforts to take 
research to scale? How do these roles and contributions influence the process and outcomes 
of going to scale?  
2. How are actors’ different aims, values and interests negotiated and managed in taking 
research to scale? How does this affect how interventions are adapted and used?  
3. How, and to what extent, do power and politics affect scaling efforts?  
4. How do we define and measure impacts and outcomes as part of scaling efforts? What 
narratives and expectations do actors create around ‘adoption’ and impact?  
5. What are the implications for how funders, research agencies, and others define, plan for, 
and measure ‘achieving impact at scale’?  
These questions were investigated through three case studies of research-based agricultural 
development in Southeast Asia: the development and spread of improved rice varieties in Laos; the 
importation, adaptation, and spread of small-farm machinery in Thailand; and efforts to scale out 
improved forage and cattle management practices in eastern Indonesia. The case studies paid 
particular attention to how the intersection of key actors, networks, and events influenced efforts to 
expand research impacts. The case studies took a long-term view, looking beyond the formal 
timeframes of individual projects to consider the events that led up to a particular innovation, as 
well as the processes of adaptation and change beyond the formal research activity.  
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1.3 Thesis overview 
I begin the thesis with a review of theories of agricultural innovation, contrasting linear transfer-of-
technology models with systems-based models. I then consider literature relevant to the process of 
scaling research outcomes, with a focus on the strategies advocated to facilitate scaling of new 
agricultural technology, such as policy engagement and capacity building. The review highlights 
the challenges of matching complex processes, such as relationship-building or finding alignment 
between different values, with short-term project timeframes. I also consider some of the tensions 
and assumptions in taking research to scale, such as tensions between balancing the needs and 
values of stakeholders across administrative levels, or the role of politics in influencing what is or is 
not scaled. 
To try and address some of these limitations, in Chapter 3 I build on the concept of agricultural 
innovation systems to define a research framework informed by concepts from political ecology and 
actor-oriented approaches. As such, the framework explicitly includes consideration of the values 
and perspectives of multiple actors and the power dynamics inevitably involved in their 
interactions. This framework is used to guide the analysis of the three case studies, each of which 
traces the key actors, events, and processes that shaped how new agricultural technology has spread 
and been adapted over time. The case studies were based on mixed methods, including extensive 
reviews of available documentation and, in the Lao and Indonesian cases, interviews with farmers, 
national and international researchers, and funding agencies.  
The first case presented in Chapter 4 considers the development, introduction, and spread of 
improved rice varieties through lowland areas of Laos, with a focus on a partnership between the 
Government of Laos and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). The case examines the 
socio-political context that contributed to the establishment of the partnership, the formal program 
of research from 1990 to 2005, and subsequent developments. The case highlights the role of farmer 
seed-exchange practices in disseminating rice varieties, and the critical role of government in 
enabling and instituting structures to support national-level policy. The program was successful in 
building capacity for rice research within Laos and in releasing several improved varieties which 
remain in use, to varying degrees, across lowland rice-growing areas. Given the absence (in the case 
of seed) or weakness (in the case of fertiliser) of effective input markets, the efforts of key actors in 
the Lao research system and of international development projects have been crucial in facilitating 
farmers’ access to seeds and other inputs.  
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Chapter 5 details the development and spread of farm machinery throughout lowland rice-growing 
areas in Thailand, following the actors and processes that drove the adaptation of small farm 
machines for rice farming over several decades. Micro-studies of the water pump, two- and four-
wheel tractors, threshers, and combine harvesters are presented to build a generalised picture of the 
processes that led to ubiquitous use of small machines—processes that were not driven by 
government or research actors but by innovative farmers, small agribusiness firms, manufacturers, 
and machinery dealers. The private sector, in the form of local machinery shops and manufacturers, 
were central in this case. Working with Thai farmers, they adapted machinery designs from Japan 
and the Philippines to suit local conditions, and drove scale-out through widespread promotion, 
credit access, and machine-hire services.  
The final case study, presented in Chapter 6, maps out a series of interconnected projects that aimed 
to increase smallholder production of Bali cattle in eastern Indonesia. The projects were shaped by 
internal policy changes within the funding agency that placed increasing emphasis on research 
impact and thus supported an unconventional project design. The case centres on the ongoing 
processes of technology adaptation by farmers, as well as some of the challenges and complexities 
in scaling up through policy influence, with Indonesian policy makers re-interpreting the research 
recommendations to suit their institutional context and resource constraints.  
Chapter 7 reflects across the three cases and discusses some of the key patterns and findings in the 
context of the broader literature. Collectively, the cases highlight the diversity of circumstances, 
events, and actors and how they interact to influence scaling processes. Though deeply context-
specific, some broad insights are evident, such as continual processes of learning and adaptation 
among all actors, and how these shape scaling efforts and the development of the technologies 
themselves. It is thus difficult to distinguish scaling out and up from the broader processes of 
innovation and socio-economic change.  
The conclusions of the research are summarised in Chapter 8. There is an inherent tension between 
the picture of scaling research impacts described in the case studies, as a complex combination of 
people, events, and circumstances, and the expectations and definitions of research impact 
emanating from research and development institutions. The findings have important implications 
for how actors in development contexts articulate, plan for, and measure the impacts of agricultural 
research for development.  
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2 Research to impact: Models and strategies to increase the impact of 
agricultural research  
Any understanding of research impact needs to consider not only research outputs but the processes, 
relationships, and networks that have contributed to those outputs. This extends to theories of who 
does research, how innovation occurs, and the methodologies and approaches used. In this chapter, 
I examine different theories of research and innovation as a foundation to analysis of increasing the 
scale (or ‘scaling’) of research impacts. I begin by discussing theories relating to the processes of 
agricultural innovation (Section 2.1), contrasting ‘transfer of technology’ models of agricultural 
research with more inclusive and collaborative approaches such as ‘multiple-source models’ (Biggs 
1990) and ‘innovation systems’ (Clark 2002, Hall et al. 2006b). In Section 2.2, I consider the 
methods and mechanisms that are advocated for scaling research, and in Section 2.3, I examine 
some of the assumptions, tensions, and challenges in taking research to scale, in particular the role 
of cross-scale dynamics and power.  
2.1 How innovation ‘happens’ 
In agricultural research for development, the term ‘innovation’ is used to refer to the development 
of new technology and its use. That is, it encompasses not just the generation of new ideas and 
technology, but also the application of these ideas in everyday life (Hall et al. 2010). In this thesis, 
‘technology’ is used to encompass inputs, practices, and knowledge. Changes in institutions are also 
closely linked to the use of new technology (e.g., a water-users group that is formed to manage the 
use of a new irrigation system).  
In this section I consider different conceptual models of the process of innovation, starting with 
linear, or ‘transfer of technology’ approaches, which have evolved over time to reflect more 
inclusive and collaborative approaches such as ‘multiple-source models’ (Biggs 1990) and 
‘innovation systems’ (Clark 2002, World Bank 2012a). The conceptual models have been used to 
explain processes of innovation and in what circumstances these have led to positive outcomes; 
they have also been used, in turn, as a normative guide to designing research-for-development 
projects.  
2.1.1 Linear or single-source models of innovation  
Agricultural research and development in the post-war period focused on the transferral of 
technologies from developed to developing countries—variously referred to as linear, transfer-of-
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technology, pipeline, or central-source models (Röling 2009, Clark 2002). From the 1960s, 
international research institutes such as the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT), which became part of the CGIAR 
system in 1971, fed technology to national agricultural research systems, which would test and 
adapt them for local conditions and pass them on to national extension systems to be disseminated 
to farmers (Biggs 1990).  
In this conceptualisation of research, the process for the development of technologies is linear and 
sequential: problem definition, technology development, testing, and dissemination (Biggs 1990, 
Chambers and Jiggins 1987). Innovation comes from the international centres to the farmer in 
hierarchical processes that have weak, if any, mechanisms for feedback to the ‘centre’ (Biggs 
2007). In this system, once a technology is ‘proven’, emphasis shifts to taking research to scale 
through extension activities, mass communication methods, and policy workshops (Biggs 2007). 
Dissemination and adoption are largely the responsibility of national extension agencies rather than 
the scientists themselves (Douthwaite et al. 2003). 
While there have been some major achievements under this model—the Green Revolution1 is the 
most striking example—it has been widely criticised as an unrealistic model of innovation 
processes and is seen as especially unsuitable for delivering outcomes to poor farmers (Biggs 2007, 
Klerkx et al. 2012, Röling 2009). Indeed, a revisionist assessment of the Green Revolution itself 
shows greater complexity of interactions among diverse actors, including political influence, than 
the single-source model would suggest (Biggs 2007). 
Linear models of innovation have been criticised for prioritising scientific knowledge over the 
knowledge of other actors, such as farmers, the private sector, non-government organisations 
(NGOs), and the government. These actors can contribute to problem-framing and assessing the 
feasibility of potential solutions and, more importantly, they often experiment and innovate 
irrespective of formal research efforts (Biggs 1990). For example, it was a Vietnamese farmer who 
developed an early axial-flow, low-lift water pump that revolutionised farming in the Mekong Delta 
in the 1960s, shifting control of water from large monopolies to households and underpinning the 
successful use of modern rice varieties (Biggs 2012, Rigg 2012). In elevating the role of scientific 
                                               
1 The term ‘Green Revolution’ is used to refer to the spread of improved (early-maturing, fertiliser-
responsive) seed varieties throughout Asia from the mid-1960s which, coupled with fertiliser and water 
access, enabled a significant increase in staple food production. Lipton and Longhurst (1989) argue that 
while it was ‘green’ in terms of increasing production, the use of the term ‘revolution’ was overstated, with 
little change to social structures of entrenched inequity or poverty.  
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knowledge, linear models of innovation lack mechanisms for feedback or evaluation of research 
outputs to be communicated back to scientists, presupposing that whatever is generated will be 
useful and appropriate (Biggs 1990).  
Linear models tend to define problems in terms of productivity, isolated from the historic, political, 
social, and institutional conditions that influence the process of innovation and the relevance or 
suitability of an innovation (Sumberg 2005). It is only when faced with ‘non-adoption’ of a 
technology that social, cultural, or other interpretations influencing the suitability of a new 
technology are considered (Klerkx et al. 2012). Linear models also frame national research systems 
as recipients of technology from international centres, and have limited concern for building 
research and extension capacity within less-developed countries beyond what is necessary to 
transfer technology from the centre (Biggs 2007).  
By excluding the voices and needs of farmers and other actors within the innovation process and by 
ignoring the local context and politics of innovation, transfer-of-technology approaches have failed 
to generate anticipated impacts, particularly for resource-poor farmers (Chambers and Jiggins 
1987). Participatory approaches, which bring a wider and more systematic contextual understanding 
of farmer priorities, constraints, and existing (‘indigenous’) knowledge, were developed and widely 
advocated to address some of these limitations, with the aim of producing technologies that are 
better attuned to the farming system (Röling 2009). Attention shifted from ‘educating’ farmers to 
adopt recommended technologies to considering the appropriateness of a technology in terms of its 
fit to the perceptions, needs, problems, and environment, as articulated by those whom research and 
development projects were trying to assist (Ellis and Biggs 2001). These methods went some way 
to changing the linear model but, according to Biggs (2007), were not sufficient to change the 
dominant narrative that emphasised the trajectory from research activity to pilot project to scale out. 
2.1.2 Multiple-source and systems models 
In contrast to linear models, systems-based models have highlighted the role of a diverse range of 
actors and networks in shaping innovation processes within a complex system (Röling 2009, Klerkx 
et al. 2010). Biggs (1990) argues for a multiple-source model of innovation, which emphasises the 
wide spectrum of people and organisations that contribute to new ideas and technology while 
situating the process of innovation within the historical, political, social, and cultural context of a 
given place. This approach pays particular attention to the politics of agricultural research: who gets 
funding and what research outputs are promoted and scaled is influenced by the power of key actors 
and politics across scale. Building on a multiple-source model, Biggs (2007) proposes the ‘actor 
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innovation systems model’ as a framework to examine the actors, relationships, and structures that 
contribute to ‘socially desirable innovation’. In doing so, Biggs shifts attention from the technology 
to the identification of where ‘desirable’ innovation is occurring and understanding the social 
processes contributing to that innovation.  
The Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS) framework draws on innovation systems theories from 
economics which sought to understand national economic and industrial development (Agwu et al. 
2008). It highlights the role of diverse actors across scale in innovation processes, mediated or 
informed by institutional conditions (Agwu et al. 2008). In the context of agricultural development, 
it explicitly brings a concern for the higher-level institutional constraints that limit the ability of 
households to implement new knowledge and management practices (Hall et al. 2010).  
Institutional settings, such as poorly-functioning or absent markets, perverse policy incentives, land 
tenure arrangements, history, and culture, in addition to the relevance of a technology, influence a 
household’s ability to implement a new technology (Saïdou et al. 2007). Institutional change is 
pursued through multi-stakeholder engagement processes, which emphasise learning and aim to 
support the ‘construction of appropriate social architectures’ to facilitate innovation and impact at 
scale (Vamsidhar Reddy et al. 2012, p.487). Multi-stakeholder networks (sometimes referred to as 
‘innovation platforms’) aim to share lessons and insights to facilitate learning that will support 
changes in markets, policy, or other areas to enable innovation (Hounkonnou et al. 2012). 
Reshaping institutions is not a simple task. Klerkx et al. (2010) highlight the tensions in structure 
and agency that influence innovation processes. Institutions and norms create structures that guide 
and define actions and behaviour for individuals and societies, which in turn are shaped and re-
defined by actors and organisations (e.g., Batterbury 2007 ). Klerkx et al. (2010) focus on the idea 
of ‘effective reformism’ to describe institutional changes that support or enable innovation, with 
innovation brokers facilitating solutions and learning between multi-stakeholder networks and 
institutions for change. The roles played in this space are diverse, ranging from problem solving and 
knowledge creation, to deal making and lobbying, to translation and communication of knowledge 
(Hermans et al. 2013). Klerkx et al. (2010) emphasise the unpredictability of these endeavours, 
arguing that innovation processes cannot effectively be ‘steered’ due to the highly dynamic nature 
of change, feedback loops, external drivers, and the responses of different actors. As stakeholders 
engage in processes of learning, their understanding and perceptions of goals and desirable means 
to reach those goals may diverge and competing strategies may emerge (Hermans et al. 2016).  
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The uncertainty of change processes supports a renewed focus on learning and capacity building 
within innovation systems (Douthwaite et al. 2017a). Hall argues for an approach to capacity 
building that extends beyond support for technical science skills to include building skills in 
partnering with diverse (non-research) organisations, networking, policy development, and 
supporting institutional learning and change (Hall 2002, 2005).  
By focusing on the social and institutional changes required to support integration and use of 
research findings, the AIS framework brings concern for communication and use of technology 
more directly into the research process and within the responsibility of researchers, rather than 
limiting it to an issue for extension practitioners as in linear models (Hall 2005). Consideration of 
going to scale is embedded in the process from the outset of the project and is conceptualised as a 
learning process, integrating knowledge from a range of stakeholders (Röling 2009, Hall et al. 
2010). This approach aims to enable the utilisation of research outputs or system changes by 
working across scales from the outset (Hall 2005) and is thus as much a normative model of how to 
design and plan for innovation as a descriptive or explanatory model of how innovation occurs. 
AIS perspectives have been criticised for not placing due emphasis on managing power imbalances 
or conflicting values within multi-stakeholder forums (Foran et al. 2014). A growing body of work 
explicitly brings ecological and complex-systems perspectives of scale into understandings of AIS 
and processes of innovation more generally (Klerkx et al. 2012, Wigboldus et al. 2016, Hermans et 
al. 2016). These perspectives emphasise principles of emergence, system response, scale dynamics, 
and consideration of conflicting stakeholder values across scale (Hermans et al. 2016). Wigboldus 
and Brouwers (2016) propose explicit consideration of roles of actors in scaling efforts, including 
an understanding of motivations and interests, as well as dynamics across levels of decision making 
(for example, farm, catchment, and regulatory systems). These issues are explored further in 
Section 2.4.  
In this section I have considered different models of how research and innovation processes occur, 
and how this can inform the design of research for development. Linear models assume a research-
centric process of technology development, with technologies disseminated through extension and 
communication channels, while systems models consider policy and institutional influences to 
understand and ‘enable’ local utilisation and further innovation. Scaling of research, or expansion of 
reach and impacts, is implicit in both these models, but occurs at different stages and with different 
assumptions about how and why this may happen. In the next section I look more explicitly at 
methods and strategies advocated to increase the impact of research through scaling out and up, 
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which span both linear and systems approaches to research; that is, I examine how these models 
inform our design of research with the goal of increasing impact. 
2.2 Strategies and methods for taking research to scale 
This section is focused on the practicalities of scaling out and scaling up. Though some writers use 
the terms interchangeably, ‘scaling out’ is most often used to refer to dissemination of technology 
to an increasing number of individuals or households, and is influenced by Rogers’s (1995) concept 
of the diffusion of innovations, while ‘scaling up’ is used to refer to embedding research findings in 
government, NGOs, or other institutions by influencing their policies and programs and building 
institutional capacity (Millar and Connell 2010). Though ‘out’ and ‘up’ are used to differentiate 
between mechanisms to achieve increased impact, such as farmer field schools (out) and policy 
workshops (up), in practice they are viewed as complementary and often pursued together, such that 
embedding research findings in government programs (scaling up) supports greater access and 
utilisation by rural households (scaling out) (Douthwaite et al. 2003). 
The process-oriented literature on going to scale is varied, covering expansion of NGOs and their 
programs (Uvin et al. 2000), reflections on agricultural research projects (Franzel et al. 2001, Millar 
and Connell 2010), scaling of social innovation (Westley and Antadze 2010), and a large section of 
grey literature from development agencies and research institutes (IIRR 2000, Gündel et al. 2001, 
Pachico and Fujisaka 2004, Hartmann and Linn 2008, Holcombe 2012, Chandy et al. 2013). Much 
of the literature reflects on case studies of ‘successful’ scaling. These case studies seek to draw 
broader lessons or checklists to support improved planning for taking research to scale but have 
limited consideration of unsuccessful cases (Hartmann and Linn 2008, Coe et al. 2014).  
In Table 2.1 I provide a brief overview of how the terms ‘scaling out’ and ‘scaling up’ (and their 
variations) are used in this literature, and what different strategies and methods are advocated to 
achieve impact at scale. The underlying principles of these terms emphasise the importance of 
process (as opposed to output), learning, adaptation, sustainability, and lasting impact (e.g., 
Hartmann and Linn 2008). IIRR (2000) argues against a focus on specific technology, instead 
emphasising the generic principles and processes that sit behind the technology as a way of 
supporting adaptation and flexibility when applying technology to new areas.  
Both linear and systems-based models of innovation acknowledge expansion of impacts as a 
desirable outcome. In linear models, scaling is usually considered once a practice or technology has 
been ‘proven’ to work, and involves passing on of research findings to extension services or other 
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government agencies. Proving that a technology works can, in itself, be problematic. Starkey (1986) 
chronicles the persistent attempts to promote animal-drawn tool-carriers that were judged to be 
effective in research-station trials yet were consistently rejected by farmers, who found the designs 
cumbersome and unsuited to field conditions. In contrast, in systems-based approaches, processes 
that support scaling of research are implicit from the outset of a project (Wigboldus and Leeuwis 
2013).  
Table 2.1 Common definitions of scaling out and up 
Term(s) Definition(s) Examples of processes and 
methods 
Scaling out 
(also referred to as out-
scaling; or horizontal 
scaling) 
 Process to support dissemination 
and use of technology beyond 
project sites. 
 Spread of technology within the 
same stakeholder group. 
 Adaptation of technology for 
new end users. 
 Geographical spread of a 
technology. 
 Replication of activities in new 
areas through project or 
organisational expansion.  
 Expansion of the number of sites 
a project is working in. 
 Increased dissemination or 
learning activities, such as cross-
site visits, field days, extension 
material, encouraging local 
farmer champions and mass 
media interest. 
Scaling up 
(also referred to as up-
scaling; vertical 
scaling; political 
scaling; or 
mainstreaming) 
 Extend reach of technology by 
embedding principles into 
policy, and programs of 
government and NGOs. 
 Incorporation of technology into 
organisations and institutions 
above the local level. 
 Enable technology adoption at 
lower levels by supporting 
institutional change at higher 
levels. 
 Linking similar initiatives to 
promote learning and wider 
technology use.  
 Learning process between 
diverse stakeholders. 
 Engagement and communication 
with stakeholders, e.g., 
workshops. 
 Influencing private sector or 
development organisations to 
promote practices as part of their 
activities. 
 Multi-stakeholder platforms, 
advocacy, lobbying, deal 
making.  
 Individual and organisational 
capacity building.  
Source: Synthesised from Douthwaite et al. (2003), Millar and Connell (2010), Hall et al. (2006a), 
Uvin et al. (2000), Anyonge et al. (2001), Menter et al. (2004), and Hermans et al. (2016).  
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Scaling can refer to the increased use of anything from a simple technology such as improved seed, 
to a collection of ideas and practices such as conservation agriculture, to institutions such as 
governance arrangements for natural resource management (Carter and Currie-Alder 2006). A 
technology or practice may go to scale as the result of a directed effort, such as efforts by a research 
project, or in an unplanned manner, without a deliberate push or effort from external actors (such as 
international researchers or government officials). Where scaling is the goal of particular actors, 
multiple pathways are likely to be pursued which may intersect, be complementary, run in parallel, 
or be in competition (Hermans et al. 2016). Here I focus on local dissemination and adoption of 
innovations, capacity development, and policy influence. 
2.2.1 Scaling out—spreading an innovation to other households and communities 
Scaling out is closely related to the concept of diffusion, which Rogers (1995, p.5) defines as a 
‘process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among 
members of a social system.’ The general implication in the scale-out literature is that the process is 
supported, directed, or driven by a particular interest (such as a development NGO or project), 
though in practice it is used to describe both intentional and spontaneous processes, as is the term 
diffusion.  
More than the spread of information, diffusion suggests processes of social change in response to 
the use of new ideas. The literature on scale-out and extension is therefore intimately tied with 
understanding processes of household decisions to use, adapt, or reject technology.2 Farmer 
decisions to try new technology (or not) have long been acknowledged as a dynamic and ongoing 
process of experimentation, learning, and adjustment over a number of years in response to a range 
of conditions and characteristics (Abadi Ghadim and Pannell 1999). 
Pannell et al. (2006) undertook an extensive, multi-disciplinary review of the adoption literature; 
they describe adoption as a process of farmer learning and experimentation, influenced by the 
characteristics of the farmer, their socio-cultural context, and the characteristics of a technology. 
This process is specific to each individual as farmers (within the household as a decision-making 
unit) draw on multiple sources of knowledge and information, some of them from formal research 
                                               
2 I try to avoid use of the term ‘adoption’ throughout this thesis. Although much of the literature emphasises 
adoption as a process of learning and adaptation, its use tends to imply binary decisions and underplays the 
processes of experimentation and innovation that ‘adopters’ undertake. I use it in this section as it is the term 
used in the literature reviewed.  
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and extension sectors, but blended with their own experience and goals, and influenced by values, 
culture, and social expectations (Pannell et al. 2006).  
Characteristics of the technology influence the degree to which it is likely to be adopted and, in 
many cases, the ease of scale-out and resources required to support the process (Douthwaite et al. 
2001). Drawing on Rogers et al. (1995) and Pannell et al. (2006), the key, interconnected 
characteristics of a technology include:  
 Complexity—the ease of understanding and implementing a new technology, the degree of 
ongoing or intense management required, and the extent to which it adds further complexity 
to overall farm management. The more simple the technology, the more likely it is that 
farmers will try it. 
 Compatibility—the extent to which a technology is perceived to match the current 
management and practices in the farming system, cultural values, past experience, and 
needs. This includes considerations of how a new technology affects other parts of the 
farming and livelihood system. The more compatible a new practice with existing farm and 
livelihood activities, the more likely it is to be used. 
 Observability—the extent to which farmers are able to see benefits from the adoption of a 
new technology, and the timeframe in which benefits are visible. Observable benefits in the 
short-term encourage the use of new technology.  
 Trialability—the extent to which farmers can experiment with a new technology or practice 
without overly compromising existing livelihood activities. Technologies that are low risk, 
have low opportunity cost, and can be trialled on a small scale are more likely to be trialled. 
Where technology is promoted as a bundle with multiple components, farmers are more 
likely to experiment with one or two parts before trying the whole package.  
 Relative advantage—the extent that a new technology is perceived by end users to improve 
on or out-perform what it is replacing. This includes considerations of cost, benefits, and 
risk relative to other activities. Where relative advantage is high, technologies are more 
likely to be of interest.  
The interplay of these factors with other drivers (e.g., markets, government incentives) and 
individual and community values and goals is complex. Where the characteristics of a new 
technology match farmer priorities in these areas, use of a technology is more likely to occur 
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(Pannell et al. 2006). Some technologies lend themselves to scale-out without significant 
intervention, such as hybrid maize, which has been facilitated through private-sector involvement, 
in contrast to improved rice varieties which often rely on state-sponsored seed production. The 
more complex the technology, the greater need for intervention and support to guide 
experimentation and use of new technology (Douthwaite et al. 2001).  
Scale-out strategies blend demonstration of impact and provision of information and support to 
potential users (Millar and Connell 2010). Commonly used strategies include: joint trials and 
meetings to discuss challenges or issues (Nyangaga et al. 2010); enlisting influential farmers, local 
‘champions’, or farmer groups to demonstrate and promote technology to their peers (Anyonge et 
al. 2001); and partnering with NGOs or the private sector as a vehicle to replicate and expand 
project activities (de Janvry et al. 2016b). Though formal government-based extension services are 
often part of projects and scale-out strategies, they are often seen as inadequately resourced or as 
having limited flexibility (or willingness) to change their approach or content (de Janvry et al. 
2016a, Anyonge et al. 2001).  
Millar and Connell (2010) share their experiences in promoting scale-out of forage varieties, animal 
management, and health practices to improve livestock production in northern Laos. The focus on 
scaling-out impacts came after five years of participatory research involving international 
researchers, Lao researchers, Lao extension officers, and farmers. Three main strategies were 
pursued by the project: (1) encouraging more farmers within project villages to try the forages, 
using impact case studies, site visits, and field days to foster discussion and learning; (2) expanding 
the project activities into new villages, supported by an increase in the number of staff to provide 
technical support; and (3) encouraging other development projects to promote forages, by running 
workshops and providing access to seeds and technical support. Spontaneous scale-out also 
occurred, mostly due to family and kin networks. Reflecting on the success of the scale-out efforts 
(more than doubling the number of villages and households reporting positive impacts), Millar and 
Connell (2010) re-affirm the importance of having proven technologies that are adaptable and that 
demonstrate benefits in short timeframes. They also highlight the importance of mentoring and 
capacity building of extension staff, who in turn support farmer learning, and of institutional 
support from various levels of the Government of Laos—which highlights mutually reinforcing 
links between scaling out and scaling up. The main actors in this example—research, government 
extension, and farmers—mirror those in technology-transfer approaches, even though the approach 
taken was much more integrative and placed value on processes of experimentation and adaptation.  
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The role of the private sector in contributing to rural development has long been acknowledged, 
with a general perception that, under the right conditions, the private sector can be more effective 
than government agencies in supporting development (Goldsmith 1985). The private sector can be 
an effective agent for scale-out of new technology, with a perceived greater reach to a more diverse 
customer base than research agencies and poorly-resourced government extension agencies (de 
Janvry et al. 2016b). Private-sector engagement is seen as a way of ‘closing the gap’ between 
generation and use of research outputs, while leveraging expertise for the benefit of both research 
and private sectors (Lewis 2000).  
Engagement with the private sector can take many forms, from formal partnerships where the 
private sector is deeply engaged in the identification and implementation of research with the goal 
of using and promoting new technology as part of their business (Hartwich and Tola 2007), through 
to opportunistic engagements with businesses, such as agri-input suppliers, who see an opportunity 
to sell new technologies and in doing so assist promotion and distribution (Goldsmith 1985).  
In a formal partnership, organisations are theoretically able to achieve more than would be possible 
by themselves (Spielman and von Grebmer 2006). For example, where initial rates of return may be 
too low to motivate private-sector involvement in a new technology to support smallholders, 
research projects may support technology development to a point where it is profitable enough for 
private-sector players (including credit institutions) to engage (Wambugu et al. 2011, Spielman and 
von Grebmer 2006). For the private sector, motivations are diverse, including accessing new 
technology, improving public image through corporate social responsibility endeavours, or securing 
greater market access (Spielman and von Grebmer 2006). For research organisations, collaboration 
is motivated by the potential for new ways of delivering or disseminating technology, as well as 
access to new sources of research funding (Hall 2006).3 
Examining social enterprise and value chain development in Africa, Moseley (2017) argues 
business-based approaches lack any incentive for businesses to include local knowledge and 
generalise technology in order to sell products over a large area, thus they revert to transfer-of-
technology approaches. Despite the promise of research-private sector partnerships to support 
agricultural development, few examples exist that demonstrate significant benefits of formal 
partnerships to poor smallholder farmers. Instead there is a tendency for these partnerships to favour 
more advanced, high-input agriculture (Spielman and von Grebmer 2006, Rajalahati et al. 2008). 
                                               
3 A review by Hartwich and Tola (2007) of 124 cases of research-private sector collaboration in South 
America found a majority of funding still came from the public sector.  
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Research and private sectors have vastly different organisational cultures, performance incentives, 
and motivations, and generally low capacity to understand each other (Hall 2006). While many 
research organisations are engaged in public-good research, profit is the key motivator for the 
private sector to be involved (Rajalahati et al. 2008). Engagement with the private sector, and more 
detailed discussion of how this strategy may play out, is revisited in the discussion on capacity 
building in the following section.  
2.2.2 Scaling up—influencing actors and institutions across scales 
Scaling up, or embedding lessons learned from research into the policies, programs, and behaviours 
of higher-level actors and organisations, is essentially a question of influence, learning, and 
adaptation. According to Carter and Currie-Alder (2006, p.138), scaling up depends on 
communication of success and ‘convincing non-local actors to learn from these experiences.’ By 
‘non-local’ Carter and Currie-Alder (2006) are referring to actors not directly involved with the 
original (community-based) project. Uvin et al. (2000) describe scaling up as a strategy for indirect 
impact, whether by developing an approach or program that government (or others) take 
responsibility for delivering, joint ventures, or training and capacity building.  
Literature that examines processes of scaling up emphasises building relationships, partnerships, 
broader networks and, in particular, fostering ‘ownership’ among relevant actors. Without the 
support of a range of actors, scaling efforts that require forms of institutional (regulatory, policy) 
change are unlikely to be successful or sustained over the long term. By collaborating with key 
stakeholders at the outset of the project and setting the research within the broader context of 
regional and national policy, projects are more likely to address key priorities and successfully 
influence higher-level actors such as those within government (Franzel et al. 2001, Anyonge et al. 
2001, Blomley and Ramadhani 2006). In fact, ‘multi-stakeholder engagement’ has become the all-
encompassing signifier for participation, including government, NGOs, and the private sector, in a 
process intended to allow the perspectives and concerns of broadly-defined stakeholders to be 
reflected in the research (akin to what the ‘farmer first’ approach aimed to do for farmers). Carter 
and Currie-Alder (2006) describe the learning process required in terms of fostering a mutual 
understanding of challenges and change across such groups.  
However, ‘stakeholder engagement’ processes are beset with diverse views and interests, power-
plays, and politics, which can obstruct processes of change and marginalise less-powerful voices if 
not carefully managed by project teams (Kristjanson et al. 2009). Yet project teams will often not 
be able to address power asymmetries, nor be the best-placed actor to do so, depending on the 
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nature of relationships and where power is held. In the example provided by Kristjanson et al. 
(2009), imbalances between project partners stemmed from the power attributed to scientific 
experts by non-experts. Hence the team employed community members to be part of the project 
team and co-create knowledge, as a strategy to build trust and elevate the importance attributed to 
the knowledge of local partners and communities. Hermans et al. (2013) highlight a specific role in 
innovation systems played by ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ who act as political agents, networking, 
lobbying, and trying to influence higher-level actors in support of an innovation. 
In the following sections I look specifically at policy engagement and capacity building as two 
interrelated strategies advocated for influencing institutions. 
(a) Engaging with ‘policy’. ‘Government’ or ‘policy makers’ are often targeted as stakeholders 
with a strong capacity for institutionalising change, due to their role in defining policies that may 
create a more favourable environment for technology use, or by continuing the activities of projects 
under government extension or other programs. Edwards and Hulme (1992, p.78) describe 
government as ‘the ultimate arbiter and determinant of wider political changes on which 
development depends, [with control over] the economic and political frameworks within which 
people and their organisations have to operate.’ Though Edwards and Hulme (1992) argue that 
working within government structures may be an effective mechanism to influence government and 
enhance the sustainability of NGO programs, they highlight that it brings with it different tensions 
and complexities, such as the tensions of trying to advocate for social change from within 
government structures and being perceived as ‘too close’ to particular parties or factions that may 
lose power.  
Anyonge et al. (2001), reflecting on their experience of trying to institutionalise effective agro-
forestry extension methods, argue that linking to policy requires consultation across administrative 
levels at all stages of the project, fostering ownership of the process and allowing partners to adapt 
methods. Their account is relatively apolitical: ‘Pilot project findings can be ingrained in policy 
development by involving policy-making bodies in their conceptualisation and implementation with 
a view to influencing their attitudes’ (Anyonge et al. 2001, p.455). However, in practice, this is a 
much more nuanced space, with efforts to break past a ‘pilot’ stage often limited by the inability of 
government officials and project staff to garner high-level political support within relevant agencies 
(Edwards and Hulme 1992). Hartmann and Linn (2008) argue the need for political space—or 
political support—for programs to be successfully scaled. Without careful consideration of how 
political space is created and managed, there are risks that efforts will be undermined by vested 
 34 
interests that see expansion of programs as a threat, or elite capture of programs by powerful actors 
seeking to further entrench their positions.  
Though largely disconnected from the literature on scaling, there is a significant body of research 
that has focused on understanding and improving the capacity of researchers to influence policy 
(e.g., Marshall et al. 2017, Gibbons et al. 2008). In a review of the impact of policy-oriented 
international agricultural research, Walker et al. (2010) suggest researchers often misunderstand the 
processes of policy making and the best way to influence it. There are various models for how 
research may influence policy making, ranging from having a direct influence (knowledge-driven 
and problem-solving models) through to an indirect ‘enlightenment’ model, where science 
supposedly slowly re-shapes dominant ways of thinking and defining problems (public discourse 
and policy responses) over the long term (Weiss 1979). While scaling literature tends to assume or 
imply that provision of information and engaging with (or educating) policy makers will contribute 
to research-informed policy, Spilsbury and Nasi (2006) highlight that policy making is not a process 
based on truth or logic, but rather on consensus, power, and deal-making.  
Scientists often view policy processes as chaotic, especially in developing countries (Young 2005). 
The information needs, timeframes, and values of researchers and policy makers are often very 
different. Spilsbury and Nasi (2006) argue that while scientists are often concerned with scientific 
rigour, accept degrees of uncertainty and ‘failure’ as part of scientific process, and work to long 
time-frames, policy makers require certainty, low risk, and often work to tight timeframes in line 
with election cycles or other political demands. Even where government departments are 
commissioning research to inform policy or programs, they may lack the capacity or support from 
senior bureaucrats to act on research findings (Office of Development Effectiveness 2015).  
The vague descriptor ‘policy maker’ hides a diverse set of actors with various roles in the policy 
process, such as providing policy advice and guidance, drafting policy, or implementing policy 
(Smith 2005). Even where goals are shared between these diverse actors and scientists, their ideas 
on which mechanisms and processes are best to achieve them are likely to be at odds with each 
other (Spilsbury and Nasi 2006).  
Scientists wishing to overcome some of these differences have been urged to properly understand 
and engage in policy processes, which requires significant time, resources, and skills that are often 
not recognised or rewarded in home institutions (Marshall et al. 2017, Adams and Sandbrook 2013). 
This is further complicated in international agricultural research, where there are restrictions on 
foreign (and sometimes domestic) analysis or engagement in policy processes, and where short-
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term project cycles and ‘fly-in-fly-out’ modes of research limit the extent to which policy processes 
can be adequately understood, let alone engaged with.  
 (b) Building capacity. Horton (2002, p.1) defines capacity development as ‘the process by which 
individuals, groups and organizations improve their ability to perform their functions and achieve 
the desired results over time.’ In agricultural research for development, building capacity could 
include working with households to increase their ability to adopt a set of practices through 
knowledge development (e.g., farmer field schools or field days) as well as facilitating access to 
resources (e.g., through subsidies or microfinance programs) (Pretty 2011, Noordin et al. 2001). 
However, in the context of scaling up, it refers more to working with organisations at different 
levels, including local research agencies, government, NGOs, and private-sector organisations, to 
improve understanding of the project practices or principles with the intention that these institutions 
will embed the principles in their day-to-day decisions or programs (Uvin et al. 2000). In terms of 
scaling strategies, building capacity of various actors—researchers, end-users, suppliers, or 
others—supports long-term sustainability by ensuring that the capacity to maintain an intervention 
or practice stays after project funding and support have finished (Clark et al. 2003).  
Conventionally, capacity building has focused on the provision of technical science skills to 
organisations within national agricultural research systems, such as universities or governments. 
However, Hall (2005) argues for a focus on developing innovation capacity, which encompasses 
‘soft skills’ and organisational cultures that foster innovation. To illustrate his case, Hall (2005) 
provides the example of a collaboration between the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute and 
Monsanto. The project was effective in building the scientific skills of Kenyan researchers to 
transfer genetic disease resistance into sweet potato germplasm, but it appeared that the virus 
targeted was not the virus farmers were struggling with. Hall (2005) argues that a focus on building 
skills in innovation, which include developing networks and coordination across actors, could have 
avoided this problem as researchers would have been better connected to the realities of the 
problem as experienced by those confronted with it.  
What developing capacity entails, particularly for innovation capacity, is heavily context-dependent 
and a long-term endeavour (Hall 2005). Horton (2002) suggests capacity development of 
organisations requires a focus on internal organisational conditions (culture, incentives, resourcing) 
as well as external conditions, and must be underpinned by leadership in the organisation. Most 
importantly, he argues that, while ‘outsiders’ can facilitate or promote development, they cannot 
‘lead an organization’s capacity development effort, or take responsibility for it’ (Horton 2002, p.4). 
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However, capacity-building agendas are often defined by external agencies, which can undermine 
rather than develop capacity. Hence Eade (2007) and Kaplan (2000) recommend approaches that 
emphasise partnership, co-learning, and co-development. 
As an example of successful capacity development, Clark et al. (2003) examine the approach taken 
by the NGO, International Development Enterprises, which, in addition to promoting new 
technology, built capacity across supply chains around the technology. To support the use of treadle 
pumps in Bangladesh, International Development Enterprises established a network and provided 
training to manufacturers, installers, and traders, nurturing a market chain that was commercially 
viable. Once local capacity was properly established, the NGO would step back and move on to 
another region (Clark et al. 2003). 
Snapp and Heong (2003) suggest that capacity development is one of the key requirements for 
scaling of participatory processes, but that securing sufficient financial and human resources to 
support the required capacity development is often a key constraint.  
2.2.3 Elements to support successful scaling 
Factors reported to contribute to the success of scaling echo principles of participatory research in 
that they both aim to foster strong relationships, shared vision, and ownership across ‘stakeholders’ 
or actors involved (IIRR 2000, Hartmann and Linn 2008). Some key elements that have been 
identified in the literature include: 
 Ensuring projects reflect the priorities and needs of stakeholders at a range of levels and are 
suitable for the local context (e.g., Anyonge et al. 2001, Blomley and Ramadhani 2006).  
 Focusing on technology or practices that are locally adaptable, relatively simple, and show 
observable benefits relatively quickly (e.g., Millar and Connell 2010, Wambugu et al. 2011). 
 Building strong partnerships and developing networks with a range of stakeholders (e.g., 
Gündel et al. 2001, Basu and Leeuwis 2012).  
 Fostering learning and integration of different knowledge types (e.g., Van Mele 2006, Pretty 
2011). 
 Building the capacity of individuals and organisations in the application of new technology 
(e.g., Wambugu et al. 2011). 
 Providing adequate planning and funding to support continued and expanded work (e.g., 
Gündel et al. 2001, Styger et al. 2011).  
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Many of these elements are difficult to achieve in practice. Styger et al. (2011) demonstrate some of 
these difficulties in their description of introducing, adapting, and attempting to scale out a package 
of rice cropping practices (the System of Rice Intensification, SRI—in itself a controversial 
technology) into selected districts in Timbuktu, Mali. Though relationships at the local level with 
farmers were strong, scale-out efforts were hampered by difficulties in building relationships with 
government extension and research agencies. Without financial resources to pay customary per 
diems to field staff, the ability to nurture successful institutional partnerships at the district level 
depended on the staff and their personal interest in participating. Building effective partnerships 
depends on personalities and institutional cultures, varies significantly between organisations, and 
can be vulnerable to staff turnover (Edwards and Hulme 1992). The difficulties experienced in the 
Mali case were tied to different institutional norms and expectations, such as the difference between 
an agency that expects payment for participation and a small research project with an ideology that 
regarded producing beneficial research outputs as sufficient compensation and which, in any case, 
was financially unable to offer more. Similar complexities are highlighted in other accounts, such as 
that of Wambugu et al. (2011), who found that ‘political interference’ and conflicting policies 
undermined efforts to scale out fodder shrubs in Kenya. Nyangaga et al. (2010) argue that outcomes 
from research projects are realised through partnerships fostered in the process of implementing the 
projects. Identifying ‘good’ partners is therefore critical, but often difficult, especially because of 
connections with politics and political processes.  
2.3 Critical assumptions—bringing in theories of scale and power 
The practical literature on scaling research, discussed above, regards the concept of scale itself as 
obvious and unproblematic. Scale is conventionally understood as extent—the degree to which we 
zoom in or out to a particular level to examine a problem (e.g., local, regional or global). This 
concept provides simple constructs to order and make sense of a complex world and is, perhaps, the 
closest parallel to how scale is conceived in literature on scaling out and up. In this basic sense, 
scale can be understood as a frame, delineating the boundaries or focus for research (Herod 2003). 
Interventions occur at the local scale and efforts to scale up and scale out seek to take a local 
intervention and expand its coverage to larger scales. The concept of scale as extent implicitly 
reinforces the strategies of engaging up the organisational hierarchy (of government, business, or 
other sectors) to gain support and engaging more widely at the local level to boost on-ground 
impact.  
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However, Marston et al. (2005) argue that such hierarchical approaches are particularly prone to 
fixed, apolitical definitions and interpretations of scale—we cannot help but fall into ‘local, 
regional, global’ or ‘micro-meso-macro’ distinctions which obscure how social relations work 
beyond scale. Marston et al. (2005, p.425) propose to discard the notion of ‘scale’ and, in its place, 
they offer a framework that focuses on the creation and dissolution of relations and events. That is, 
analysis is no longer tied to place but to ‘sites’ which are the ‘emergent property of interaction 
between human and non-human inhabitants.’ Scale is then defined by relational and functional 
space (Rocheleau 2008, Zimmerer and Bassett 2003), which is a perspective that has resonance 
with systems-based views of innovation that emphasise networks of actors and interactions as being 
at the heart of how innovation (and scaling) occur.  
Moreover, processes of ‘going to scale’ have largely been viewed uncritically as a pragmatic 
question of technique with insufficient attention to the broader literature on scale dynamics, power, 
and politics (Wigboldus et al. 2016, Hermans et al. 2016). Scale becomes important if we consider 
that most agricultural research in developing countries seeks to adjust some aspect of farming 
systems or natural resource management to improve smallholder livelihoods and contribute to 
broader-scale beneficial change—that is, encourage shifts in allocations of household resources and 
livelihood strategies that have effects across scales. This is reflected in the hierarchical nature of 
impact pathways which outline the links between project activities and progressively higher-level 
changes, defining how the project will have impact (Nyangaga et al. 2010). However, political 
ecology and human geography perspectives shift attention to power and politics around scale, in 
particular, the issue of changing or reinforcing particular power dynamics, such as the ability of 
different actors to participate in collaborative multi-scale endeavours. In the remainder of this 
section, I summarise some of the acknowledged challenges and limitations in the ‘scaling of 
agricultural innovations’ literature and draw on political ecology and human geography to explore 
these issues further.  
The basic objective of taking research to scale is to take something that worked in one location and 
apply it in another so the same benefits can be experienced more widely. There are several 
assumptions underlying this objective: that what works in one place will work similarly in another; 
that what works at one scale will work at another; and that scaling an intervention will likewise 
scale the positive impacts (Menter et al. 2004, Wigboldus et al. 2016, Pitt and Jones 2016). Yet the 
realisation of these assumptions cannot be taken for granted.  
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Wigboldus et al. (2016) argue that the benefits of scale-out, or replication, are limited. Even where 
agro-ecological characteristics may be shared across sites, it is difficult to say with confidence 
whether or in what manner innovations will be incorporated into existing agricultural and social 
systems (Lovell et al. 2002). The appropriateness of a new technology to additional areas is 
dependent on particular historical, political, economic, and social settings (Scoones 2009, Carter 
and Currie-Alder 2006), hence the technology is likely to be re-interpreted by people at a new site. 
As Rigg observes:  
Just because an event, an intervention for example, appeared to lead to a particular 
outcome, this does not mean that ex ante it will do so again. There are many reasons 
for this: the fact that historical moments do not repeat themselves; that small 
changes can have large effects; that causalities are difficult to pin down; and that 
humans are eccentric, their actions sometimes perverse, and their behaviour 
notoriously difficult to model (Rigg 2012, p.82). 
According to Tsing (2012), one of the greatest uncertainties in determining scalability is the 
‘transformative nature of relationships’—you cannot be sure of the outcome where projects depend 
on relationships or interactions between different actors. This can shape how new technologies are 
incorporated into existing systems in both positive and negative ways. For example, in relation to 
productivity impacts, the technologies of the Green Revolution theoretically offered similar benefits 
for small and large landholders (Ruttan 1977). The inequality observed in the spread of Green 
Revolution technology in terms of access, benefits, and costs were not a reflection of the 
technology, Ruttan (1977) argues, but rather of pre-existing patterns of inequality in resource access 
between households, which were strengthened through the roll-out of the technology. In other 
words, the local context, with underlying institutions and causes of social inequity, shaped the 
outcomes of the use of improved seed, favouring the larger farmers or farmers with more fertile 
land (Jarosz 2012). Outcomes of interventions that centre on social processes, such as new 
institutions for natural resource management, are likely to be even more difficult to predict from 
place to place. 
Furthermore, the act of scaling up, of transferring practices or institutions from a local setting to 
higher scales, changes the nature of the innovation. Scaling of locally-derived innovations often 
requires a process of generalisation, defining ‘universal’ principles for widespread adaptation and 
application (Hartmann and Linn 2008). Actors across scale have different values, goals, and 
aspirations: the goals and concerns of a policy maker tasked with water allocation are likely to be 
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quite different to those of a catchment manager or an agricultural water user (Scott 1998). Efforts to 
scale innovations invariably highlight the differences in values across scale. These different values 
and concerns reshape how a problem may be understood and how impacts will be perceived 
(Laborte et al. 2007). What is a desirable pathway for change? What is the desired future state? The 
answers to these questions are contestable, but are often not critically considered in the process of 
defining projects or attempting to take them to scale (Wigboldus and Leeuwis 2013, Wigboldus and 
Brouwers 2016).  
A good example of these issues is where participatory projects and institutions are taken to scale, 
which highlights tensions between top-down and bottom-up processes. In many cases, it is the 
intimate local processes of negotiation and ownership from which a project is shaped and developed 
that contribute to its success. When this is then harnessed by district or national bodies for generic 
application elsewhere—based on the original, local success—it may well detract from the principles 
which made it a success in the first place. Reflecting on efforts to expand community-based natural 
resource management schemes, Sachedina (2010) found that, as NGO activities scaled up and 
became more aligned to, and dependent on, government support, the community-based processes 
that fostered local legitimacy and ownership were undermined or non-existent. In this example, the 
loss of local value stems from a process of integrating values and priorities with higher-level actors 
(regional governments) whose values and goals were at times in outright conflict with the original 
mandate of the NGO. 
In other words, scaling up does not simply imply a steady increase in benefits, but can significantly 
reshape the nature of an innovation and its impacts. Furthermore, the expansion of community-
based programs by government in a top-down process (that is, taking what worked in one 
community and scaling it through government programs to others) is also likely to fail because local 
communities may not have the institutions in place, such as local governance arrangements, or the 
equitable intra-group relations that the original program assumed (Afroz et al. 2016). The changes 
associated with transferral of projects or principles to higher levels and the expanding set of actors 
and organisations involved may erode ‘fundamental underlying principles’ of the initial innovation 
(Hermans et al. 2016). 
As interventions are scaled, the nature of benefits also changes. In agricultural research, the 
assessment of initial project success is often focused at the level of intervention, such as the farm or 
household level, and particularly on those who have ‘adopted’. This obscures differential impacts, 
positive or negative, that emerge at a higher level as a greater number of households begin to apply 
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new practices (Harrington et al. 2001). For example, while the use of high-yielding varieties was 
found to be beneficial for those who were quick to use them, it triggered a drop in output prices due 
to increased supply, effectively forcing other farmers to adopt just to keep up, with little prospect of 
economic gain—‘the treadmill effect’ (Sunding and Zilberman 2001, Hartmann 2012). Cumulative 
effects may also be positive—for example, widespread adoption of soil conservation practices by 
farm households in an upper watershed can have beneficial impacts on downstream populations 
(Newby and Cramb 2011). 
Issues of power and politics are entangled throughout this literature, though they are rarely 
adequately considered (Wigboldus and Brouwers 2016). Engagement in dialogue and learning 
through multi-stakeholder partnerships is a recurring theme, a mechanism to engage diverse actors 
in a vision of change and to leverage support to foster that change. In the context of scaling up 
participatory governance arrangements, Nelson et al. (2009) and Carter and Currie-Alder (2006) 
argue for scaling of local knowledge as a way of making government more accountable and 
responsive to local needs. There is limited examination of the barriers to achieving this, however, 
nor of how local politics and powerful actors shape what is and is not scaled up (Biggs 2007). 
Rather, it is assumed that, by engaging with a range of ‘stakeholders’ and involving them in the 
process, successful scale-up will occur.  
In reality, complex and often opaque processes of policy and program design and implementation 
mean the mechanisms in which research findings can inform policy development are poorly 
understood and haphazard (Spilsbury and Nasi 2006). The use of brokers and facilitators, or 
‘boundary objects’ such as visioning, are mechanisms to guide and generate a shared understanding 
(Klerkx et al. 2010). However, when strategies for taking research to scale involve aligning with 
‘powerful patrons’, trade-offs and compromises can result which change the core elements of the 
initial innovation (Hermans et al. 2016). While a degree of compromise in collaborative 
partnerships and multi-stakeholder forums is to be expected in seeking a shared vision, powerful 
actors are more likely to dominate.  
Wigboldus et al. (2016) argue the literature on scaling has been limited by a linear focus on 
dissemination and adoption and has focused on the attributes of technology rather than the process. 
Simple understandings of taking research to scale as part of a linear transfer of knowledge, as is 
common in donor requirements of projects, mask an unpredictable, political process of social 
change. These processes do not match neatly to three- or five-year research projects, nor do they 
cease with the end of a project (Valters 2014). Yet in agricultural research for development it is rare 
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for researchers to have the opportunity to return to old project sites and understand the real impact 
of their work, or to have the opportunity to understand how expected impacts have, or have not, 
come to pass.  
2.4 Summary and conclusion  
There is significant pressure on research organisations to demonstrate benefits from their research 
in terms of poverty alleviation, food security, equity, and environmental sustainability. Concern for 
ensuring research impact, especially in complex contexts, has encouraged systems-based 
approaches to agricultural research that engage a wide range of actors in research, and an attention 
to the policy and institutional frameworks that can constrain or discourage use of new technology. 
This brings a concern for scaling of research into the research planning process rather than being a 
separate concern for extension systems. Strategies to support scaling, such as expansion of project 
activities, policy engagement, or capacity building, involve complex processes such as relationship 
building and navigation of different values, which are unsuited to short-term project timeframes or 
the skill-sets of many researchers.  
Framed as a moral imperative, there has been limited discussion and critical reflection in the 
agricultural-research-for-development literature on the assumptions inherent in the process to take a 
project to scale, such as tensions between balancing the needs and values of interested actors across 
administrative levels, or the role of politics in influencing what is or is not scaled. Yet these 
assumptions have a significant impact on how researchers plan for, implement, and report on 
strategies for scaling. In the next chapter I outline an analytical framework and the methods used to 
explore these assumptions in the three case studies.  
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3 Research framework and methods 
In Chapter 2, I analysed the challenge of expanding the impact of agricultural research in 
development contexts and reviewed theoretical and strategic approaches to this challenge. While 
theories of innovation based on both a linear transfer-of-technology and agricultural innovation 
systems (AIS) grapple with the challenge of taking research to scale, an AIS view more adequately 
recognises the influence and contribution of multiple actors and interests and the role of institutions 
in shaping how scaling can occur. The review of strategies highlighted the multiple and intersecting 
pathways projects rely on to support expansion of impacts, such as dissemination of information 
through local networks, fostering learning and capacity building among key groups, engaging with 
policy makers, and collaborating with the private sector. In the review I argued that a critical 
reflection on some of our assumptions about how scaling happens, and the influence of different 
actors, contexts, and power imbalances, tends to be missing in the literature and discourse on 
scaling and impact.  
In this chapter, I describe the theoretical framework and methods used to answer the research 
questions outlined in Chapter 1. I begin by reflecting on my role as an ‘insider-researcher’. I then 
discuss three analytical approaches that guided the research—political ecology, agricultural 
innovation systems, and actor-oriented theory. In the main part of the chapter I outline the research 
design and describe the methods used in data collection and analysis. I used a multiple case-study 
design. Each of the three cases highlights a different pathway or mechanism used to scale research 
outcomes as well as different country contexts: (1) Building capacity of in-country researchers and 
infrastructure was explored through a case study of improving rice varieties in Laos from 1990. (2) 
Public-private sector collaboration was explored through a study of mechanisation in rice farming 
in Thailand from the 1960s. (3) Engaging with policy makers and government departments was 
explored through a case study of improving production and management of Bali cattle in eastern 
Indonesia from 2000. The case studies drew on documentary analysis and interviews with 
researchers, policy makers, and intended beneficiaries to examine the processes of taking research 
to scale. Finally, I reflect on the challenges in implementing the research as planned.  
3.1 Researcher background  
The motivation for undertaking this research was driven by experience in several international 
agricultural research projects in my role as a research officer at the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). CSIRO is an applied research agency and, as with many 
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other publicly-funded research organisations, it places a significant emphasis on demonstrating 
‘real-world’ benefits of research (CSIRO 2017). The projects I worked on emphasised a discourse 
of local impact, scale-out, and scale-up. From my perspective, there was genuine personal 
commitment by researchers to improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers (well beyond 
academic achievement), alongside the requirement of donors for large-scale impact which focused 
on the adoption of technology. Between donor requirements and researcher commitment to have a 
positive impact, there was limited room within the project to critically examine the connection 
between activities at the local level and broader development transitions. Throughout the course of 
my candidature I continued to work as a researcher in many of these projects. While my work at 
CSIRO aimed to contribute to scale-out and scale-up, my PhD research was seeking critical 
reflection on the process.  
Over the course of a seven-year (part-time) PhD, it was possible to observe significant changes 
within CSIRO and Australian funding agencies in how impact was discussed, defined, and 
measured—expanding to embrace theories of change and impact pathways. I was involved in 
several projects that sought to contribute to a framework for how CSIRO could create better links 
between its research and the impacts and outcomes of that research. My work in this area has been 
influenced by, and has influenced, the thinking in my PhD research.  
Two of the three case studies had strong links to my work at CSIRO. I worked as a social scientist 
on two CSIRO projects in the Indonesian case,4 and as a team member on a recently completed 
adoption study (for which data and interviews are included in this thesis, see below). In the Laos 
case study, though I had no direct relationship to the Lao-IRRI work, I met a number of key 
informants who supported my research through a CSIRO-led climate adaptation project.5 
My ‘insider perspective’ in the Indonesian case and my connections to other key informants 
brought both advantages and constraints to the research. I have no doubt these relationships have 
facilitated my access to information and research participants. In the Indonesian case in particular, I 
know many of my interviewees well, facilitating a more relaxed and open interview. However, as a 
member of the community I am studying, I am also to some degree ‘socially bound’ to the field (in 
                                               
4 SMAR/2009/096: Scaling up herd management strategies in crop-livestock systems in Lombok and 
SMAR/2009/061: Building capacity in the knowledge and adoption of Bali cattle improvement technology 
in South Sulawesi, both funded by the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) 
via the Smallholder Agribusiness Development Initiative (SADI). 
5 LWR/2008/019: Developing multi-scale adaptation strategies for farming communities in Cambodia, Laos, 
Bangladesh and India, funded by ACIAR, 2010–2015. 
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this case, to my colleagues and research partners) (Mosse 2006). Strategies to deal with some of the 
potential tensions are discussed in Section 3.3.  
3.2 Analytical perspectives  
In attempting to understand the processes and impacts of taking research to scale, I drew on three 
complementary frameworks: AIS, political ecology, and actor-oriented perspectives. The 
approaches share a focus on the interplay of agency and structure and how these influence processes 
of social change at different scales, but vary somewhat in the emphasis they bring. I briefly discuss 
each in turn before outlining the theoretical framework that has guided this research.  
3.2.1 Frameworks informing the research 
AIS provides a broad framework for understanding how new technology and practices are 
incorporated into daily life and thus the requirements of a ‘healthy’ innovation system (Hall et al. 
2010). As outlined in Chapter 2, it broadens our focus from linear transfer-of-technology models 
which focus on researchers, extension workers, and farmers as key actors, to much larger, 
interconnected networks, including input suppliers, traders, and processers, and their role in 
mediating agricultural change (Hellin and Camacho 2017). In doing so, AIS draws attention to the 
social aspects of innovation and the institutions and behaviours that moderate social change, rather 
than focusing on agricultural innovation solely as a technical problem (Clark 2002). Key concepts 
in applying AIS include an understanding of actors, roles and relationships, institutions (i.e., norms 
and established behaviours), and how these shape innovation processes and institutional learning 
(Hall et al. 2006b, Chapter 2). 
A political ecology perspective helps to bring both power and cross-scale dynamics to the forefront 
of analysis, addressing key limitations or potential weaknesses in approaches such as AIS, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Political ecology examines linked processes of social and environmental 
change, with explicit attention to issues of power, politics, and cross-scale interactions (Robbins 
2012). It places local change within a broader context, tracing relationships and influence across 
scales and the interplay between structure and agency (Rocheleau and Roth 2007). Political ecology 
approaches encourage interrogation of key assumptions. That is, by making explicit some of the 
structures and power dynamics that influence processes of change, it challenges otherwise accepted 
assumptions about how change happens.  
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Early studies in political ecology examined the causes and consequences of environmental 
degradation, highlighting that decisions made by land users are tied to the decisions of other, often 
more powerful actors, such as landlords or governments at higher scales (Blaikie and Brookfield 
1987). Considering environmental change, political ecologists ask who wins, who loses, and why, 
tracing cause and effect over time and space (Robbins 2012). In agriculture, political ecology 
approaches have highlighted inequalities and conflicts across global food systems (Hall 2015). For 
this thesis, it provides guidance on understanding the implications of change in agricultural 
production systems for different actors. For example, McCann (2011) traces the evolution in 
practices for cereal seed selection in Africa from farmer-selection and early international seed trade 
through to alliances of global private companies. McCann’s study highlights the role of modern 
seed development in drawing farmers into global networks of finance and marketing, and draws 
attention to the risks farmers bear due to the flawed assumptions of international actors, such as that 
stable nation-states are in place that can maintain new seed development and distribution processes.  
An actor-oriented approach to understanding processes of scaling allows us to consider the 
‘complex conjunction of people and events’ that explain the outcomes of a particular intervention, 
beyond the features of the technology or the intervention methodologies used (Cramb 2000b, p.12). 
The approach, promoted and outlined at length in the work of Norman Long (2001), emerged out of 
frustration with approaches to development theory that were ‘people-less’—fixed on drivers and 
context without seeking to understand the ‘self-organising practices of those inhabiting, 
experiencing and transforming the contours and details of the social landscape’ (Long 2001, p.1). In 
other words, it is an approach that seeks to examine the relationships of different actors, their 
agency and strategies, the structures and institutions that shape their actions, and how the interplay 
of these shapes the outcomes of social change.  
‘Actor’ here does not necessarily imply an individual. It is used broadly to refer to anything from an 
individual to a national government or multi-national corporation—an entity that plays a role in 
processes of social change. Long (2001) is careful to remind us that these entities are likely to be 
made up of individuals with diverse views and interests, and caution should be taken to avoid 
assuming that goals, values, and views are shared. In this thesis, international research projects can 
be viewed as an ‘arena’ in Long’s framework—‘social locations or situations in which contests over 
issues, resources, values and representations take place’ (Long 2001, p.59). These projects, 
especially those described in Chapters 4 and 6, bring diverse sets of actors together, ostensibly with 
the same goal. By studying the interactions and connections between different actors (the 
‘interface’) we can begin to build a picture of how negotiations between actors regarding different 
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opinions and worldviews, knowledge, and power dynamics shape the outcomes of planned 
interventions (Long 2001). For example, in using actor-oriented tools to analyse agricultural 
innovation systems in Bangladesh, Matsaert et al. (2005) found the approach allowed for a multi-
scale understanding of dynamics between local and national actors, allowed different interests and 
power dynamics to be highlighted, and built on indigenous understandings of the system.  
3.2.2 Themes of analysis 
Drawing on the theories outlined above and the literature discussed in Chapter 2, the following 
themes or areas of inquiry were defined. These themes were used to provide a consistent framework 
for analysing the case studies, but with sufficient flexibility to reveal and interrogate features or 
events that were particular to each case. As each case study was compiled, themes were refined 
based on new insights.  
(a) History and context. Though the cases were centred on ‘projects’ or planned interventions, to 
view the projects as defined activities, removed from the broader history of events, would discount 
the wider set of factors that shape how interventions play out. As Long (2001, p.32) writes:  
… conceptualising intervention as a discrete and clearly localised activity obscures 
the theoretically important point that intervention never is a ‘project’ with sharp 
boundaries in time and space as defined by the institutional apparatus of the state or 
implementing agency. Interventions are always part of a chain or flow of events 
located within the broader framework of the activities of the state and/or 
international bodies, and the actions of different interest groups operative in civil 
society. 
The intent here was not to be deterministic: an intervention may have different outcomes, even in 
places with similar histories and cultural structures, and this is evidence of the different ways in 
which people contend with or react to a given situation (Long 2015). Rather, allowing for history 
and context was about understanding how the past experiences and legacy of individuals, 
organisations, and the technology or science itself shaped reactions and responses to a given 
intervention. 
Key lines of inquiry under this theme included: What series of events or conditions contributed to 
the development of the project or innovation in the case study? What histories and contexts did the 
actors (e.g., households, bureaucrats, researchers) bring to an intervention? How did this influence 
the meanings they attributed to a given intervention and, in particular, efforts to take it to scale?  
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(b) Key actors, roles, relationships, and connections and how they evolve. A range of actors are 
involved in any agricultural research project—national and international researchers, funders, 
companies, farmers, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs—and each of these actors plays a number of roles in 
defining scope, imagining desirable outcomes, determining appropriate or acceptable methods to 
achieve goals, and accepting, reshaping, or challenging the views of others. The connections and 
alliances between actors influence how interventions unfold over time. Actors hold diverse views 
and values, and projects (as arenas) become sites of negotiation as actors pursue ‘their own short- 
and long-term objectives and strategies, manoeuvre, negotiate, organise, cooperate, participate, 
coerce, obstruct, form coalitions, adopt, adapt [and] reject’ (Cramb 2000b, p.12).  
The case studies identified key actors, their ‘role’ in the scaling process, how they related to each 
other, and, as far as possible, their motivations, values, and goals. The questions asked included: 
What kind of agency did they demonstrate in effecting change or maintaining the status quo? What 
kind of challenges did they face? How did their values, aspirations, and agendas influence the 
process and impact of scaling agricultural technology? What kinds of connections and relationships 
existed between actors, and how were these networks mobilised to support processes of change?  
(c) Strategies (formal and informal) for taking research to scale and their impacts. Chapter 2 
outlined a number of commonly advocated strategies to support taking research to scale, such as 
partnership with the private sector or close collaboration with farmers to act as local champions. 
The literature also highlighted the tendency for these strategies to be portrayed in relatively 
simplistic terms, without due consideration of the agency of different actors to change, confound, 
and/or promote scaling efforts.  
As part of the case studies, formal (planned) and informal (or opportunistic) strategies for scaling 
research outcomes were documented. The questions asked within this theme were: Which actors 
were involved in the scaling process and how? Who was excluded or kept on the periphery? Which 
key actors, events, or actions influenced the scaling process and in what way?  
(d) The dynamics of structure and agency. Both political ecology and actor-oriented approaches 
give careful attention to the agency of actors to evaluate, challenge, strategise, and engage with 
broader structures that influence their actions. In particular, these approaches recognise the agency 
of ‘local’ actors in challenging imposed or assumed structures (Long 2001). In the context of the 
case studies, a consideration of structure and agency was taken to emphasise that ‘participants’ in 
agricultural research projects (such as farmers, local researchers, and government officers) are not 
 49 
passive recipients of information. The agency of these actors in challenging dominant structures, or 
in aiding, supporting, derailing, or tolerating scaling efforts, influences outcomes.  
Analysis in each case considered whether and how the agency of different actors had affected 
scaling outcomes. Likewise, it considered how prevailing institutions shaped the ways actors 
responded to new information; how the process of taking research to scale and its impacts (if any) 
had been experienced by different actors; and instances of adaptation and reshaping of innovations.  
(e) Power and knowledge. Concern for power dynamics underpins each of the preceding themes, 
but it is separated here to make it explicit. Power to make decisions, to frame problems and their 
solutions, and to accept or reject new knowledge is held and expressed in different ways by 
different actors, and changes over time. The case studies explored how different actors used power, 
and how differences in opinion, contestation, and conflict were managed as part of scaling efforts. 
(f) Scale and networks. Debates in human geography have drawn attention to the construction of 
scale as a social process that involves the expression of power (Delaney and Leitner 1997, Marston 
et al. 2005). These debates have informed a rethinking of scale in political ecology where scale is 
not so much defined by geography or location but by relational and functional space (Rocheleau 
2008, Neumann 2009). In relational or network alternatives to scale, the ‘scale’ of analysis emerges 
out of the interactions and relationships between different actors (Marston et al. 2005). As such, 
they give priority to the power relationships that create entities across space (Jonas 2011). By 
emphasising the relationships and interactions that contribute to a particular event, analysis is 
explicitly separated from geographic space and therefore removed from implied hierarchies of 
dominance and subordination (Rocheleau and Roth 2007). This provides a way of understanding 
relations spread over space, such as a rural household with a member who has migrated and is thus 
removed from ‘local’ space, though they continue to be connected and contribute to the security of 
the household and community through remittances (Rigg 2007). The concept of scale I used in the 
case studies followed Rocheleau and Roth (2007), that is, it was defined in terms of relations and 
networks. This is consistent with Long’s (2001) discussion on the arena and interface, where the 
focus of analysis is defined by interactions (and disconnection) rather than geographical space. 
3.3 Research design 
The research sought to understand complex and evolving phenomena. Any development 
intervention or research project sits within a social arena characterised by multiple actors and 
institutions with competing values and perspectives and subject to ongoing change. Case-study 
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research allows for deep exploration of phenomena within particular contexts and for a rich 
description and exploration of events, processes, and impacts (Yin 2009). Case studies also allow 
for different perspectives and values to be made explicit and explored through the research process 
(Stake 1995).  
Stake (1998) describes two different motivations for case-study research: instrumental, where cases 
are explored to provide general understanding and case selection is driven by our anticipation that it 
will contribute to this understanding; and intrinsic, where the case represents a specific problem of 
interest and the aim is to understand that specific case. Rather than articulating these as exclusive 
aims, Stake suggests ‘there is no line distinguishing intrinsic case study from instrumental, rather a 
zone of combined purpose separates them’ (Stake 1998, p.88). The case studies within this research 
sit very much within this ‘zone of combined purpose.’  
Individually, the case studies on improved rice varieties, cattle management, and mechanisation are 
of intrinsic interest. Each provides the opportunity to understand the phenomenon of expanding the 
scale of research from a different perspective; each is linked by various projects of agricultural 
‘modernisation’ and development. Collectively, they hold value in providing insight into 
agricultural change and the process of expanding impact. The case studies were used to identify and 
examine interactions and relationships and distil insights. By using a similar approach across the 
three cases it was possible to generalise to theory—in this instance, theories of scaling and 
agricultural development (Yin 2009). It was not the aim, nor would it be appropriate, to use the case 
studies for statistical generalisation, but rather to contribute to a critical reflection on the theory and 
practice of scaling agricultural research for development. 
3.3.1 Case study selection 
According to Flyvberg (2011, p.301), the definitive action in case-study research is deciding on the 
case and its boundary: defining what is to be studied and the limits of that study. Three cases were 
selected for this research, informed by initial desktop review and consultation with supervisors and 
experts with a close association and knowledge of agricultural research projects in Southeast Asia. 
Cases were selected to contrast different social and political systems; different types of technology; 
different degrees of ‘success’; and different mechanisms for scaling. Selection also considered the 
pragmatics of access to data and information. The case studies struck a balance between drawing on 
my own experience and extending my knowledge to new areas.  
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3.3.2 Overview of cases 
Given the focus on research projects and their efforts to increase the impact of research, two out of 
three of the cases were chosen to focus on research-driven innovation, or innovation which started 
with a research project led by research organisations. The third case, mechanisation in Thailand, 
provides a contrast as, although research actors were involved, there was not a project per se at the 
centre of innovation efforts. The three case studies were as follows.  
(a) The development and spread of improved rice varieties in Laos (Chapter 4). This case 
focused on the Lao-IRRI Rice Research and Training Program (referred to in the thesis as the Lao-
IRRI Project), which was a 15-year, international partnership to support Laos to become self-
sufficient in rice production at the national level. It is widely considered to have been highly 
successful, with development and dissemination fostered by strong international collaborations and 
strengthening of research capacity within Laos. The program officially finished in 2005, providing 
an opportunity to explore impacts almost 10 years after its completion. The case also had a distinct 
political context, with the program operating in a strongly-centralised, single-party state. The case 
provided insights into scale-up through public-sector capacity building, and scale-out through a 
combination of international projects and local practices for seed exchange—the challenges of 
which are discussed in depth in the case.  
(b) Mechanisation of rice farming in Thailand (Chapter 5). While the Thai Government tried for 
many decades to introduce farm machinery, ultimately mechanisation was achieved through 
interactions between farmers, small engineering workshops, and researchers. This case examined 
the development, adaptation, and widespread adoption of small-scale machinery in lowland rice 
production areas of Thailand. The case provided insight into the role of the private sector in driving 
adaptation and scale-out of machinery as an early example of informal public-private sector 
partnership.  
(c) Improved animal management practices for Bali cattle in eastern Indonesia (Chapter 6). 
This case study focused on a series of projects in eastern Indonesia between 1999 and 2012. The 
final set of projects had an explicit aim to embed simple cattle and forage management practices in 
government policy and to disseminate information to farmers. This case thus provided the 
opportunity to examine processes of scaling up through policy engagement and scaling out through 
farmer-to-farmer communication backed up by project-employed extension support. 
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Each case study shared the same general approach and methods, though the Thai case was based on 
a desktop review rather than fieldwork and primary data collection. Originally, this case was 
envisaged to focus on the spread of agricultural machinery in Laos, particularly two-wheeled 
tractors and seeders, but documentation of this process was sparse, making it challenging to develop 
the case within time and resource constraints. Early interviews in Laos indicated that many farmers 
were buying imported machines from Thailand, so I decided to focus the case instead on Thailand, 
which now is the source of machinery for many farmers across Southeast Asia. Due to the historical 
nature of the case and the availability of reports and other secondary data, a desktop study was 
deemed appropriate.  
3.4 Data collection and analysis 
Data to build the case studies were drawn from multiple sources, which allowed for comparison of 
different perspectives. Written accounts of the processes and key events for each case were sought 
from unpublished documents (project reports, field reports, discussion papers); published papers 
and reviews (journal papers; evaluation reports); and informal sources (e.g., newspapers, websites). 
The approach to finding and accessing documents involved extensive internet and database 
searches, as well as referrals and sharing of reports by experts and interviewees. Documents were 
stored, annotated, and re-analysed as the body of evidence was built and new themes and areas of 
interest emerged.  
For the Lao and Indonesian case studies, documentary analysis was complemented by interviews 
and small group discussions with key actors who had been involved with the project(s) (Table 3.1). 
As noted above, the mechanisation case was based on a desktop review. Interviews allowed for 
perspectives to be captured that may otherwise have remained hidden by looking only at official 
accounts in reports and public documents (Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori 2011). At the same time, 
interviews are not neutral spaces for data collection. As Alvesson (quoted in Diefenbach 2009, 
p.880) notes, ‘[interviewees follow] cultural scripts about how one should normally express oneself 
on particular topics ... [The interview is] better viewed as the scene for a social interaction rather 
than a simple tool for the collection of “data”.’ Though difficult to manage, Diefenbach (2009) 
suggests tactical answering can also provide important data as it gives evidence of the dominant 
ideology and thinking.  
As stated earlier, for the Indonesian case, I knew many of the interviewees from my time as a 
researcher on the final set of projects. In the Lao case, I knew one or two of my interviewees 
through a different project, not related to the Lao-IRRI Project. This provided me with the 
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opportunity to discuss issues with participants that I would not otherwise get to raise, due to a pre-
existing degree of trust. However, it also presented a risk that participants felt they were unable to 
decline involvement, either through a sense of obligation to me (or where I was not known to the 
interviewee, obligation to the person who had put us in contact) or perceiving that the PhD research 
was somehow part of the project and they were bound to participate.  
Table 3.1 Interviews and small group discussions conducted  
Method Case Study 
 Improved rice varieties, Laos Cattle and forage management, 
Indonesia  
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
28 Interviews 22 Interviews 
20 with farmers and district officials in 
Outhoumphone and Champhone 
Districts of Savannakhet.  
7 with current Lao researchers and 
government officials who had been 
involved as researchers in the Lao-
IRRI Project. 
1 with an international researcher who 
had been part of the Lao-IRRI Project 
team. 
8 with farmers in Central Lombok. 
2 with Indonesian researchers who had 
been team members in multiple 
projects in the case. 
6 with Indonesian Government 
officials who had been involved in the 
policy stakeholder group. 
5 with Australian researchers from 
CSIRO (4) and the University of 
Queensland (UQ) (1) who had been 
team members in one or more projects 
in the case. 
1 with a former Australian government 
official who had been involved in the 
design and funding of parts of the 
research.  
 
 
 
 
 
Small group 
discussions 
2 Discussions (involving 6 
individuals) 
2 Discussions (involving 12 
individuals) 
6 current Lao researchers and 
government officials who had been 
involved as researchers in the Lao-
IRRI Project 
5 Indonesian researchers who were 
part of the Lombok project team 
7 Indonesian field staff who were part 
of the Lombok project team 
 
 
Note: For interviews, totals reflect the number of respondents. However, some interviewees 
participated in follow-up interviews or email discussions. Two Indonesian interviewees also 
participated in the group discussion and are included in both tallies.  
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Before each interview or group discussion, the aims of the research, how information would be 
used, and participation were discussed with participants. Depending on the context, existing 
relationship, and language, consent was recorded either by the interviewee themselves in written 
form or via verbal consent (Appendix 10.2). With participants who did not speak English, my 
ability to communicate this information relied on a translator. Interviews were wide-ranging and 
questions were modified to suit the participant’s involvement in the project. An example of the 
interview schedule is provided in Appendix 10.3. More detail is provided for each case below.  
Detailed research notes were made during interviews and field visits. With interviewee permission, 
some interviews were recorded and later transcribed to aid analysis. After field visits or interviews, 
I made further notes to record descriptions of events and processes, personal interpretations and 
reflections, and thoughts on methods and planning (Altrichter and Holly 2005). To allow for 
anonymous reporting of data obtained from interviews, each interviewee was assigned a number. 
Where data or direct quotes from interviews are used in the thesis, reference is made to ‘Interview 
X’, where ‘X’ indicates the interview code. 
Where participants had reasonable fluency in English, they were offered the opportunity either to 
comment on a presentation of early results or to look over parts of the thesis in which data from 
their interviews were used, as a way of ensuring their views were being represented fairly. Such 
opportunities may help but not completely remove the risks relating to conflicting perspectives and 
representations (Mosse 2006). Particularly in the Indonesian case, I was sensitive to the potential 
for this work to create tension among former team members. One interviewee disagreed with the 
interpretation of certain events as outlined in an early draft of Chapter 6. With the interviewee’s 
consent, their points have been added to the thesis as data, to give a more balanced voice to the 
different perspectives within the team.  
Interview data (notes and transcripts) and other documentation were analysed against the themes 
outlined in Section 3.2. I took a grounded approach, refining and adding to the themes as different 
patterns or insights emerged from the data. The following sections provide more detail of the 
primary data collection process in Laos and Indonesia.  
3.4.1 Primary data collection in Laos  
Interviews with former Lao-IRRI Project staff, many of whom now held roles in government 
departments and research agencies, covered their reflections on the Lao-IRRI Project and, in 
particular, the processes and mechanisms through which it had been scaled out to farmers and 
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scaled up to influence current government policy. Towards the end of the interview, participants 
were also asked to consider the processes of scaling since the Lao-IRRI Project formally ceased, 
and current challenges in agricultural research in Laos. Questions were adapted slightly to have 
varying emphasis on policy, research, or implementation, depending on the interviewee’s role and 
expertise. Interviews were conducted in English (all interviewees had good levels of spoken 
English) and detailed notes were made during and immediately after the interviews. One discussion 
was recorded with the permission of the interviewee. It was decided not to record other interviews 
to facilitate a more comfortable environment for participants.  
Interviews sought to capture interviewees’ experiences and views of the project and their reflections 
on the processes and impacts. Participants would often re-interpret questions to reflect the stories 
they wanted to tell and felt were important to an understanding of the topic. For example, an 
opening question: ‘Can you tell me about your role in the program?’ was reframed by several 
interviewees, who felt it was important to understand the program in the broader political context of 
the country before discussing their role or the specifics of the program.  
Interviews with farmers were held in four villages in Savannakhet Province. Savannakhet has 
extensive lowland areas used for agriculture and is a major contributor to national rice production, 
especially the districts of Outhoumphone and Champhone. With large areas of both irrigated and 
rainfed rice production, it was also a key province for the Lao-IRRI Project. Working in 
Savannakhet enabled alignment with CSIRO project sites and therefore facilitated access to the 
field through established and trusted relationships with district and provincial staff. Villages were 
chosen in consultation with provincial and district officers and sought to cover a range of 
characteristics, such as exposure to international research projects, accessibility, and agro-
ecological conditions. Of the four villages, three (Villages 1, 2, and 4) were chosen due to their long 
history of involvement with international agricultural research projects (Table 3.2). Village 1 was 
part of the original Lao-IRRI Project and also involved with subsequent projects that aimed to build 
on this work in rice production. Village 4, in Champhone District, also had irrigation, which 
allowed for comparison of different conditions. All villages except for Village 3 had good 
relationships with Provincial and District Agriculture and Forestry Offices (PAFO and DAFO) and 
good access by road. Village 3 was included for comparison as it was comparatively remote 
(though still reasonably close to the provincial capital) and had less exposure to international 
agricultural research projects.  
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The aim of the farmer interviews was to capture changes in practices and technology at the 
household level from the farmer’s perspective (as opposed to experts and researchers). They 
explored why and how changes had occurred, the kinds of decision-making processes that 
underpinned them, and the perceived benefits and constraints of the changes.  
Interviews in Laos were conducted over two periods. Interviews with former project staff in 
Vientiane and Savannakhet were undertaken in December 2013. One interview was held in 
Brisbane in September 2014. Interviews with farmers in Savannakhet and one Lao researcher were 
held in October 2014. 
A female Lao researcher was employed to support the interviews with farmers. Further support was 
also provided by a male Lao Masters student who was connected to the PAFO and involved with 
CSIRO research projects. Initially, we had planned to do individual interviews with farmers. 
However, in many cases, small groups were waiting for us on arrival at the village, so interviews 
were conducted with small groups of two or three to reduce the burden of time on the farmers. A 
debrief with research assistants was conducted after each session to go through the results. Some 
summary notes in English were also provided by the female research assistant, which we went 
through together and added to from my own observations and notes. Though they yielded valuable 
insights, the process of talking to farmers in Laos about their perspectives on technical change and 
innovation was significantly different to what had been originally planned. This is discussed below 
in reflections and limitations.  
Table 3.2 Village characteristics and farmer interviews, October 2014 
 District Research 
involvement 
Access Rice 
system 
No. of 
farmers 
interviewed 
Village 1 Outhoumphone High exposure and 
participation in 
research.  
Sealed road access 
from provincial 
centre. 
Rainfed  
 
4 
Village 2 Outhoumphone High exposure and 
participation in 
research. 
Sealed road access 
from provincial 
centre. 
Rainfed 7 
Village 3 Outhoumphone Low exposure and 
participation in 
research. 
Most remote of four 
villages. Dirt road 
access. Inaccessible 
during wet season. 
Rainfed 
 
4 
Village 4 Champhone High exposure and Reasonable access Irrigated 4 
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participation in 
research.  
(dirt road, but more 
accessible than 
village 3).  
3.4.2 Primary data collection in Indonesia  
The Indonesian case study was initially planned mostly as a desktop review with a small number of 
interviews with former Australian team members.6 A key limitation initially was not having any 
data on how processes had unfolded since the projects were officially completed. In late 2016, a 
CSIRO colleague and I were successful in applying for a modest amount of ACIAR funding to 
conduct a follow-up ‘Adoption Study’ in Lombok to gauge the extent of ongoing use of practices, 
reasons for non- or dis-adoption, and impacts. This provided a good opportunity to return to one of 
the former project sites and deepen the case study.  
The scope of the Adoption Study was narrower than the PhD case study. My team members were 
generous in allowing me to take the lead in designing interview guides and adding additional 
interviews and questions for this study to explore the questions of my PhD. My involvement 
deepened the analysis that would have been possible in a typical ACIAR study of this kind.7 
Interviews with government officials, former project staff, and farmers followed much the same 
topics as in the Lao study. However, with regard to the farmer-participants in Indonesia, we were 
able to follow up with many of the same farmers who had been involved directly in the research 
projects.  
For interviews and group discussions conducted in Indonesia as part of the Adoption Study, my 
CSIRO colleague and I undertook interviews with the support of a translator and a research officer 
from the University of Mataram (UNRAM) who had worked on the original project. The research 
officer had a position of trust with the farmers and provided technical expertise in terms of 
understanding the practices that had been researched and potentially adopted. He was able to 
interpret the unwritten cultural script that we (my colleague and I) were not able to see, and 
provided expert insight into the dynamics of changing practices at the farmer level.  
                                               
6 This initial review was supported by the CSIRO-funded project: Developing a framework for scientific 
enquiry on determinants of agricultural innovation to support impact choices and strategy. 
7 Funding for adoption studies primarily covers operational costs. Labour is an in-kind contribution, and thus 
adoption studies typically only involve one researcher, usually the former project leader. 
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3.4.3 Reflections on farmer interviews  
Before undertaking interviews in-country, I had read several reflections from PhD candidates and 
experienced researchers who shared their challenges in gaining access to ‘the field’, navigating 
complex foreign cultural scripts, and benefiting from the generosity of the colleagues who had been 
their guides and translators (Michaud 2010, Turner 2010). With my existing experience in 
fieldwork through CSIRO, I felt prepared for these kinds of challenges; alongside my overseas and 
Australian colleagues, I had designed and supported several rounds of farmer interviews and group 
discussions over several years. This experience blinded me to the stark difference between being in 
a team, supported by colleagues with whom I had built trust and understanding over many years, 
and being a student, attempting to build rapport with a new research assistant in a drastically 
unrealistic timeframe, as was my experience in Laos. 
In Laos, the biggest lesson for me in terms of research design was the awareness, not only of the 
‘cultural script’ of the interviewee, as Alvesson (in Diefenbach 2009) describes it, but also the 
norms and expectations surrounding how to arrange and conduct interviews. There were vast 
differences between my original plans and the realities of what was possible or expected in the 
context of fieldwork, particularly as it related to getting farmer perspectives. My original plans for 
how potential interviewees would be approached involved day-long visits in villages and chance 
meetings as people went about their daily business. This was re-interpreted within the cultural 
context, practicalities, and experience of those I was working with. The plans were adjusted and 
mirrored the process I had seen many times before through my CSIRO project work. It was as if 
there was a script for how to go about talking to farmers, and that script enabled the local officials 
and the communities to manage the demands of the many foreign aid and research projects that 
arrived seeking primary data. Breaking out of this pattern was not possible, unless I had been able 
to follow an ethnographic approach and embed myself in villages for an extended time. As we 
arrived in each village, a number of farmers would be waiting for us. Many of them I knew as 
farmers involved in the CSIRO research project—I had little ability to reach outside these groups 
for alternative views. I do not believe my Lao colleagues intended to control the process or to 
whom I spoke; rather, they were concerned to ensure efficiency and practicality. Helping me took 
time out of their schedules, and the operational aspects of the research were re-organised to 
minimise this burden.  
The second challenge in Laos was the conduct of the interview itself. I had planned for relaxed, 
evolving discussions with farmers, exploring detailed narratives on agricultural change. I had 
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designed a semi-structured interview guide and had planned to conduct the interviews with 
translation by the research assistant. However, the research assistant advised against on-the-spot 
translation, stating it would be uncomfortable and inconvenient for the farmers. I decided on a 
compromise that resulted in a loss of my ability to probe or ask additional questions. The detailed 
discussions I planned became more like surveys with short questions and answers, with debriefs 
after each interview. Though the data obtained were useful and valid, they were far removed from 
the thick, detailed descriptions I had hoped to elicit.  
As part of large international research projects, I had learnt to trust my (experienced) Lao 
colleagues’ judgement and use it to inform research decisions. I transferred this trust to a junior 
researcher. While the research assistant was hard working and diligent, we were unable to build the 
same level of mutual understanding that had underpinned my past experience and enabled this trust 
to work. On reflection, my expectations and plans were unrealistic, more suited to the large 
international projects through which I had become exposed to this research than to the limited 
resources of a part-time PhD research project. 
The Indonesian case presented some, but not all, of these challenges. Farmer groups to be visited 
were selected in much the same way—a discussion of selection criteria, a series of proposals from 
our in-country colleagues, the final decisions overlaid with practicalities of travel, timing, and 
distance. Farmers were pre-arranged and waiting for our arrival, and accessing additional 
perspectives was difficult. The difference in Indonesia was the familiarity I had with our Indonesian 
colleagues, which facilitated frank discussions about what we were not seeing as much as what we 
were.  
3.5 Summary and conclusion 
Building on Chapter 2, in this chapter I have outlined a broad framework and the key themes that 
guided the research design and methods of data collection and analysis. The perspective of 
agricultural innovation systems, which emphasises connectivity and its importance for innovation, 
was the conceptual starting point. However, this approach has been criticised for failing to 
adequately consider how these connections can marginalise some actors. Drawing also on political 
ecology and actor-oriented theory enabled a clearer consideration of diversity, power, structure, and 
agency to complement the frame provided by agricultural innovation systems. Within this broader 
framework, the key themes were: history and context; key actors and roles; strategies for scaling 
research; structure and agency; power and knowledge; and scale and networks.  
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Three case studies of research for agricultural development in Southeast Asia were outlined, each 
highlighting different strategies and circumstances for scaling efforts—the spread of improved rice 
varieties in Laos; mechanisation of rice production in Thailand; and the introduction of improved 
cattle management practices for smallholders in Indonesia. Each case is illustrative of a particular 
strategy in scaling research—capacity building, collaboration with the private sector, and policy 
engagement—which provides the opportunity to explore these strategies in depth and to compare 
insights across cases.  
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4 Development and spread of improved rice varieties in Laos 
In this chapter I apply the framework and concepts outlined in Chapter 3 to a case study of 
improved rice varieties in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (referred to henceforth as Laos). I 
trace the development and spread of improved varieties in Laos, drawing on published and 
unpublished accounts of key projects and in-depth interviews capturing the perspectives of 
researchers, policy makers, and farming households.  
Laos provides an interesting case to explore the research questions of the thesis. Initial efforts to 
introduce new agricultural practices during Asia’s ‘Green Revolution’ were derailed in Laos for a 
number of reasons: the impact of the Vietnam War; unrest associated with the seizure of power by 
the socialist government and proclamation of independence in 1975; an unsuccessful push to 
collectivise agricultural production; and limited investment in agricultural research or material 
support to collectives (Evans 1988). Faced with ongoing food shortages across the country, the 
government embraced agricultural modernisation as a central policy but lacked the resources to 
properly implement it.  
The Lao-IRRI Rice Research and Training Program (referred to here as the Lao-IRRI Project) was a 
15-year partnership between IRRI and the Government of Laos. It aimed to build the capacity of 
Laos in rice research and develop improved varieties suitable to Lao farming conditions. According 
to Bestari et al. (2006), the introduction of modern varieties and other inputs has been one of the 
key factors in supporting an increase in overall rice production in Laos. IRRI credits the program 
with bringing the Green Revolution to Laos, supporting increases in rice production to levels of 
national self-sufficiency, and building research capacity within Laos (IRRI 2006).  
The case study captures perspectives and events relating to the development and spread of 
improved rice varieties, starting with the historical context that led to the establishment of the Lao-
IRRI Project, then examining the development and achievements of the project, and finally re-
visiting the legacy of the project in 2014. The case highlights capacity building as a key strategy to 
support long-term, widespread impacts of research, embedding skills and resources within Lao 
research institutions to continue developing rice varieties and working with communities to 
improve production systems, while also contributing to national rice policy. To this end, the project 
had direct links to, and support from, high-level officials within the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Lao People’s Revolutionary Party.  
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While demonstrating important achievements in terms of productivity increases, the case study also 
highlights the role of improved rice varieties in shifting where knowledge about rice varieties is 
held; identifies challenges regarding access to new varieties and changing practices for seed 
exchange and replenishment; illustrates how new technology is blended into existing practices 
rather than being adopted wholly; and indicates institutional gaps at the provincial and district 
levels to support seed multiplication and distribution.  
4.1 A brief history of political and rural development in Laos, 1975–1990 
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic was declared in 1975, after almost 30 years of civil war and 
unrest. The threads of the conflict are complex, tied to French occupation, a growing nationalist 
movement, and Western concerns over the spread of Communism that saw the north of Laos used 
effectively as an air base (and bombing ground) by the United States of America (Stuart-Fox 1996, 
Evans 1988). When the communist Lao People’s Revolutionary Party came to power and abolished 
the monarchy, they declared three revolutions: economic production; scientific and technical; and 
cultural and ideological (Evans 1988).  
4.1.1 Collectivisation of agriculture  
Under the monarchy, all land had been owned by the King but managed at the village level and 
divided among households by the village head. Under the new government, all ownership of land 
was transferred to the State (Ducourtieux et al. 2005). The government introduced controls on 
trading between provinces, established state-run farms, and mandated the collectivisation of 
agriculture (Bourdet 1995). Collectivisation was seen as the best way to rapidly modernise 
agriculture and protect against food shortages, but also as a way of strengthening state control 
against civil unrest and revolt (Evans 1988). 
Cooperatives were usually made up of 30 to 40 households, though some were as large as 200 
households (Schiller et al. 2006). Members of cooperatives contributed their land for the 
cooperative’s use, while their labour contribution was calculated in points based on the duration and 
type of work, which would in turn determine the distribution of produce and any profit (Stuart-Fox 
1996). Rules were complicated and inconsistently implemented by local officials (Stuart-Fox 1996). 
Even though membership of cooperatives was voluntary, weekly meetings were held to convince 
villagers that small plots were inefficient and collectivisation was the best way forward, and many 
households feared the ramifications of not joining (Evans 1988). However, people grew 
increasingly dissatisfied with the cooperative system, resenting the coercion of the district officials, 
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limited provision of equipment or support from government, uncertainty about the implications of 
joining, and generally preferring their traditional lifestyle (Stuart-Fox 1996). Farmers began to burn 
crops or leave land fallow rather than be forced into collectives (Stuart-Fox 1996). Far from 
modernising and increasing production, collectivisation led to a drop in production and was 
suspended after less than a year, with officials citing a need to provide better training and improved 
conditions (Stuart-Fox 1996).  
4.1.2 Economic restructuring 
Recognising the failure of socialist reforms, the Party endorsed the New Economic Mechanism 
(NEM) in 1986.8 Under this policy, the economy has been progressively restructured, for example, 
re-establishing private property rights, easing restrictions on trade, and deregulating commodity 
prices to support economic growth (Bourdet 1996). The reforms introduced under the NEM were 
enthusiastically received by organisations like the World Bank, which described the ensuing 
economic progress of Laos as ‘unparalleled’ (Rigg 2005, p.22).  
While the NEM may have supported growth in industry and services, growth in agriculture was still 
stunted (Bourdet 1996). Rice production was not enough to keep pace with population growth and 
Laos was dependent on food imports (Evans 1988). Bourdet (1996) suggests slow growth in 
agriculture was partly due to the vulnerability of farming to drought and flood, and partly due to the 
largely subsistence nature of production, lack of modern inputs, and poor infrastructure, 
exacerbated by an urban-centric political elite.  
Economic reform was not matched by political reform; the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party 
remains the only approved political party in Laos. Party administration extends to all levels and 
areas—village, district, province, ministries, and mass organisations (Stuart-Fox 2011). 
Appointment to local positions, though theoretically by election, is often through lines of patronage 
and controlled by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (Stuart-Fox 2011). Opposition is not 
tolerated, with imprisonment or ‘re-education’ the response to public expressions of discontent 
(Bourdet 1996). 
The second Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan brought decentralisation of 
government, with the central government providing ‘guidelines’ while the provinces were charged 
                                               
8 Reforms in Laos followed those implemented by Vietnam and China, which de-collectivised agricultural 
production and encouraged foreign investment but retained strong protections for state-owned industry 
(Stuart-Fox 2011). 
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with the administration and implementation of programs (Hopkins 1995). In practice, information 
(and misinformation) flows up to the central government and decisions flow down (Stuart-Fox 
2011).  
4.1.3 Rice research 
Salakham Rice Research Station, established in 1955 in Hatsaiphong District, near Vientiane, was 
the first formal commitment to rice research in Laos—previously research had focused only on fruit 
trees and coffee (Inthapanya et al. 2006). Research at the Salakham Station during the 1960s 
focused on evaluation of improved varieties brought from IRRI (e.g., IR-8), Thailand (e.g., Niaw 
Sanpatong), and the Philippines (e.g., C4-63-1). Early releases of improved varieties from other 
countries and selected Lao traditional varieties were distributed through agricultural development 
programs funded largely by the United States (Inthapanya et al. 2006). Most households rejected 
the new varieties, preferring the taste and quality of traditional sticky rice to the non-glutinous, 
higher-yielding varieties. The seed production capacity of the station was low, indeed far below 
what would have been required for wide-scale use of the new varieties (Interview 6). In any case, 
these early experiments with improved varieties were disrupted with the establishment of the Lao 
PDR.  
The capacity for rice research after 1975 was low: a significant proportion of educated Lao fled the 
country, while physical resources and infrastructure were damaged or depleted through neglect 
(Stuart-Fox 1996). Though it was common for officials to undertake graduate and diploma training 
in Soviet-bloc countries, as one interviewee pointed out, the Russians ‘weren’t very competitive at 
rice’ and thus there was limited capacity built in rice agronomy (Interview 7). 
Agricultural cooperatives were used to test and distribute improved seeds from Vietnam to 
members—effectively the cooperatives were used as a basis for extension. For the most part, 
resources were limited and support provided to cooperatives was in the form of information rather 
than materials (Evans 1988). The process was top-down and focused on agricultural intensification 
(Interview 7). Recognising the preference of the majority of the population to consume glutinous 
rice, researchers worked to cross IRRI lines with Lao varieties to improve yields but retain eating 
quality (Inthapanya et al. 2006). However, none of these crosses was ever released (Schiller et al. 
2006).  
From 1979 to 1982, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) supported rice-
intensification research to build on this early breeding work. Researchers worked with ‘farmer seed 
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growers’ to produce certified seed to distribute to other farmers the following year (Hatsadong 
2013). With close relationships between farmer seed growers and extension workers, farmers were 
‘… partners in the process … [This system] helps the farmer to understand the idea of improved 
seed and production, distribution, and pricing for themselves’ (Interviewee 6).  
From 1983 to 1988, attempts were made to build a formal seed distribution system with the 
establishment of Phone Ngam, Thasano, and Naphok seed multiplication centres to provide a 
connection between the provinces and Salakham station (Hatsadong 2013, see Figure 4.1). 
Reservations have been expressed about the suitability of this kind of system compared to more 
locally-based farmer seed production groups (Hatsadong 2013). Further support was provided 
through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and FAO to strengthen linkages 
across the regional research stations (Hatsadong 2013). There was still no national rice research 
program at this time and research was relatively limited in scope and geographic reach.  
With modest research and distribution capacity, the use of improved varieties was limited. 
Estimates vary between two to five per cent (Bestari et al. 2006) and five to ten per cent 
(Inthapanya et al. 2006) of overall seed use. Use of the varieties had mainly occurred in small 
pockets along the Mekong where the combination of access to irrigation and improved varieties 
enabled dry-season rice production, which was intended for sale rather than household consumption 
(Lao-IRRI Project 1993, Inthapanya et al. 2006). Tanaka (1993) reports that farmers around 
Vientiane had brought varieties (including improved varieties) over from Thailand and incorporated 
the new seeds alongside traditional varieties, deciding which to plant based on water availability 
and suitability to field conditions. 
Inthapanya et al. (2006) suggest three reasons for the limited uptake of improved varieties during 
this time. First was the absence of an effective mechanism to distribute seeds, restricting awareness 
of, and access to, improved varieties. Where improved varieties had been utilised, as in the case of 
the Thai varieties RD6 and RD10, this was most likely due to cross-border, farmer-to-farmer 
exchange rather than formal distribution programs (Tanaka 1993, Inthapanya et al. 2006). Second, 
the early improved varieties were non-glutinous while the majority of the population in Laos has a 
strong cultural preference for glutinous rice. Even though the improved varieties out-performed 
local varieties in terms of yield, households preferred to maintain traditional varieties where the 
main purpose of the crop was home consumption (i.e., eating quality was valued over yield). Third, 
throughout this time, Lao farming systems were subsistence-oriented and used no or minimal 
purchased inputs (Lao-IRRI Project 1993). In low-input conditions, traditional varieties were often 
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better adapted than the early modern varieties, which performed best with fertiliser and irrigation 
(Inthapanya et al. 2006). 
4.1.4 Household practices of rice production  
The main rice production systems in Laos are upland, lowland rainfed, and lowland irrigated 
(Linquist et al. 2006). Linquist et al. (2006) differentiate the three systems as follows. Lowland 
areas are characterised by the presence of bunded fields which are flooded (by rainfall or irrigation) 
for at least some of the growing season, compared to upland areas where rice is planted on sloping, 
unbunded fields with no irrigation. While the area cultivated under these systems varies from year 
to year, lowland rainfed areas represent by far the largest proportion of the total area. In 1990, 
lowland wet-season production accounted for almost 60 per cent of the total harvested area 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2000, p.12).9 All three systems can be found in each of the 
three regions of Laos—Northern, Central, and Southern (Figure 4.1)—though their relative extent 
varies. 
Upland areas are concentrated in the Northern Region of Laos, which accounted for about 80 per 
cent of all upland rice production in 2004 (Linquist et al. 2006, p.31). Traditionally the uplands 
have been used for long-fallow swidden agriculture and upland farmers have been politically and 
culturally marginalised by the central state. It has been a priority of the Government of Laos to stop 
swidden practices and diversify production away from rice in the uplands (Lao-IRRI Project 1993).  
The Central and Southern Regions are dominated by lowland production systems. Up until the 
1990s, very little irrigation infrastructure had been developed, so most production was rainfed.10 In 
1990, about 72 per cent of all rice produced was from rainfed lowland production systems (Schiller 
et al. 2006, p.18) of which 57 per cent was grown in the Central Region, including Savannakhet 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2000, pp.49–50). Due to the importance of lowland 
production in Laos, this case study focuses on lowland rainfed rice production, in particular 
Savannakhet Province in the Central Region.  
According to the Lao Population Census of 1995, 83 per cent of labour was engaged in agriculture 
and fisheries for the main purpose of subsistence (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2000). 
                                               
9 Production statistics distinguish between lowland wet season production; lowland dry season production; 
and upland production. Wet season production may include some supplementary irrigation.  
10 In 1990 dry-season production made up only 1.9 per cent of the total area cultivated for rice. However, this 
does not include areas with access to supplementary irrigation in the wet season (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry 2000, p.12). 
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Household production relied on family or shared (exchange) labour, draught animal power, and 
limited or no use of chemical inputs (Lao-IRRI Project 1993). Rice has traditionally played a 
central role in Lao social and spiritual life. As the staple food, it is also intertwined with ideas of 
culture and family (Bestari et al. 2006). Key activities in the crop calendar were represented by 
ceremonies aimed at appeasing spirits and ensuring a good harvest (Simmalavong 2011).11 
Villages were often isolated and focused on their own food needs, as one interviewee described, 
reflecting on their initial impressions of Laos:  
In that early period [1990s] … with the mountainous areas, and also with the problems 
within the country … village life was very focused on the villages, there was very, very poor 
road infrastructure and so … the rice that was being produced was for mainly subsistence 
purposes. So the villages [had] become very, very focused on selecting and growing the 
rices that they liked most (Interview 1). 
Farmers selected rice varieties by trial and observation each year, with consideration for 
characteristics such as yield stability, taste, and suitability to agro-ecological and social conditions 
(Appa Rao et al. 2006a). Traditional practices of seed selection and multiplication have contributed 
to a significant diversity of rice varieties in Laos, especially for glutinous varieties (Bestari et al. 
2006). 
Appa Rao et al. (2006a) describe the traditional process of seed selection as follows. Farmers 
looked for plants that showed a range of desirable traits through the season and harvested, threshed, 
and stored seed from these plants separately to test the next year. If the farmer was happy with the 
results, these seeds would be multiplied and used the following season over a larger area. The 
nature of seed selection, where seeds were tested on small portions of the farmer’s fields, meant 
they were able to select for traits specific to their agronomic conditions, as well as social and 
cultural preferences. Each household would usually plant four or five different varieties each 
season, which would spread labour requirements as well as pest and disease risk by staggering the 
stage of crop maturation over the season (Linquist et al. 2006). In addition to fostering new traits 
within their own seed stock, farmers would look for plants with desirable characteristics, often 
                                               
11 Ceremonial practices, such as the Rocket Festival (Boung Ban Fay), conducted to ensure sufficient rainfall 
for the season, were initially banned in an effort by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party to separate 
seasonal calendars and spiritual practice. After a devastating drought in 1977, the Rocket Festival was again 
permitted (Evans 1988).  
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observing and swapping seed with their neighbours, or when visiting family in other districts, 
provinces, or countries (notably Thailand and Vietnam) (Interview 1, Appa Rao et al. 2006a). 
 
Figure 4.1 Rice research centres and locations of Lao-IRRI research activities.  
Source: Modified from Shrestha et al. (2006, p.38). 
In short, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, rice production, and agriculture in general, remained 
low-input and followed traditional practices. Yields were low compared to similar countries and far 
below domestic food requirements (Worner 1996). Rice crops were regularly affected by drought 
and flood, and food security was often precarious at both household and national levels, especially 
in the North. By 1990, limited progress had been made towards the government’s goal of self-
sufficiency in rice (Hopkins 1995). In 1988 and 1989, severe drought cut rice production by one 
third and triggered emergency food aid to avert widespread food shortages and famine (Schiller et 
al. 2006, Sayagues 1990).  
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4.2 Overview of Lao-IRRI Rice Research and Training Program, 1990–2007 
This backdrop of ongoing food shortages and limited government efforts to support increased rice 
production provided impetus for the Lao-IRRI Rice Research and Training Program (Lao-IRRI 
Project). Increasing production in agriculture and forestry was a key aim of the government after 
the Lao PDR was proclaimed, and achieving national self-sufficiency in rice production was a 
central aim of the Interim (1978–80), First (1981–86), and Second (1986–90) Five-Year National 
Socio-Economic Development Plans (Stuart-Fox 1986a, Worner 1996). However, limited progress 
towards this goal had been achieved by 1990.  
IRRI was established in the Philippines in 1959 to increase rice production in Asia (Cantrell and 
Hettel 2001). The early success of IRRI in increasing rice yields gave proof of concept to the 
potential of dedicated international agricultural research centres, and in 1971 a network of such 
centres was established under the umbrella of the Consultative Group for International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) (Cantrell and Hettel 2001). According to Cantrell and Hettel (2001), the CGIAR 
and its institutes have held a long-standing commitment to supporting the development of national 
agricultural research systems, initially focusing on public research institutions, but expanding to 
consider private-sector, NGO, and other actors. IRRI established close partnerships with major rice-
producing countries, setting out research priorities and commitments in memoranda of 
understanding (MoU) and often establishing offices in-country. After criticism that the first releases 
by IRRI as part of the Green Revolution were developed without consideration of farmers’ 
circumstances or needs, IRRI shifted to more participatory modes of research, such as involving 
farmers in varietal selection (Douthwaite et al. 2001).  
4.2.1 Project establishment, aims, and scope 
A MoU was signed between the Government of Laos and IRRI in 1987. The MoU articulated a 
commitment to developing the research capabilities in Laos and improving rice production to 
achieve national rice self-sufficiency. The goals listed in the MoU were to be implemented through 
the Lao-IRRI Project. The Australian Government had tentatively agreed to fund the project, but 
money was diverted by the Australian Prime Minister to build the first bridge across the Mekong 
between Laos and Thailand. Faced with a loss of funding and collapse of the project, the Director of 
IRRI instead negotiated with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) for 
support (Interview 1). The project was signed off in 1989 and commenced in August 1990, with 
SDC committing USD 16 million to the program over several phases (Shrestha et al. 2006).  
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The Lao-IRRI Project represented the first long-term, coordinated effort to support rice research in 
Laos. The main objectives reflected national policy goals to build the capacity of the Lao rice 
research system and increase rice production (Shrestha et al. 2006). As the project progressed and 
national self-sufficiency was achieved and maintained, government priorities shifted to emphasise 
diversification and modernisation of the agricultural sector more broadly and included consideration 
of sustainability and improving livelihoods. Research priorities of the Lao-IRRI Project also 
adjusted to reflect revised government priorities and as skills and knowledge in rice production 
grew (Lao-IRRI Project 2005).  
The program was structured around several broad areas: improving and building research 
infrastructure; providing training for Lao researchers; development of a national rice research 
program covering varietal improvement, crop establishment, and soil and pest management; and 
developing a national seed collection to record and preserve traditional rice varieties (Shrestha et al. 
2006).  
Government policy objectives were tailored for the different rice-growing environments in Laos, 
and these in turn guided the research focus and emphasis within the Lao-IRRI Project. In the rainfed 
lowland areas, the government’s priority in the early 1990s was to increase yield per hectare and 
expand the total area under production. Increasing irrigation access was also a priority to reduce the 
impact of a variable climate on rice yield and increase dry-season rice production. In contrast, in the 
upland areas the focus was to stop shifting agriculture, ‘stabilise’ production systems, and diversify 
crops to reduce dependency on rice (Lao-IRRI Project 1993).  
IRRI oversaw the program and placed three international staff in Laos on a full time basis: a project 
leader and a lowland systems specialist, both based in Vientiane, and an upland systems specialist 
based in Luang Prabang in the Northern Region. Close collaboration and involvement was sought 
with the Lao Department of Agriculture and Extension and the Provincial and District Agricultural 
Offices (PAFO and DAFO).  
4.2.2 Research network and capability 
The first phase of the Lao-IRRI Project focused on building the capabilities within Laos to conduct 
rice research. One aspect of this was to expand and upgrade research facilities across the country. 
The National Agricultural Research Centre (NARC) near Vientiane became the principal research 
centre, coordinating rice research across the regions, overseeing the germplasm bank, and crossing 
and evaluating varieties for lowland rainfed areas (Shrestha et al. 2006). Regional seed 
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multiplication stations were established or upgraded to support varietal improvement and testing of 
varieties in specific agro-ecological zones (Figure 4.1, above). Basic infrastructure was built to 
support the operations of the research network, including roads, seed storage, drying facilities, and 
administration and training buildings (Shrestha et al. 2006). The network of regional centres 
provided a connection between the project, district agricultural offices, and farmers. These 
connections were central to the development of improved varieties that were tested in a range of 
local conditions (Interview 1). 
Beyond provision of physical infrastructure, the Lao-IRRI Project had a strong focus on developing 
the capabilities of Lao researchers. Training was provided in rice breeding and production, disease 
control, and cropping and farming systems, as well as English language and project management 
(Lao-IRRI Project 2005, Gorsuch 2002). Training—which included degree and non-degree 
programs, workshops, conferences, study tours, and other skill-building activities—was provided to 
staff from a broad spectrum of organisations including development planning, research, and 
extension agencies (Shrestha et al. 2006). Of the training provided, 57 per cent of trainees were staff 
from PAFOs and DAFOs, who were in charge of field trials and testing of varieties under local 
conditions (Shrestha et al. 2006, p.28).  
4.2.3 Varietal improvement and management practices 
In the rainfed lowlands, the project sought to develop a range of short- and medium-duration 
improved varieties for households to choose from. The primary focus was development of glutinous 
varieties for subsistence production, with secondary consideration of non-glutinous varieties for 
sale (Lao-IRRI Project 1993). In contrast to varieties released as part of the first phase of the Asian 
Green Revolution, researchers in the Lao-IRRI Project aimed to develop varieties that had high 
yield potential, even with low input use, which would be suitable for a range of agronomic 
conditions, recognising the limited access to inputs and irrigation of most Laotian households. 
Evaluation of varieties focused primarily on good eating quality and shorter duration (Lao-IRRI 
Project 1993). As these goals were met, varietal development shifted from breeding for crop 
duration and productivity to tolerance of specific conditions like drought or pests (Interview 10). 
Three types of varieties were released during the Lao-IRRI Project: Lao modern varieties that were 
developed specifically for Lao conditions by the Lao-IRRI Project; other modern varieties 
developed in other countries but suitable in some areas of Laos (e.g., IR-66, RD-23); and traditional 
Lao varieties that were found to be suitable for use in ‘new’ areas (Shrestha et al. 2006). By 2005, 
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17 Lao improved varieties had been released, the first in 1993 (Table 4.1, refer to Appendix 10.4 for 
full details of Lao varieties released).  
Improved varieties were part of a technical package that aimed to realise the yield potential of the 
varieties given environmental constraints, and increase overall production. This included 
recommendations for planting times, plant spacing and density, and fertiliser use (Lao-IRRI Project 
1998). Additional practices in pest management and crop establishment were also explored but less 
broadly recommended.  
Table 4.1 Release of Lao improved varieties from 1993 to 2005 
Year Varieties released Total 
1993 TDK1, TDK2, PNG1 3 
1995 PNG2 1 
1997 TDK3 1 
1998 TDK4, TSN1, NTN1 3 
2000 TDK5 1 
2003 TDK6, TDK7 2 
2004 TSN2, TSN3, TSN4 3 
2005 PNG3, PNG5, PNG6 3 
Total  17 
Notes: Naming indicates the research station where breeding lines were developed – 
National Agricultural Research Centre in Thadokkham Village, Saythany District, 
Vientiane Municipality (TDK); Phone Ngam Rice Research and Seed Multiplication 
Centre, Pakse, Champasak (PNG); Thasano Rice Research and Seed Multiplication Centre, 
Savannakhet (TSN); 30-ha Rice Research and Seed Multiplication Centre in Namthane, 
Phiange District, Sayabouly (NTN). Not all varieties are still recommended, including 
PNG2 and TDK7, due to susceptibility to disease (Inthapanya et al. 2006). Source: 
Inthapanya et al. (2006, p.240) 
The rice research program was supported by the development of international relationships and 
extensive national-local networks. Initial varietal improvement research depended on relationships 
with the Thai-IRRI research program and the research station in Ubon, Northeast Thailand 
(Thepphavong and Sipaseuth 2007). Until 1997, crosses were carried out by the IRRI rice breeding 
division and Thai-IRRI program on behalf of the Lao-IRRI Project, with genetic material from 
traditional Lao varieties, varieties from Northeast Thailand, and other accessions sourced from the 
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International Rice Germplasm Centre and IRRI. Progeny of F2 crosses12 were transferred to the 
national research station for further evaluation and development in Laos (Lao-IRRI Project 1993, 
1996). From 1997, the NARC had the capability to cross varieties in-house (Lao-IRRI Project 
1998).  
Once evaluated by the NARC, promising lines were sent to regional research centres to test for 
yield, adaptability, and suitability in different environments. Promising lines were evaluated in 
replicated and multi-location trials, mostly under farm conditions (Lao-IRRI Project 1996). By 
1996 the project was conducting trials in every province of Laos (Lao-IRRI Project 1997, Figure 
4.1 above). Varieties that were generally adaptable, producing relatively stable yields in a range of 
areas, would be listed as promising lines (Lao-IRRI Project 1996).  
Demonstration plots were used to conduct final assessment and evaluation of varieties with farmers, 
and also served as a mechanism to promote the use and benefits of improved varieties (Lao-IRRI 
Project 1997). After harvest, farmers would be able take seed from the demonstration plots for their 
own use. A number of ‘collaborator farmers’ were also involved in testing the varieties and 
management practices on their own farms. Collaborator farmers would set aside a portion of their 
land to trials and keep detailed production records. They were able to choose which varieties they 
trialled, and were provided with seed and other inputs, especially fertiliser (Lao-IRRI Project 1997). 
One of the activities under the Lao-IRRI Project that has supported the rice improvement program 
was the collection and preservation of over 13,000 seed samples from across the country (Appa Rao 
et al. 2006b). While establishing an important record of the biodiversity of rice in Laos, this also 
enabled the preservation of wild and traditional varieties before the introduction of new varieties 
(Interview 7). This collection is used to identify traditional varieties that may be suitable in ‘new’ 
areas of Laos, and as part of improvement programs.  
4.3 Scaling of research findings  
In this section I examine the key pathways used to increase impact in the Lao-IRRI Project: 
institutional influence and building the capacity of government (scaling up) and dissemination to 
farmers (scaling out).  
                                               
12 Filial generations indicate the number of generations after making a cross; F2 is the second filial 
generation. 
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4.3.1 Developing a national capability for rice research  
(a) Engaging with government. Engaging with, and contributing to, institutional development of a 
rice research system was a key mandate of the project. In this way, scaling up was a stated and 
explicit goal from the outset. Ties between the Government of Laos and the Lao-IRRI Project were 
strong by necessity—the government was tightly controlled by the Lao People’s Revolutionary 
Party and the project required government approval for basic project activities, such as field visits 
to the provinces, which had to be lodged for approval a month in advance (Interview 1).  
Until the National Agriculture and Forestry Research Institute (NAFRI) was established in 1999, 
the project sat directly under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Though having strong 
government support allowed the project to achieve significant change, the project was not immune 
from the risks or tensions of working in the country. Schiller (n.d.) speculates that the initial IRRI-
appointed lowland agronomy specialist’s contract was ended due to his Thai nationality and the 
poor relationship between Laos and Thailand at the time. The support of key high-level government 
officials was instrumental in allowing the project to go ahead.13 As one interviewee recalled:  
[The Vice Minister for Agriculture and Forestry] would often come down for coffee 
just to check ‘how is everything?’ and [if there were] any areas where we needed 
support, and then he would—where appropriate—he would then make sure the 
support was given. Because at that time it was potentially difficult to work in Laos 
for a number of reasons (Interview 1). 
One of the Lao-IRRI Project leaders reflected on the role of the Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry (formerly Vice Minister): ‘Lao-IRRI has been more fortunate than other projects in Laos 
because of political support from Dr Siene’ (Schiller, quoted in Gorsuch 2002, p.6). The Minister 
had studied in Russia and had strong connections to IRRI, which culminated in tenure as an IRRI 
board member from 1996 to 2001 (Shrestha et al. 2006, IRRI 2004). As a result, he ‘was very, very 
conscious of the need to develop a national research capacity within Laos’ (Interview 1). The 
Minister’s background gave him a familiarity and understanding of the value of the project and 
what it was trying to achieve.  
                                               
13 At the time of the project, there was limited formal separation between the Lao People’s Revolutionary 
Party and the government (Stuart-Fox 1986b). This is still largely the case, though it is now possible (but not 
common) to hold a leadership position without being a senior party official (Interview 1). 
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In addition to strong connections, the Lao-IRRI Project was directly responding to the requests of 
the Government of Laos, in particular the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, to establish a 
network of research stations across Laos and to achieve national self-sufficiency in rice. With 
government support and involvement, the project was able to contribute to the institutional 
architecture and agricultural research capacity of Laos. With the establishment of NAFRI came the 
National Rice Research Program. The program has continued to coordinate the development of the 
rice sector in Laos through the network of research stations and provincial and district agriculture 
and forestry offices—the structures and research areas established by the Lao-IRRI Project were 
thus effectively institutionalised. It would seem that a careful process of building research capacity, 
demonstrating impacts, and ensuring that local ownership and leadership within the program was 
developed contributed to this outcome.  
(b) Developing research capacity. When the project started, only five junior agricultural 
technicians were conducting field studies near Vientiane; by 1998, the National Rice Research 
Program employed 130 people and had activities in all provinces (Gorsuch 2002). Physical 
infrastructure—roads, buildings, dryers, and seed storage facilities—were a key foundation for 
developing the research network. Building the technical and administrative capacity of Lao 
researchers was central to embedding the ideas and approaches of the project in government 
institutions, while building an international network of collaborators has supported ongoing funding 
and research opportunities since the Lao-IRRI Project finished (Shrestha et al. 2006). 
Training was provided to staff in national and regional centres, and especially to those in provinces 
responsible for field activities (Shrestha et al. 2006). In addition to formal training opportunities, 
IRRI publications and factsheets were developed in the Lao language to make information relevant 
to Laos more accessible (Interview 1). The Lao-IRRI Project sought to foster a sense of ownership 
of project activities (Shrestha et al. 2006). Annual meetings brought together representatives from 
all provinces to agree on work plans for the coming year, including which trials would be conducted 
in which provinces (Interview 1). Bringing the teams together in this way fostered collaborative 
links between the central and regional research stations, and the provincial and district offices. 
While these links helped the internal functioning of the research program, external links and 
relationships were built between NAFRI and other international research agencies such as the 
University of Queensland, CSIRO, FAO, and ACIAR, providing access to additional funding and 
an ongoing portfolio of research for NAFRI (Shrestha et al. 2006).  
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Many of the Lao researchers who were part of the Lao-IRRI Project now have senior positions 
within the National Rice Research Centres, the Ministry of Agriculture, and NAFRI, and bring the 
experiences, perspectives, and networks gained through the project to these positions. One 
interviewee was quick to point out that the Lao-IRRI Project built on the training opportunities that 
had been provided to many Lao people in the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries 
through the 1970s and 1980s. This foundation, the interviewee believed, meant a pool of 
researchers with basic skills was available even in very remote provinces of the country (Interview 
1). Formal evaluation of the Project concluded it had ‘clearly played a key role in building the 
capacity of research and related agricultural organisations to develop and implement various 
programs effectively’ (Shrestha et al. 2006, p.40). 
Maintaining the same level and extent of training and skills may be a challenge, with one 
interviewee arguing that the capacity built through the Lao-IRRI Project has been eroded as 
experienced people have moved to other organisations or retired (Interview 5b). A 2007 study 
highlighted the limited growth in the number of staff with Masters or PhD degrees in the NARC 
and Multiplication Centres as an ongoing limitation to plant breeding and seed development 
(Thepphavong and Sipaseuth 2007).  
4.3.2 Networks for distribution  
Developing research capability was obviously crucial, but as one informant expressed it, ‘... it is not 
just a question of developing varieties, it is also a question of getting these varieties out to the 
farmers—out to the provinces and then out to the farmers’ (Interview 1). With the strengthening of 
the network of research centres, and strong links with the PAFOs and DAFOs, the Lao-IRRI Project 
established a presence across the country. Though initial steps in the varietal development process 
were centralised at the NARC, attention was given to developing breeding material suited to the 
different regions that could be tested and adapted to local conditions. One interviewee noted this as 
being central to the success of the varietal development activities in the project, with each region 
receiving breeding material tailored to local conditions (Interview 5a). 
Reflecting on the spread of varieties across the country, several interviewees indicated a level of 
autonomous and rapid uptake, fuelled by demonstrable and observable results. One interviewee 
described how use of seeds ‘just went boom’ after they were released (Interview 3); another 
suggested ‘if it is a good thing, it spreads by itself’ (Interview 7). Early releases, such as TDK-1 
were most suited to areas with good soil structure and access to irrigation, so were readily taken up 
in these areas (Interview 3). However, in rainfed and remote areas uptake was more limited. The 
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expansion of irrigation facilities in the lowland areas supported further uptake by increasing the 
area suited to improved varieties, encouraging their use in dry-season rice cropping (Interview 1, 
Interview 3). However, these developments were concentrated along the Mekong corridor.  
The project utilised familiar tools and mechanisms to increase its exposure in villages in which it 
was testing and demonstrating varieties: village meetings, demonstration plots, and farmer-to-
farmer communication, supported by collaborating farmers. One of the biggest constraints to this 
process was providing an adequate supply of seed to farmers when and where it was needed 
(Interview 5a, Interview 1).  
Formal project efforts to scale out the research were complemented by a careful process of 
observation, trial, and seed exchange among farmers. ‘Lao farmers tend to want others to try new 
things so they can observe; if they see the benefits, they will consider doing it’ (Interview 2). 
Farmer practices of seed exchange are still prevalent in Laos. A survey of farmers in the south and 
central lowlands in 2012 found 40 per cent of farmers sourced seed from other farmers, compared 
to 18 per cent from the seed multiplication centres, PAFO, and DAFO, and 20 per cent from 
international projects (Sacklokham, forthcoming). Traditional practices of seed exchange support 
the dissemination of improved varieties initially, accounting for most of the use of improved 
varieties. However, it is a slow process and can take many years for seeds to be distributed over a 
large area, by which time seed stocks need to be replenished (Manivong et al. 2008).  
Over successive harvests, the quality of improved seed declines and yields fall. Rather than saving 
seeds from each harvest for planting the next year, farmers need to replace seeds every two to three 
years if they are to maintain the yield benefits. As farmers began to use improved varieties, two 
needs emerged: to adapt traditional practices to regularly replenish seed; and to establish an 
effective system for seed multiplication and distribution. There had never been a formal seed 
distribution system in Laos, although there had been some attempts through cooperatives to 
establish seed producer groups. The issue of seed multiplication and distribution was considered in 
a consultancy to the project in 2001 which highlighted a need for a more organised national 
approach to seed production to ensure supply (Lao-IRRI Project 2003). Though it had never been 
the mandate of the Lao-IRRI Project to address the absence of seed multiplication and distribution 
networks, it was known within the project that this was an issue (Interview 1). 
Seed had to be produced in sufficient quantities (but not excessively, to avoid waste) and distributed 
to farmers who were accustomed to saving seed from the harvest rather than purchasing seed. 
Weaknesses in the nascent extension system and low technical skills of extension staff limited the 
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adoption of improved varieties and other practices (Lefroy-Braun and Winch 2004). In the absence 
of an established and well-functioning extension system, collaborations with other projects became 
(and remain) a key facilitator for seed production and distribution. 
The Lao-IRRI Project maintained formal collaboration with many projects. The types of projects 
varied from those with their own research purpose, for which improved seeds developed under the 
Lao-IRRI Project were one component of research, to those whose aim was explicitly to encourage 
adoption of new varieties developed as part of the Lao-IRRI Project. For example, the Savannakhet 
Integrated Rural Development Project (Phalanxai District) and the Improving Crop Yields project 
(in Phalanxai and Outhomphone Districts, Savannakhet), both aimed to increase rice production 
through the use of ‘proven, low-input and sustainable technologies for rice-based agricultural 
systems’ (Lefroy-Braun and Winch 2004, p.2). Both projects were conduits to promote and support 
households to access and use improved varieties. For example, the Improving Crop Yields project 
supported production of 10 tonnes of improved seed, which was distributed to 1,659 farmers 
(Manivong et al. 2008, p.9). These farmers further distributed the seed to other households as part 
of normal seed exchange practices, mostly to farmers within the same village.  
4.3.3 Utilisation and impact 
External review of the Lao-IRRI Project in 2000 found the project had been ‘highly successful’ as 
indicated by: the increase in rice production and self-sufficiency; the rapid adoption of modern 
varieties; the increase in double cropping in irrigated areas; and income and food security benefits 
at a household level (Shrestha in Lao-IRRI Project 2003, p.175).  
Nationally, rice production in Laos more than doubled from around 1.5 million tonnes in 1990 to 
3.5 million tonnes in 2012, largely following the upward trend in yield per hectare (Figure 4.2). A 
review of rice policy suggested that the increase in rice production was supported by expansion of 
the area farmed and an increase in irrigated areas, but that the scale-out and use of Lao modern 
varieties was the ‘single most important factor’ to achieve these increases (Eliste et al. 2012, p.63). 
The Rice Research Program has continued under NAFRI, with a further 13 Lao modern varieties 
released between 2005 and 2013 (Inthapanya et al. 2013, p.170). 
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Figure 4.2 Rice production and yield, Lao PDR 1961–2011.  
Source: FAOSTAT accessed 17 November 2014. 
In 1990, an estimated 90 per cent of rice production in the lowlands was from traditional varieties 
(Appa Rao et al. 2006b, p.123). By 1998/99 an estimated 29 per cent of land area was planted with 
improved varieties, just six years after the first releases from the Lao-IRRI Project (Table 4.2). The 
following year, Laos had produced enough rice to meet national consumption needs and has been 
able to maintain this since, though at regional and household levels there are still production deficits 
(Schiller et al. 2013). By 2010/11, the area planted with improved rice varieties had increased to 45 
per cent nationally and as high as 65 per cent in the Southern Region (Table 4.2). The difference in 
uptake across the regions shown in Table 4.2 reflects the focus of the rice improvement program on 
the lowland rainfed environment and the generally more suitable conditions in the lowlands. Most 
varieties were not suitable for the upland areas due to pests and lack of water (Interview 8a).  
At the national level, the success of the Lao-IRRI Project in enabling Laos to become self-sufficient 
has allowed for a policy shift away from national rice self-sufficiency.14 Nevertheless, the 
government still places significant emphasis on increasing rice production. Production and yield 
targets for the lowlands, once linked mainly to food security, are now framed by emphasis on the 
                                               
14 Although national self-sufficiency has been achieved and maintained, emergency food, seed, and fertiliser 
were distributed after severe flooding in 2008. 
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commercialisation of production (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2010) and the development 
of rice export markets (Schiller et al. 2013).  
Table 4.2 Area of paddy land planted by seed type (%) 
 1998/99 2010/11 
Region Traditional Improved Traditional Improved 
Northern  93.1 7.0 87.7 12.3 
Central  58.0 42.0 46.3 53.7 
Southern  69.6 30.4 35.0 65.0 
National 70.9 29.1 54.5 45.5 
Source: Agricultural Census Office (2000, 2012) 
From 1995 to 1998, the Lao-IRRI Project conducted household-level impact studies in Phonehong-
Nafaay village in Thourakhom District of Vientiane Province, and Oupalath village in Phonethong 
District, Champassak. The results highlight the potential for rapid spread of the modern varieties, 
with all but four out of 67 farms in Phonehong-Nafaay and all 69 farms in Oupalath incorporating at 
least part of the recommended package (mostly just the improved varieties) within the three-year 
period (Lao-IRRI Project 1999). Households that applied all recommended practices had higher 
yields, earned higher returns, and consumed more rice, yet consumed proportionately less of their 
harvest (Lao-IRRI Project 1999). The study found that partial application of the package (using 
improved varieties without other recommendations) meant the full potential in yield was not 
reached, which significantly limited the potential benefit (Lao-IRRI Project 1998, p.81).  
In a separate study in Champasak and Saravan in 1996, Pandey (2000) found significant variation in 
the proportion of land that was planted with improved varieties from household to household and 
across villages. Though a high proportion of households (60 per cent) used the varieties, they were 
planted on only 21 per cent of the area surveyed (Pandey 2000). Use of modern varieties and 
fertiliser was higher in villages that were more accessible (i.e., with road access). Pandey concludes 
that ‘such variation in adoption patterns reflects differences in resource base, access to information 
and seeds, access to markets, and various farm and household characteristics’ (Pandey 2000, p.23). 
As with the use of improved varieties in other countries, it was the larger farmers with better access 
to markets and using fertiliser who were more likely to use the improved varieties, as they were 
able to get the most yield benefits.  
In 2004, as part of a benchmark activity for the Improving Crop Yields project, villages in 
Outhoumphone and Phalanxai Districts were surveyed and conditions were compared between a 
village in Outhoumphone District involved in the Lao-IRRI Project but where activities had ceased 
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in 1999 and villages from both districts that had no prior involvement with a project (Figure 4.3). 
Households surveyed in the former project village experienced a higher degree of self-sufficiency in 
rice, ‘disproportionately’ higher incomes, and significantly higher yields (an average of 5.4 t/ha 
compared to 1.4 t/ha) (Lefroy-Braun and Winch 2004).15 In considering these results, it is important 
to note that the project was deliberately targeting areas that were not using the Lao-IRRI Project 
practices, so it could be expected that these villages were more remote and had generally lower 
production than other villages. Phalanxai District is also further from the provincial capital and 
generally has higher levels of poverty and food insecurity than Outhoumphone District (Epprecht et 
al. 2008).  
An impact study at the end of the Improving Crop Yields project concluded that households in 
project areas had improved rates of rice self-sufficiency and improved incomes. However, again, 
the effect was higher in villages in Outhoumphone compared to other districts, indicating perhaps 
more favourable conditions to take advantage of opportunities presented by the project (Manivong 
et al. 2008). 
4.4 Vignette of the Lao-IRRI legacy in 2014 
The concept of scaling implies that the use of project outputs (knowledge, practices, or resources) 
will endure over time, particularly after a project has finished. I wanted to examine whether and 
how improved varieties had been incorporated into household processes of rice production, and the 
impacts of doing so, since the Lao-IRRI Project had finished. I also intended to explore changes 
that emerged over time and beyond the formal project lifespan. In this section I explore how some 
of the local actors and processes related to the Lao-IRRI Project have evolved in the seven years 
since the project finished. I start by looking at household and village level experiences with 
improved varieties (and to a lesser extent, fertiliser) in four villages in Savannakhet, and then 
consider the role of the Thasano Research and Seed Multiplication Centre in Savannakhet.16 
Savannakhet Province is one of the main lowland rice-producing areas in Laos and has been the 
focus of several international research projects aimed at increasing rice production.  
                                               
15 In 2009, average yield for lowland irrigated rice was under 5 t/ha, compared to under 4 t/ha for lowland 
rainfed rice (Sacklokham 2014, p.146). 
16 The Centre was formerly called the Thasano Research Station and is referred to here simply as Thasano. 
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4.4.1 Village and household level 
Interviews and small group discussions were held with 19 farmers in four villages in Champhone 
and Outhoumphone Districts during October 2014 (Figure 4.3). Villages were within 2.5 hours 
drive of the provincial capital, the city of Savannakhet. Discussions considered how and when 
farming practices had changed with the introduction of new technologies, including improved 
varieties (see Chapter 3 for more detail of the methods used). 
Villages 1 and 2 were the most accessible of the villages visited, being only nine kilometres from 
Savannakhet City and located just off a major road. Both were established in the 1960s, having 
been relocated from another district. Though separate villages, they had a shared origin and similar 
agro-ecological conditions. The process of intensification of production in Village 1 began just one 
or two years before Village 2. Village 1 has had a longer history of involvement with international 
research projects.  
 
Figure 4.3 Savannakhet Province showing Outhoumphone, Champhone and Phalanxai 
districts.  
Source: Modified from Manivong et al. (2008, p.1) 
Village 1 was involved in the Lao-IRRI Project in the late 1990s and all households were said to 
now use improved varieties. Since the Lao-IRRI Project, interviewees remembered at least four 
other big international agricultural research projects working in the village on different aspects of 
agricultural production such as crop establishment and climate adaptation. Projects helped facilitate 
access to fertiliser and other inputs that could otherwise be difficult for households to purchase. 
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Though the farmers tried to maintain the practices once projects finished, usually they adapted them 
to reflect the low levels of inputs they were able to access without project support.  
The deputy head of Village 2 reported that all households in his village also used improved 
varieties, which were introduced in the mid-2000s by staff from Thasano, though farmers also 
mentioned getting improved seed from neighbouring villages. Traditional varieties were still used 
by some of the farmers interviewed. Three big international agricultural research projects had 
worked in this village in the last 15 years or so (one was ongoing at the time of the interview), each 
aiming to improve rice production in some way. However, as with Village 1, villagers here noted 
they found it difficult to continue using the practices after projects had finished because they could 
not afford or easily access the required inputs.  
Of the four villages visited, Village 3 was the most remote (though still only two to three hours 
from Savannakhet), connected by a narrow, bumpy, dirt road. Village 3 had the least connection to 
Thasano and the least exposure to international research projects. Households were still using 
traditional varieties but had started using improved varieties around 2010, after they were 
introduced by an international research project concerned with improving food production and 
marketing systems. Some of those interviewed stated that they wanted to maintain diversity and 
continue to use both traditional and improved seed. 
Village 4 had irrigation and had also been the site of several international agricultural research 
projects. One project was ongoing at the time of the visit, trialling strategies to support adaptation to 
climate variability, such as use of a direct seeder (Figure 4.4). As part of the project, regular field 
schools were held to discuss progress and challenges in the farming season and the farmers were 
receiving detailed weather information to guide timing of activities and crop choices. The village 
was well supported, with DAFO officers visiting twice each month and a PAFO officer attending 
once each month. Researchers from Thasano also visited as part of trialling transplanting machines 
and other new techniques. Some farmers had started using improved varieties from Thailand in the 
early 1990s, while others had only started to use improved varieties in 2009. 
Across all villages, there had been widespread use of improved varieties but, as was the case during 
the Lao-IRRI Project, the adoption of the other practices to support yield improvement, particularly 
fertiliser use, remained low. Households spoke about the benefits of improved varieties in 
conjunction with other changes, such as mechanised land preparation. Improved varieties gave 
higher yields, for some farmers up to 50 per cent higher, while mechanisation helped save labour. 
Increased yields supported improved livelihoods—but there were increased costs in terms of inputs 
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(seed, fertiliser, machine maintenance) and pest and disease problems. Generally speaking, 
households interviewed appreciated the yield increases, but their aim was not to maximise yield at 
any cost but rather to increase the efficiency of production to meet household needs and to free 
labour and other resources for other (often non-farm) activities. This is consistent with other studies 
(Newby et al. 2013, Manivong et al. 2014) which show how low returns to rice discourage farmers 
from investing in inputs to the ‘recommended’ levels.  
 
Figure 4.4 Researchers inspecting ‘the field’ in Savannakhet, July 2014.  
Notes: The rice (rainfed) was planted by direct seeder, as part of a project trialling options to reduce 
vulnerability to climate variability. Villages 2 and 4 were involved in this project. Source: Author. 
At the village level, a number of different Lao modern varieties were being used, as well as Thai 
varieties and traditional varieties. In Village 4, when asked about which varieties were in use, one 
farmer noted how they would often rename an improved variety, for example, after the person they 
had received it from. The diversity of varieties used may have declined, but households still 
selected for traits that were appropriate for household needs, labour, risk, and local conditions. 
Some households noted that they found it difficult to know which of the suite of available improved 
varieties were most suitable for their land.  
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International research projects had played a significant role in the introduction of Lao improved 
varieties into these villages—much as they did during the Lao-IRRI Project. This was true for all 
villages except Village 2, where interviewees mentioned Thasano rather than a project. Particularly 
in Village 1, which had a long history of being designated a ‘project village’, interviewees 
identified projects by the scientists and researchers rather than by the project name. 
Another similarity across villages was the persistent role of traditional practices around seed saving 
across seasons and farmer-to-farmer seed exchange. However, the use of improved seed had 
resulted in some changes to this practice. Households expressed annoyance at having to pay for a 
resource they had previously been able to manage and reuse for free. However, it was clear that the 
benefits of increased yields outweighed the costs, as farmers continued to use improved varieties 
and replenish seeds when required. The dissatisfaction reflects a process of adjustment in 
expectations that households were going through. Thasano was at the centre of farmer networks to 
replenish seed—whether households went to the centre themselves or obtained fresh seed from 
others who had recently been. In Village 3, there was a level of coordination across the village, with 
one person organising to purchase seed on behalf of all who wanted it. It should be remembered 
that, relative to the rest of Savannakhet Province, all these villages had reasonably good access to 
Thasano. 
4.4.2 Crop Research and Multiplication Centre, Thasano  
Thasano, located 40 minutes’ drive from Savannakhet City, is one of three centres responsible for 
seed production and distribution in Laos, being responsible for seed for the Central Region 
(Sacklokham 2014). The current Director has worked at Thasano since 1997 and was well known 
by many of the farmers I spoke to (and equally through government and international research 
circles). When I visited the station in 2013, sheds were stacked with bags of seed as machines 
buzzed and spluttered their way through the preparation of trays of seedlings for trials of a Kubota-
brand transplanting machine. When I visited in 2014, the transplanter had broken down and the 
Director was trying to source new transplanters and considering other forms of mechanisation. 
While my companions and I talked to the Director, a group of young girls picked through 
winnowing trays of rice to remove poor-quality grains—a venture into high-quality export of 
organic rice. There was a strong sense of entrepreneurialism here, with the Director seeking to 
capitalise on opportunities for organic production and linking local farmers with new markets for 
export or high-end sale in Vientiane. While the station pursued its innovative research program, 
shifting to biotechnology for quicker breeding and exploring mechanised production through MoUs 
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with the private sector, connection with Thasano was essential for many of the international 
research projects that came in and out of Savannakhet and relied on it for seed stock.  
The station was where basic seed multiplication was carried out, either for sale to farmers or to 
research projects. Since 2008, Thasano had been collaborating with farmer groups to produce 
registered and certified seeds—in effect supporting the development of a decentralised seed 
production system (Interview 2). Farmers multiplied seed in compliance with strict guidelines to 
preserve purity and quality, and either sold the seed back to PAFO or Thasano for a premium price 
or sold to other farmers (Sacklokham, forthcoming). This had been supported through the World 
Bank-funded Rice Productivity Improvement Project (RPIP), which funded equipment, initial seed 
stock, training, and technical support to farmers (World Bank 2012b). The central aims of the RPIP 
were to enhance the capacity of research stations to produce breeder and foundation seed, and to 
train small groups of farmers in seed multiplication leading to commercial seed production (World 
Bank 2012b).  
Systems for seed multiplication and distribution are still not well established. On the one hand, 
limited farmer demand means seed stocks are kept relatively low to avoid over-supply and spoiling 
(Interview 2). At the same time, international research projects—which have played an essential 
role in distribution of seed and supported their use by farmers—have ‘sudden and significant’ 
demands which can strain under-resourced centres (Schröder 2003). The RPIP project found a key 
constraint for the seed multiplication centres was a lack of operational funds, which had led to 
reliance on commercial arrangements with international projects. The government provided salaries 
for staff but expected or encouraged seed multiplication centres to cover operational costs through 
commercial seed production (World Bank 2012b). In contrast, at the household level, an absence of 
commercial seed markets limited the ability of households in the farmer group to sell high-quality 
seeds above the price of paddy rice (World Bank 2014).  
Thasano, or ‘the Centre’, was well known by many of the farmers interviewed. The role of the 
Director was crucial in building a strong profile and reputation for the Centre with farmers, across 
the different levels of government, and with international researchers. According to Schröder (2003, 
p.177), who evaluated seed production activities prior to RPIP, ‘seed rice production activities are 
mainly left to the personal initiative of the research station manager and the Thasano Research 
Station in Savannakhet can be regarded as an outstanding success story.’ The Director’s efforts 
extended to helping farmers in seed selection when they came to the station for seed. The Director 
did not leave the station during the month the farmers came because she wanted to talk to them and 
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ask them about their fields and cropping history so she could recommend a variety and teach them 
how to use it (Interview 2).  
4.5 Discussion 
The introduction of improved varieties across lowland Laos has had many benefits in terms of 
increased rice production and the effects on income and livelihoods that have flowed from this. The 
case presents an opportunity to examine scaling-up by directly influencing policy makers and 
capacity building to embed practices in government structures; and scaling-out by leveraging 
farmer practices of seed exchange, supported by international projects. However, the case also 
highlights how contextual factors, such as the role of the government and of influential individuals, 
such as the Vice Minister for Agriculture, can shape the effectiveness of these strategies.  
First, consider the role of government and of the socio-political context in which the project started. 
The conditions in Laos at the time the MoU was developed with IRRI and at the commencement of 
the project were dire: a country trying to rebuild after decades of war and revolution; a failed 
restructuring to collective production; significant and successive crop losses due to drought and 
flood, leading to severe food shortages. Interviews with key project staff conveyed an almost 
palpable sense that this project had to succeed. Prior to the Lao-IRRI Project, there was no specific 
or coordinating research entity in Laos, no national rice research program, and a relatively empty 
landscape in terms of international research projects (Interview 1). The open space into which the 
Lao-IRRI Project stepped helped assure the necessary political support and gave the room to 
develop a national network of rice research centres. By design (and direct instruction from the 
government), the project was able to put in place the architecture and connections to implement 
project activities at a national scale, with links across the provinces and down into the districts.  
Such direct access to high-level government officials and scope to build up a research program 
starting from the basics is rare. Perhaps it is most common in post-conflict states, where physical 
infrastructure, formal and informal institutions, and skills and capacity have been weakened or 
completely destroyed (Erskine and Nesbitt 2009). IRRI established a similar program to build 
capacity, establish a rice research program, and introduce improved varieties in Cambodia in 1986 
as that country struggled to rebuild after the destruction wrought by the Khmer Rouge (Nesbitt 
2003). Similarly, the Seeds of Life Program in Timor-Leste supported the development of a 
national policy and research capability for a range of seed crops after independence from Indonesia, 
fostered by close relationships with the emerging Government of Timor-Leste (Borges et al. 2009).  
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According to one of the former Lao-IRRI Project leaders, the basis of success for these kinds of 
programs is ‘the political will of the countries to make the programs work’ (Schiller, quoted in 
Gorsuch 2002, p.5). In this case, the combination of history and circumstance aligned the goals of 
the Government of Laos with the goals of the CGIAR, particularly IRRI, which is one of the key 
factors for successful scaling cited in the literature (Anyonge et al. 2001, Blomley and Ramadhani 
2006). However, it is more than just an alignment of intent that supports successful project 
outcomes. All international research projects must, to some degree, reflect national policy 
objectives, yet this does not necessarily lead to meaningful engagement with policy makers, nor 
widespread impact (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, government dissatisfaction with Lao-IRRI 
activities could have led to an entirely different outcome, as demonstrated by the dismissal of a key 
international scientist discussed in Section 4.3.1.  
Second, the task of the Lao-IRRI Project began with a focus on developing the capacity of the 
institutions and individuals within Laos to establish and take ownership of a rice research program. 
Horton (2002) highlights the importance of mentoring, beyond one-off training events, to 
effectively build capacity, and this was certainly a feature of the Lao-IRRI Project. The project’s 
extensive capacity-building efforts were sufficient to establish a national capability and system. It 
seems clear that the extent of impacts on the ground, in terms of the number of varietal releases 
suitable to different environments and their use across the country, would not have been possible 
without the scale of capacity-building that occurred. While the national program has continued and 
releases of improved varieties are ongoing, since the Lao-IRRI Project finished concerns have been 
raised about whether the research capacity has been—or can be—sustained (Thepphavong and 
Sipaseuth 2007, Clarke et al. 2015). Data from this study do not directly affirm this concern, though 
they do suggest that current research capacity is dependent on key individuals. One interviewee 
suggested that a combination of lack of specialist agricultural skills at the district level, a disconnect 
between extension and research, and government pressure to release new varieties was transferring 
higher risk to farmers as varieties are released without adequate testing (Interview 3).  
Third, consider the processes at play in promoting scale-out of improved varieties. In the absence of 
government operational support for breeding and with a still-nascent extension system, the Lao-
IRRI Project largely depended on promotion of the varieties in project sites and subsequent farmer 
exchange to spread the varieties. Farmer observation of new practices in other farmers’ fields is a 
long-held way to select new seeds to trial (Sacklokham forthcoming, Appa Rao et al. 2006a). 
However, the capacity of the project to provide and distribute seed also depended heavily on other 
international research projects, which brought seeds to additional areas and supported farmers with 
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information on their use. International projects have played an important role in expanding the use 
of new varieties, with many villages first gaining access to the varieties with the arrival of an 
international project in their area. However, Schröder (2003) points out that this has led to a 
preference of the Government of Laos for projects to fund seed multiplication, rather than itself 
ensuring basic availability as a public good. Recent efforts to encourage commercial production 
have been limited by a lack of households willing to pay premiums for good seed (World Bank 
2012b).  
One of the key constraints to a commercial market for seed is the long-held practices in Laos for 
selecting, multiplying, and exchanging seeds at the household and village levels. The result of these 
practices has been that farmers typically had a range of varieties highly suited to their conditions 
and preferences. The introduction of improved varieties has shifted this knowledge from farming 
households to research and extension services. New varieties are developed by scientists, albeit with 
the involvement of some farmers, whether through participatory varietal selection or other studies 
that aim to understand what traits farmers value. These participatory approaches were strong themes 
within the Lao-IRRI Project and remain good practice in rice varietal development today. However, 
in contrast to past farmer practices, where each farmer would be connected to seed selection and 
varietal development through their own processes of exchange and experimentation, most farmers 
are now more removed from the process of developing improved varieties. Participatory varietal 
selection directly involves only a sample of farmers. 
 One of the reflections of farmers in the village discussions was that they were now less certain 
about selecting varieties suitable for their land and soil types. Sacklokham (forthcoming) likewise 
found farmers wanted more varieties for specific environments and better information regarding 
under what conditions different varieties were most suited to give optimal results. Disconnecting 
varietal development from farmers has undermined their familiarity with the suitability of seeds for 
different areas. This is observable in other aspects of production, with ritual and ceremonies 
traditionally used to inform key decisions such as the timing of planting now replaced by scientific 
knowledge and recommendations (Hatsadong et al. 2006, Simmalavong 2011). Efforts by seed 
centres to collaborate with farmer groups to multiply seed could be one mechanism to build farmer 
understanding of the range of improved varieties.  
Impacts that emerge over time are also more profound than an increase in rice yield at the farm 
level and point to fundamental transitions in production and markets. In the science of plant 
breeding, there is an accepted or implicit acknowledgement that pests and diseases will eventually 
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evolve, or the seed stock will deteriorate, such that breeders need to keep ahead of these processes 
(Lipton and Longhurst 1989). Varietal improvement does not stop with the release of a high-
yielding variety but is a continuous process of adaptation. The release of a relatively simple 
technology such as improved seed into the system likewise triggers a series of social and 
institutional adjustments—as households re-interpret recommendations to suit their resources; as 
new and old practices of resource management are adjusted to accommodate each other; or as 
knowledge and understanding of varieties is re-housed to sit with breeders rather than farmers.  
4.6 Summary and conclusion  
The Lao-IRRI Project was successful in meeting its key aims: establishing a national research 
capacity and system for rice research in Laos; introducing improved varieties that met the needs and 
conditions of Lao farmers; and supporting Laos to become self-sufficient in rice production. 
Improved varieties suited to the Lao context are now widely used in lowland areas across the 
country, although distribution and supply systems are still under-developed. Central to the efforts of 
the project were strategies to build capacity of individual researchers while embedding the 
approaches and skills fostered through IRRI within Lao systems of government and research. This 
process followed a classic pattern of bringing technology, approaches, and varieties from IRRI in 
the Philippines and Thailand to Laos, adapting and testing for local conditions, and disseminating to 
farmers, while being sensitive to farmers’ goals and circumstances. 
The design of the Lao-IRRI Project of course contributed to this success. Varietal research was 
conducted in each district to ensure relevance to the different agro-ecological zones, that is, the goal 
from the outset was to be relevant at scale, and the project was designed and implemented with this 
in mind. Farmers were involved in selecting and testing varieties, thus overcoming some of the 
issues that had discouraged use of high-yielding varieties in the past. The Lao-IRRI team was based 
in-country, and was careful to ensure a sense of Lao ownership over the program. The program was 
also well-funded, over a sufficient period of time to allow for the development of infrastructure and 
researcher skills for a functioning research system. 
However, there is more to this than good planning. The timing of the program was critical. Framed 
by an urgent need to improve rice production, the Lao-IRRI Project had vital political support from 
the government to carry out its activities, and did so with sensitivity to the local context. It also had 
support from key individuals, such as the (Vice) Minister for Agriculture, who had a personal 
connection to IRRI and understood and promoted the goals of the project within government. The 
relationship with government is critical in this case in terms of the goal of building a national 
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capacity and program in rice research, but also due to the government’s role in facilitating (or 
blocking) access to the provinces and districts.  
Crucial operational support was also provided by the Director of Thasano, whose dedication to seed 
multiplication has supported other international projects to disseminate seeds, but who is also 
deeply personally committed in her role to promote and support the farmers of the region in 
improving their production. Without such commitment or dynamism, there would have been more 
substantial gaps in seed accessibility than has been the case.  
At the household level, introduction of new varieties has been supported by farmer practices of seed 
exchange, but these systems have had to be adapted to account for different management 
requirements compared to traditional varieties. International research and development projects 
remain central actors in facilitating household access to improved varieties and other inputs, 
especially fertiliser.  
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5 Mechanisation of rice farming in Thailand 
In this chapter I examine the small-scale mechanisation of rice farming in Thailand. The diffusion 
of farm machinery, particularly water pumps and two-wheel tractors, was rapid in Thailand from 
the mid-1960s. It occurred in conjunction with the emergence of a dynamic and innovative local 
manufacturing industry and with limited promotion by government. The role of research was 
indirect in some cases (such as providing the broader package of technology that intensified rice 
production and encouraged mechanisation) and catalytic in others (such as providing blueprints for 
local manufacturers, saving considerable time and cost for the manufacturers in testing).  
This case provides an alternative understanding of strategies to take technology to scale, with 
private-sector actors and farmers initially contributing to the promotion and spread of technology, 
largely independent from the efforts of government. Examining the stories of how different types of 
machinery (pumps, tractors, threshers, and harvesters) were developed and spread, it is possible to 
develop a generalised understanding of why and how mechanisation in Thailand progressed. In 
contrast to the case of improved rice varieties in Laos, exploration of mechanisation in Thailand 
does not centre on a single program or department but on a diverse set of actors and their efforts.  
5.1 Agricultural development and mechanisation in Thailand 
Leturque and Wiggins (2011, p.3) refer to Thailand as ‘a prime example of successful agriculture 
development in an industrialising country’, managing to decrease poverty from 57 per cent to less 
than 10 per cent nationally. The reduction in poverty was largely driven by economic growth, 
industrialisation, and rural-urban migration (Leturque and Wiggins 2011). A significant element in 
this story has been mechanisation of farming in Thailand, which has been one of the most rapid and 
extensive mechanisation processes in Southeast Asia (Cramb 2017). 
Agricultural development in Thailand can be discussed in three broad stages: (a) extensive 
production; (b) expansion in land area and introduction of Green Revolution technologies; and (c) 
intensive, specialised production (Chomchalow 1993, Kasem and Thapa 2012, Soni 2016). Prior to 
1955, agricultural production was extensive, low-input, and predominately for subsistence and 
domestic markets (Chomchalow 1993). Farming systems were mostly rice monocultures with low 
productivity. Land preparation was done by buffalo-drawn plough, while transplanting, weeding, 
and harvesting were all done by hand. Where irrigation was possible, it was conducted with scoops 
or water wheels (Cramb 2017).  
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The period from 1955 to roughly the late 1970s was marked by expansion—the population was 
growing rapidly and there was a resulting increase in the area used for farming, largely by way of 
forest clearing (Chomchalow 1993). Mechanisation in the form of four-wheel tractors supported the 
expansion of land area (Wattanuchariya 1983). The Thai Government priorities at the time—as 
represented through the National Economic and Social Development Plans (NESDP)—were to 
increase agricultural production by means of expansion and the introduction of Green Revolution 
technologies, and included investment in infrastructure for irrigation and roads (Kasem and Thapa 
2012, Chomchalow 1993, see also Table 5.1, below). The area of irrigated land increased from 1.7 
million hectares in 1970 to 3.1 million hectares in 1980 (Leturque and Wiggins 2011, p.18). The 
provision of irrigation infrastructure, introduction of improved varieties, and use of fertiliser 
enabled production to be intensified and brought the possibility of double cropping, especially in 
the Central Plain. The use of tractors, pumps, threshers, and harvesters expanded from here on, 
propelled by increasingly favourable conditions (Cramb 2017).  
As shown in Table 5.1, after the limits of land expansion were reached, government priorities 
shifted to productivity gains through intensive agriculture. At the same time, the Thai economy was 
restructuring and new industries were emerging. As rural people were drawn into non-farm jobs, 
farmers began to face labour shortages and rising labour costs. Mechanisation had become more 
appealing, providing a strategy to ease labour shortages and reduce labour costs, as well as enabling 
more timely operations in double-cropping areas (Khan 1985). The increased yields enabled by 
intensive production made machinery more financially viable for smaller farms (Lipton and 
Longhurst 1989). From the 1990s onwards, agricultural growth would be supported by investment 
in farm capital (machines), improved technology and intensification of land use, and diversification 
into high-value, non-rice crops (Cramb 2017). Even through the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–
1998, agriculture provided a safety net for many (Leturque and Wiggins 2011). 
Throughout this period, agriculture in Thailand has been dominated by smallholder farmers. Thirty-
two per cent of landholders are defined as small to very small (owning up to 1.4 hectares of land), 
with the national average farm size only 2.9 hectares (Rerkasem 2008). As such, the Thai 
smallholder farmer has persisted, despite predictions of demise in the face of economic 
development (Rigg et al. 2016). 
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Table 5.1 Summary of NESDPs as they relate to farm machinery  
NESDP (years)  Content relevant to agriculture and mechanisation 
First (1962–1966) First three plans emphasise increased production through 
expansion of agricultural land and promotion of Green 
Revolution technologies.  
Third plan introduced emphasis on double cropping and support 
for local industry.  
Second (1967–1971) 
Third (1972–1976) 
Fourth (1977–1981)  
Fifth (1982–1986) 
Shift to focus on increasing agricultural productivity rather than 
cultivated area. Increased production through appropriate 
technology and improvements to cropping systems and livestock.  
Mechanisation becomes a priority. Supporting strategies include 
promotion of rural industry, expansion of irrigated area, support 
for farm cooperatives and improved loan access through the 
Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). 
Sixth (1987–1991) Mechanisation a strategy to increase agricultural productivity.  
National policy for agricultural mechanisation outlined, 
including aims relating to access to low-cost agricultural 
machinery; quality and price; and suitability for various 
conditions across Thailand.  
Seventh (1992–1996) Turn towards sustainable agriculture and promotion of value-
adding activities for agricultural products.  
Added objectives regarding R&D of machines for characteristics 
of farmers; new machines for Thai farm conditions. 
Eighth (1997–2001) 
Ninth (2002–2006) 
Focus on sustainable agriculture and organic production, 
promotion of agro-industry.  
No explicit mechanisation agenda, but includes a general 
objective to replace human labour with agricultural machinery 
and make Thai agriculture more competitive.  
Source: Synthesised from Cowell (1977), Chakkaphak (1978), Anchan (1983), Chakkaphak 
and Cochran (1986), Rijk (1989), Chamsing and Singh (2000), Soni (2016), Kasem and 
Thapa (2012).  
Development across Thailand has occurred unevenly across the four regions: Northern, Northeast, 
Central, and Southern (Figure 5.1). The Northeast is home to almost half the farming population 
and the largest area of land used to grow rice, but it is remote—both politically and 
geographically—and has less favourable farming conditions, including low rainfall and sandy soils 
(Butler et al. 2017). 
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The Northern region has mixed upland and lowland areas and diverse land use including lowland 
rice, maize, and high-value horticulture, while the South is characterised by rubber and oil palm 
plantations (Cramb 2017). The Central Region, which encompasses Bangkok and includes fertile 
alluvial soils of the Chao Phraya Delta, is referred to as the ‘rice basket’ of Thailand, though in 
recent decades double-cropping of rice has often been replaced by other high-value crops such as 
fruit, vegetables, and flowers. The Central Region17 was the focus of irrigation infrastructure 
provision programs, the first to double-crop rice crop rice, and the first where agricultural 
machinery was used on a wide scale (Sukharomana 1983). In the following sections I consider 
some of the processes, events, and conditions that contributed to the rapid spread of machinery 
which began in the Central Region and extended well beyond. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Regions of Thailand 
Source: CartoGIS Services, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.  
                                               
17 The most fertile area is the Central Plain, which spans the central part of the Central Region, and the 
southern part of the Northern Region.  
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5.2 Development, adaptation, and spread of farm machinery 
There is no single identifiable ‘project’ that drove mechanisation in this case study. The 
Government of Thailand took a relatively hands-off approach to mechanisation and engaged 
significantly only when the process of mechanisation was already well underway. Some support 
was provided for R&D, but higher-level policy and programs that dealt with agricultural machinery 
were largely absent until the late 1970s (Table 5.1). By the time mechanisation was reflected as a 
policy in the five-year NESDP, small pumps and two-wheel tractors were already widespread.  
Early efforts to introduce agricultural machinery in Thailand can be traced back to as early as 1891 
(Soni 2016). These attempts were characterised by the unsuitability of imported machines for Thai 
field conditions—machines that were too large for small farms and too heavy for operation in wet-
season paddy fields. However, perhaps more importantly, the drivers and pre-conditions for 
mechanisation were not present (Cowell 1977). Despite these various experiments and 
demonstrations, it was not until the early 1960s that farmers began to show an interest in 
mechanising field operations (Khan 1985). Mechanisation started with power-intensive machines, 
such as water pumps, two-wheel tractors, and threshers, and then expanded to control-intensive 
machines, such as combine harvesters (Chamsing and Singh 2000, Thepent 2009).18 
5.2.1 Axial-flow pumps 
According to Burns (1993, p.781), the low-lift portable pump which replaced manual water-lifting 
devices was the ‘most important engineering innovation for wet-rice irrigation in the last 80 years.’ 
Low-lift pumps are used where water is available less than three metres from the surface (IRRI 
1983). The introduction of pumps into Thailand allowed for better management of water levels in 
rainfed crops, and in some areas allowed for two or three rice crops to be grown per year 
(Chinsuwan and Cochran 1986). Pumps enable water to be moved from rivers to canal systems and 
then to farmers’ fields (Burns 1993). Axial-flow pumps, which have an impeller encased in tubing 
to draw water up, were widely successful in Thailand and Vietnam19 (IRRI 1983). Pumps were 
                                               
18 Binswanger (1986, p.38) states ‘[o]perations can be grouped in terms of the intensity with which they 
require power (or energy) relative to the control functions of the human mind (or judgement).’ Binswanger 
elaborates that the comparative advantage of mechanising power-intensive operations (milling, threshing, 
water pumping) means they are mechanised first, whereas control-intensive operations are mechanised later 
in response to high or increasing wages. 
19 In Vietnam, the pump was designed and first made by a rice farmer who had worked for a French dredging 
company and based the pump on the design of the dredgers (Rigg 2012, Biggs 2012).  
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usually powered by small petrol engines or two-wheel tractors as they became more common 
(Chinsuwan and Cochran 1986). The spread of the pump was described as ‘dramatic’ (Burns 1993) 
and as an ‘instant success’ (Sukharomana 1983).  
Debriddhi Tavakul, an engineer with the Department of Agriculture, developed the Thai axial-flow 
pump in 1941 (Chinsuwan and Cochran 1986). Debriddhi aimed to design a simple, low-cost pump 
that small manufacturers could easily produce, but this early design was never made commercially 
available. The original wooden design was modified in 1955 to have steel parts (Chinsuwan and 
Cochran 1986). The design was shared with manufacturers in Bangkok and the Central Region, 
who were able to replicate it with limited technical support (Chinsuwan and Cochran 1986). 
Though Phélinas (2001) notes that some water pumps were imported in the 1950s, it is the locally 
produced axial-flow pump based on Debriddhi’s design that led to the rapid spread of mechanised 
pumping for agriculture in Thailand (Chinsuwan and Cochran 1986, Sukharomana 1983). Farmers 
were looking for ways to secure and control their water supply, save labour, and achieve more 
timely irrigation, and interest in the pump grew quickly (Phélinas 2001).  
 
Figure 5.2 Bangkok and nearby provinces, Thailand  
Note: Suphanburi and Chachoengsao (shaded) had a concentration of manufacturers and were sites 
of early experimentation in machinery due to favourable farm conditions and proximity to 
Bangkok. Source: Modified from CartoGIS Services, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian 
National University 
 98 
Chachoengsao and Suphanburi Provinces in the Central Region were the two main areas where the 
pumps were manufactured (Figure 5.2). Both provinces are suited to lowland, irrigated paddy 
production. Both Debriddhi and private manufacturers continued to refine the design of the pump 
after its release. Private manufacturers made modifications to suit the local requirements of their 
customers. In Chachoengsao, manufacturers lessened the flow restriction to reduce power use and 
made other minor adjustments so it was easier to produce and maintain (Chinsuwan and Cochran 
1986). In Suphanburi, manufacturers enlarged the water inlet and added blades to the impeller to 
increase efficiency (Chinsuwan and Cochran 1986).  
Limited statistics are available on the number of pumps used for agriculture and most do not 
distinguish between use for agriculture and for domestic use. Rijk (1989) estimates the total number 
of pumps for agricultural use in selected years, shown in Table 5.2. Compared against Chinsuwan 
and Cochran’s (1986) estimate of axial-flow pumps, we can see that the axial-flow pump made up a 
large proportion of agricultural pumps. Table 5.2 also highlights the steady increase in the number 
of axial-flow pumps, with an average annual growth rate of 38 per cent between 1967 and 1983. 
Table 5.2 Number of pumps in Thailand 1967–1985 
Year  Total pumpsa Pumps for 
agricultural useb 
Axial-flow pumpsa 
1967 .. .. 80,000 
1975 251,228 .. 175,902 
1976 277,084 .. 193,959 
1977 317,328 .. 222,130 
1978 359,308 289,827 251,516 
1979 473,975 .. 331,783 
1980 517,975 .. 362,583 
1981 603,548 438,382 422,484 
1982 780,610 .. 546,427 
1983 858,671 .. 601,070 
1985 .. .. 614,791 
Source: aChinsuwan and Cochran (1986, p.201); bRijk (1989, p.177). 
In their analysis of the speed with which the pumps spread, Chinsuwan and Cochran (1986) 
emphasise the suitability of the pump’s design for local conditions and its affordability. The use of 
pumps in irrigation preceded planning and exceeded expectations. One project found as much as 25 
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per cent of areas they had earmarked for tertiary and on-farm irrigation development were already 
being irrigated with low-lift pumps (Burns 1993).  
5.2.2 Two- and four-wheel tractors20  
Over a period of more than 50 years, various unsuccessful attempts were made to introduce 
mechanised forms of land preparation to Thailand (Appendix 10.5). The common theme in all these 
attempts is that the machines were unsuitable for Thai field conditions. Early tractors were too large 
for the small Thai fields, too heavy for the muddy fields, and too expensive. In the 1950s, 
researchers at the Rangsit Rice Experiment Station tried to start a four-wheel tractor hire service for 
land preparation (Chakkaphak and Cochran 1986). However, farmers were wary of the negative 
impacts of using the tractor, believing it would lead to soil compaction, leak oil, plough too deep, 
and affect soil quality. The hire service was unviable and eventually abandoned (Chakkaphak and 
Cochran 1986). 
Perceptions changed with the importation of two-wheel tractors in the mid-1950s as farming 
conditions changed—increased access to irrigation and expansion in land area for cropping meant 
mechanisation had more benefits to offer, saving time and supporting double cropping. Farmers 
were interested in the machines, particularly a Japanese two-wheel tractor which was suited to small 
farms, and local workshops began to copy and adapt the tractors based on farmer feedback and local 
conditions (Thepent 2009). A local manufacturing industry emerged in response to the strong 
demand, particularly in the Central Region and around Bangkok (Wiboonchutikula 1983, 
Sukharomana 1983).  
The local industry was characterised by its ability to adapt and adjust designs (Khan 1985). Local 
manufacturers modified the gearbox used in Japanese two-wheel tractors, reducing the cost 
(Sukharomana 1983). Manufacturers also increased the length of the steering handles on two-wheel 
tractors to make steering easier in the uneven, and sometimes rocky, Thai fields, and to better 
balance the weight of the tractor (Sato et al. 1999). Later adaptations included improvements to the 
clutch, forward and reverse speeds, and the addition of a steering clutch (Rijk 1989).There were no 
protections or regulations on design of machines, and once a workshop had successfully adapted a 
design (as demonstrated through sales and farmer feedback) other workshops would copy the local 
adaptation, driving competition (Sukharomana 1983). Cowell (1977) describes one small 
                                               
20 Two-wheel tractor is used here to refer to single-axle, self-propelled machines with changeable 
attachments, sometimes referred to throughout Asia as a ‘power tiller.’ 
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manufacturer who copied a two-wheel tractor from pictures in a catalogue that he borrowed from 
his neighbour, selling 10,000 of these tractors in eight years.  
The Agricultural Engineering Division (AED) in the Department of Agriculture also worked on 
different tractor models, in particular trying to develop a four-wheel tractor. The first successful 
design was a modification of the two-wheel tractor. The AED increased the engine power and 
added two small wheels and a seat, and a small Thai four-wheel tractor nicknamed ‘iron buffalo’ 
was released (Chakkaphak and Cochran 1986). A Thai company further developed the model for 
sale but it was still relatively expensive and the company folded in the late 1960s (Wattanuchariya 
1983). Four-wheel tractors were either imported, or assembled by locally-based multinational 
companies like Ford and Massey Ferguson (Soni 2016).  
Chakkaphak (1978) describes patterns of two- and four-wheel tractor use based on the type of 
machine and environmental conditions. Large imported four-wheel tractors were used for land 
preparation in upland areas or areas where rice was broadcast rather than transplanted. Smaller 
tractors, mostly locally made, were used in the lowland paddy areas. Table 5.3 shows the rapid 
increase in tractor numbers from 1975 to 2000. In the space of just 15 years, land preparation in 
Thailand went from almost entirely being done by buffalo-drawn plough to having as much as 55 
per cent of crop area prepared by machines (Ramsay 1985). Preparation by buffalo was too slow to 
meet timeframes needed for double cropping (Jongsuwat 1980). In the Central Region, almost all 
land preparation was done by machine at this time (Binswanger 1986). This rapid change was due 
to a combination of the rapid spread of two-wheel tractors, popularised due to their low cost and 
multi-functionality, and the hire services that emerged, mostly for four-wheel-tractors, utilised by 
larger farmers who had large areas of upland crops (Chancellor 1971). This is explored further in 
Section 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Number of two- and four-wheel tractors in Thailand, 1975–2000 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Two-wheel tractorsa 90,000 284,000 380,000 595,000 1,510,000 1,753,639 2,310,000 
Four-wheel tractorsb 7,000 18,000 31,415 57,739 148,841 439,139 n.a. 
Source: aCramb (2017); bWorld Bank (2017). 
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5.2.3 Axial-flow thresher 
Experimentation with mechanical threshing in Thailand started as early as 1956 (Chakkaphak and 
Cochran 1986, Appendix 5). The AED tried to develop a prototype and imported a large number of 
Japanese pedal threshers, but there was no farmer interest and most units stayed in storage until 
1975 (Mongkoltanatas 1986). None of the drivers for farmers to mechanise threshing were present: 
farmers were only producing one crop and labour was in abundant supply (Mongkoltanatas 1986). 
Under these circumstances traditional methods such as hand beating and treading by humans or 
animals were sufficient (Juarez and Pathnopas 1983). However, with improvements in irrigation 
and the introduction of modern varieties allowing for a second crop, and as labour became scarce, 
mechanical threshing became more attractive (Mongkoltanatas 1986).  
In 1975, AED sold the remaining pedal threshers that had been in storage since the 1950s—all units 
(approximately 400) were sold within a few months of becoming available (Mongkoltanatas 1986). 
In contrast to the earlier effort to introduce the threshers in the 1950s, this time they were 
affordable, supported by extension information, and relevant to farming activities (Mongkoltanatas 
1986). The sale of these threshers provided evidence to local manufacturers that a mechanical 
thresher was a viable business proposition (Mongkoltanatas 1986). The farmer interest was present, 
but there had been little progress in developing a thresher that was suitable to Thai field conditions. 
It was at this juncture that a partnership with IRRI played a central role. 
The Thai-IRRI Small Farm Mechanisation Project started in 1967 and aimed to increase access to 
machines by smallholder farmers. The project placed IRRI engineers alongside the engineers in the 
AED and supported the adaptation of IRRI machines to suit local conditions (Cowell 1977). As part 
of formal project efforts, engineers from AED and IRRI worked directly with a number of 
manufacturers on testing and adapting designs (Cowell 1977). Manufacturers heard of the project 
through personal networks and promotional demonstrations (Mongkoltanatas 1986). Designs spread 
beyond the manufacturers working directly with the project, with many non-project companies 
using the same designs (Cowell 1977). The manufacturers had a business interest in promoting the 
threshers and held their own field demonstrations to advertise and encourage farmers to use their 
machines (Juarez and Pathnopas 1983). 
Since 1967 IRRI in the Philippines had been developing an axial-flow thresher that would be more 
suitable than existing models, which were too large and not suited to Asian rice varieties (Khan 
1985). After some success using the machine in the Philippines, the blueprint for the thresher was 
shared with AED, which tested and adapted it with support from IRRI staff, and then shared it with 
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a number of local manufacturers (Khan 1985). The AED and IRRI worked closely with 
manufacturers to reproduce the model. The first thresher was made in Chachoengsao, but the model 
demonstrated poor grain cleaning and high losses in separating and screening (Mongkoltanatas 
1986). Problems were reported back to IRRI in the Philippines to aid refinement of the design.  
In 1976 a new IRRI thresher design was shared and successfully modified for local conditions by a 
local manufacturer, and then directly copied by others nearby (Mongkoltanatas 1986, Figure 5.3). 
IRRI continued to send improved thresher designs to AED but there was reduced interest from risk-
averse manufacturers. According to Mongkoltanatas (1986, p.392): ‘[manufacturers] felt that 
because the locally modified models which had been widely adopted performed satisfactorily, it 
was not advisable to shift to a new model which had undergone only limited tests.’ 
 
Figure 5.3 Prototype of IRRI axial-flow thresher Model TH3, designs for which were released 
in Thailand in 1976. 
Source: Khan (1986, p.378). 
The threshers were most popular in the Central Region, where there was reasonable irrigation and 
large areas under double cropping; in areas where double cropping was not possible there was 
limited use as traditional methods were still deemed sufficient (Sukharomana 1983). The thresher 
was first used in Chachoengsao Province, Central Region, and spread rapidly to other areas under 
double cropping (Khan 1985, Sukharomana 1983). Chachoengsao Province was seen as more 
‘advanced’ than other provinces, and benefited from a close proximity to Bangkok and well-
developed road and irrigation infrastructure (Tomosugi 1995). It also had an entrepreneurial set of 
local manufacturers who worked with AED-IRRI on the designs. Somporn et al. (2000) surveyed 
villages in the Central Region and the Northeast and found the thresher had been ‘fully adopted’ in 
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irrigated survey areas by 1987 because it allowed for quicker turn-around of crops and released 
labour for other activities; by 1998 the thresher was used in both non-irrigated and irrigated 
environments. By this time, the thresher had begun to be replaced in the Central Region by the 
combine harvester (Thepent 2009). 
The first farmers to try the threshers were typically wealthy. In a small sample of farmers using 
threshers in Chachoengsao, Cowell (1977) found they had an average of 17.9 hectares of land, and 
almost all had businesses in addition to farming. As with tractors, farmers who bought threshers 
hired out their services (Cowell 1977, Mongkoltanatas 1986). A survey conducted in Chachoengsao 
and Suphanburi in 1978–1979 by Juarez and Pathnopas (1983) found most farmers had first come 
across the threshers in use on other people’s farms. The farmers who initially purchased threshers 
and set up hire services were influential—Juarez and Pathnopas (1983) found that up to 80 per cent 
of rice threshed at their survey sites was threshed by machine contracting services. The use of hire 
services has remained the major mechanism for farmers to access threshers. According to the 2013 
Agricultural Census, of the landholdings where mechanical threshers were used, 97 per cent were 
accessed via service providers.  
Use of threshers was lower in other regions, depending on the characteristics of their farming 
systems. In the North, where long rice straw was used for production of garlic and mushrooms, the 
thresher’s design to cut straw into short pieces made it undesirable (Mongkoltanatas 1986). In the 
South, the thresher was not suitable for the rice varieties grown (Mongkoltanatas 1986).  
5.2.4 Thai combine harvester 
In 1958 Debriddhi, who had pioneered the design of the axial-flow pump, also developed a 
prototype of a harvester for Thai fields but never released the design for commercial use (Chamsing 
and Singh 2000, Soni 2016). Combine harvesters were imported in the late 1970s from Japan, 
Europe, and the United States (see Appendix 5). The harvesters were designed for larger fields, 
were cumbersome and heavy to transport between the smaller Thai fields, were expensive, and were 
not well-designed to harvest the diversity of rice varieties grown in Thailand (Krishnasreni and 
Kiatwat 1998). However, there was interest in the machines from farmers, and manufacturers were 
interested in producing them (Cowell 1977).  
Following the collaborative approach previously used with IRRI, AED partnered with 
manufacturers in Bangkok to develop a combine harvester based on the design principles of 
imported machines, but adapted to Thai field conditions (Krishnasreni and Kiatwat 1998). AED 
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provided technical expertise, training materials, and advice, while the private sector provided labour 
and materials (Krishnasreni and Kiatwat 1998). Limitations in local manufacturing techniques led 
to some initial challenges with parts breaking (Krishnasreni and Kiatwat 1998). Nevertheless, 
according to Chamsing and Singh (2000), the model became the basic template for all locally-made 
combine harvesters.  
The combine harvester was initially used mostly in the Central Region, which had more intensive 
rice production and more wealth than other regions, but has since spread to the Northeast. As with 
the tractors and threshers, hire services for harvesters facilitated access and served to promote and 
demonstrate the potential of the technology. The harvester was found to have totally displaced 
threshers in several areas of the Central Region by 1998 (Somporn et al. 2000). The rapid uptake of 
combine harvesters and bulk transport of rice to millers prompted the introduction of mechanical 
rice dryers, mostly to the millers rather than farmers (Thepent 2009). The use of harvesters meant a 
large volume of rice was coming to millers at the same time, usually with high moisture content 
(Thepent 2009). Mechanical dryers allowed for more rapid drying of large quantities of rice to the 
point where it could be milled.  
5.3 Understanding ‘spontaneous’ scaling of mechanisation in Thailand 
In this case study, in contrast to the other cases in the thesis, there was no single project or actor that 
can be seen to have driven efforts to scale mechanisation. Government, through the AED, imported 
models of tractors which were largely unsatisfactory, until manufacturers in Japan developed 
machines suited to small farms which in turn provided a template for local manufacturers to adapt 
and improve. There was an iterative process of farmer trial, rejection, and selection that drove the 
refinement process. Manufacturers and dealers were at the centre of networks for advertising, 
promotion, and demonstration of agricultural machinery in Thailand for both small machines (two-
wheel tractors and pumps) and larger machines (four-wheel tractors, threshers, and harvesters). The 
success of local manufacturers was supported through collaboration with IRRI in sharing and 
further refining designs from the Philippines.  
In this section I examine the different actors and their respective roles in supporting the wide-scale 
development and use of machinery in Thai rice farming in the Central Region and some of the 
limitations and challenges of the process. 
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5.3.1 Key actors and processes 
(a) Agricultural Engineering Division. M.R. Debriddhi Tavakul, who was instrumental in the 
design of the Thai axial-flow pump and harvester, founded the AED in 1957 under the Department 
of Agriculture in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Chinsuwan and Cochran 1986).21 The AED 
had primary responsibility for farm machinery in Thailand. Though other departments, such as 
Agricultural Extension, also had some involvement, there was limited cooperation across 
departments (Rijk 1989). In 1989, AED had 500 staff, of which about 35 per cent were working on 
research-related activities, 21 per cent on development and training, and the rest allocated to service 
and repair of government equipment (Rijk 1989).  
AED experimented with the introduction of imported machines and designing machines in 
Thailand. In doing so, they brought new ideas into the agricultural system—albeit ideas that were 
initially ahead of the enabling context and farmer readiness. Their efforts highlighted the potential 
for improvement that eventually encouraged local industry (Chancellor 1971). They also had 
responsibility for providing training to government staff and farmers on machine maintenance and 
operation, mostly through training centres located outside of Bangkok. According to Rijk (1989), 
the AED provided technical information and support to government policy-makers regarding 
agricultural machinery. For example, AED played a role in the introduction of industry standards, 
though there was limited interest from industry to standardise production (Krishnasreni and Kiatwat 
1998). 
The Department of Agricultural Extension was established in the 1970s and had a Farm 
Mechanisation subdivision which aimed to bring together extension activities that had previously 
been spread over a range of departments under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Rijk 1989). 
The sub-division’s role in the case study is unclear based on information available.  
Beyond these departments, the Thai Government’s role was largely in setting regulatory and other 
institutional conditions, such as increasing the availability of credit to farmers, changing import and 
export taxes, or imposing import quotas to protect local manufacturing. These changes are 
discussed throughout the following sections. 
(b) International research institutes and networks. IRRI’s Agricultural Engineering Department 
was established in the 1960s with a focus on designing equipment to meet the needs of smallholder 
                                               
21 Now the Agricultural Engineering Research Institute, Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives. 
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rice farmers (Chancellor 1998).22 IRRI entered into the mechanisation process in Thailand when it 
was already well underway and sought to support, expand, and improve it through technology 
design and building the capacity of manufacturers and AED staff (Cowell 1977). Strategically, this 
fell under IRRI’s ‘industrial extension’ activities, which aimed to provide direct support to 
manufacturers and develop machine designs that could be produced from easily accessible materials 
(Chancellor 1998). Support was limited to IRRI designs only, leaving local actors to develop 
designs largely unsupported (Cowell 1977). Chancellor (1998, p.33) listed a total of 102 IRRI-
designed machines available for adaptation and use in Thailand.  
A handful of other international research projects and networks were also operating at this time, 
mostly partnered with the AED, including the Regional Network for Farm Machinery (RNAM, now 
Centre for Sustainable Agricultural Mechanisation, funded by UNESCAP). RNAM sought to share 
insights and lessons between member countries and foster an Asian farm machinery industry (as 
opposed to the European or American industries that catered to very different agro-ecological, 
economic, and social conditions). Member countries included Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India. RNAM aimed to support policy and 
share prototypes between countries but, according to Rahman (1986), it was limited by insufficient 
funds, lack of trained personnel, and stifling bureaucratic procedures between countries. In 
Thailand, RNAM may have supported higher-level coordination through the National Committee 
on Agricultural Machinery but there was little evidence of RNAM’s effectiveness.  
(c) Local manufacturers. Through the 1960s and 1980s, the Thai agricultural manufacturing 
industry was characterised by a large number of small firms, most of which started as repair shops 
or manufacturers of animal-drawn equipment (Chamsing and Singh 2000, Cowell 1977). Rijk 
(1989, p.181) estimated there were 130 agricultural machinery manufacturers in Thailand by the 
early 1980s. This had grown to 206 firms in 1994, of which 46 per cent were classified as small (up 
to 10 staff); 34 per cent medium (11–30 staff) and 20 per cent large firms (more than 30 staff) 
(Krishnasreni and Kiatwat 1998, p.70). Production was labour-intensive and labour arrangements 
flexible, allowing firms to expand and contract the number of employees to meet changing demands 
                                               
22 External review of IRRI considered their Agricultural Engineering Department to be largely successful, 
providing quick returns on investment when compared to varietal development (CGIAR Technical Advisory 
Committee Secretariat 1998). The Department was gradually reduced in size and has since been disbanded 
completely, though specialists in agricultural engineering are still employed at IRRI with a focus on post-
harvest technology.  
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(Rijk 1989). Most workers were unskilled with no formal training and relied on a handful of trained 
workers to provide on-the-job instruction and oversight (Krishnasreni and Kiatwat 1998).  
Local manufacturers in Thailand provided a bridge between the development of machinery by 
others (overseas companies, AED, IRRI) and the needs of Thai farmers. Manufacturers took 
designs of imported machines, or those developed by AED, and copied and modified them—either 
directly or in some cases from pictures in catalogues (Cowell 1977). Design ideas and feedback 
from farmers were critical to this process of adaptation (Cowell 1977). Successful modifications 
would in turn be copied by other firms. Competition between manufacturers drove adaptation of 
machines, with each company claiming distinct modifications that out-performed others 
(Sukharomana 1983, Mongkoltanatas 1986). The lack of patent laws was important as it allowed 
firms to copy and adapt existing designs which they would otherwise not have had the resources or 
expertise to design and test from scratch (Cowell 1977). 
Khan (1985, pp.521–522) describes the involvement of manufacturers in the success of the IRRI 
thresher:  
The contributions of the cooperating IRRI thresher manufacturers, especially those with 
innovative skills and quality consciousness, were essential links in the technology transfer23 
chain. The original IRRI thresher designs were invariably modified and adapted by 
manufacturers to suit their markets and production facilities. … [M]anufacturers helped to 
develop and adapt the IRRI technology and served as extension agents for popularizing the 
machines developed by IRRI. 
In other words, the manufacturers played the roles often played by researchers and extension agents 
in other cases, such as developing new crop varieties, in terms of testing, adapting, and promoting 
new technology. The collaboration with IRRI offered these companies a more flexible and adaptive 
approach to designing the machines, compared to working with foreign companies, which local 
manufacturers felt were more restrictive and resistant to design changes (Cowell 1977).  
Initially workshops relied on simple technology for manufacturing—there was no significant 
investment by manufacturers in technical or material improvements or quality control until the 
1980s, when the import of cheap Chinese and second-hand Japanese tractors began to compete with 
locally-produced machines (Rijk 1989). Prior to this, foreign companies had not been able to 
                                               
23 Khan’s use of ‘technology transfer’ invokes central-source models of innovation, with IRRI at the centre.  
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compete with the low prices of Thai machines, and the quality of Thai machines had been sufficient 
to meet farmer needs. According to Wattanuchariya (1983, p.46), the farm machinery industry 
emerged and thrived due to the work of private companies, but with competition from cheaper 
imported machinery, the industry needed government intervention to survive. Local manufacturers 
successfully lobbied the Thai Government to change tariff and import regulations to protect the 
domestic manufacturing industry from foreign competition. One of the regulations was to stipulate 
a percentage of locally-sourced material inputs that were being assembled in Thailand—for diesel 
engines, this was 60 per cent (Marsden 1984). These regulations sparked the establishment of joint-
venture companies, such as Siam Kubota, to produce machines for the Thai market. In a Japanese 
joint venture examined by Marsden (1984), the Japanese partner provided technical expertise, 
machinery designs, training, and quality control to a Thai contractor, who in turn contracted ten 
different subcontractors and 46 parts suppliers to meet regulations on local parts. 
At the same time quality improvements were encouraged by international assistance and the 
introduction of Thai standards and accreditation schemes. Though mandatory for imported 
machinery, these schemes were largely voluntary for domestic manufacturers (Thepent 2009).  
Government support and training for manufacturers was provided through the Industrial Services 
Institute (Ministry of Industry) which provided technical training and advisory services and initiated 
the Forum of Tractor Manufacturers of Thailand to support and improve local manufacturing 
(Wattanuchariya 1983). Aside from its own research and development role, the AED also supported 
manufacturers to test and modify new machines, with options for investment credit, technical 
support, and management training (Wattanuchariya 1983). However, according to Marsden (1984), 
the practical support for manufacturers from the Thai Government and its departments was limited. 
Instead, Marsden found manufacturers sought information and technical assistance from their own 
networks of suppliers and customers, largely due to the specialised nature of individual firms and 
the government’s inability to be across technical developments in all areas. Some government 
training was also provided to mechanics and drivers working in machine-hire schemes, but places 
were limited (Chancellor 1971).  
(d) Dealers. Manufacturers based close to Bangkok mostly sold machines through dealers, while 
those outside Bangkok would sell directly to farmers (Wattanuchariya 1983). Dealers actively 
promoted machinery through demonstration events, advertisements, and displays (Chancellor 
1971). To encourage farmers to purchase machines, dealers would also provide access to credit 
(Wattanuchariya 1983). One of the biggest challenges for dealers was the failure of many farmers to 
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repay credit, with 10 per cent of sales repossessed due to loan defaults, compared to three to four 
per cent in Malaysia (Chancellor 1971).  
The role of manufacturers and dealers is consistent across machinery types—both have a clear 
financial interest to promote the benefits of machinery and encourage and support farmers to 
purchase and use them. This financial interest ensures attentiveness and responsiveness to farmer 
needs through appropriate design and (relatively) affordable cost, addressing some of the common 
reasons for the failure of earlier imported models to be taken up.  
(e) Owners, contractors, and farmers who used hire services. The first farmers to purchase and 
use machines tended to be wealthier, with larger than average areas of farmland, especially those 
purchasing the larger machines such as threshers (Chancellor 1971, Cowell 1977). Farmers were 
generally positive in their feedback about the machines, noting that they reduced time taken for 
tasks and labour costs and made the work easier. The time and labour saved in land preparation was 
reinvested in alternative income-generating activities (Chancellor 1971).  
Contractor services are central to understanding how and why mechanisation, particularly threshers 
and harvesters, spread so quickly in Thailand (Chancellor 1971). Large farmers who had purchased 
machines relatively early saw hiring out equipment as a way to repay their loans and recoup their 
investment (Chancellor 1971). Contractors would find work via local agents, who would arrange a 
number of jobs in an area in return for a commission, and by farmers approaching them directly 
(Chancellor 1971).  
Hire services were effective in promotion of mechanisation and enabled a larger proportion of the 
farming community (those who had insufficient capital to purchase machinery or for whom their 
small land area made it uneconomic to do so) to use machines. Farmers were sensitive to price 
increases and would switch providers readily, so fierce competition among hire services kept costs 
to the hiring farmers down. However, farmers who used tractor-hire services also had larger than 
average land holdings (for four-wheel tractors, 9.3 hectares, compared to the average at the time of 
3.6 hectares) (Chancellor 1971, p.847), so, at least initially, poorer farmers may still have struggled 
to access machinery. Cowell (1977) found the average land area of two-wheel tractor owners in 
survey sites in the Central Region to be 2.2 hectares, though he noted that the poorest farmers were 
still unable to access machinery at that time. Farmers were generally happy with the services, 
though machine breakdown could result in delays or no-shows. Payment was in cash after the work 
was completed or, in 30 per cent of cases, on credit until after harvest (Chancellor 1971).  
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(f) Banks and credit providers. Farmers’ lack of access to credit for purchase of machinery was 
one of the main constraints that slowed the spread of agricultural machinery (Sharp 1987, 
Mongkoltanatas 1986). While some large importers would offer machinery on hire-purchase 
arrangements, many of these machines would be repossessed in poor crop years (Rijk 1989). More 
commonly, loans would be taken out through local dealers, who had a better ability to estimate the 
credit-worthiness of a farmer, better understanding of local conditions and practices, and less 
trouble collecting repayments (Chancellor 1971, Rijk 1989). Indeed, interest charged on loans was a 
key income source for dealers and enabled them to keep margins on machines low (Rijk 1989).  
There was limited credit available through banks for agriculture until 1975, when the Thai 
Government required a minimum of five per cent of all loans should be provided to farming 
households (Siamwalla et al. 1990). Banks that were unable to meet this requirement had to transfer 
the equivalent amount to the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC),24 which 
was ordered to significantly expand its loan activities (from 2.65 billion baht loaned in 1974 to 3.5 
billion in 1975) (Siamwalla et al. 1990). These policy directives significantly expanded the 
operations of the formal banking system in rural areas (Siamwalla et al. 1990). Initially, the BAAC 
provided loans of up to one fifth of the total machinery price to farmers (Mongkoltanatas 1986). In 
1979–80, it revised the scheme to instead provide the loan in-kind, with machines purchased by, 
and registered to, the BAAC directly (Mongkoltanatas 1986). To ensure quality, BAAC would only 
purchase from ‘approved’ manufacturers who had registered with BAAC and met quality standards 
(Anchan 1983). Though the Bank was strongly criticised by manufacturers outside the scheme, it 
facilitated farmers’ access to quality machines at relatively low prices (Rijk 1989) and boosted sales 
of some types of machines (Mongkoltanatas 1986).  
Access to capital was also a challenge for the domestic manufacturing industry. Credit for 
manufacturers was difficult to access (Anchan 1983, Sukharomana 1983) and they felt 
discriminated against by import and taxation regulations that seemed to favour imported machines. 
Initially, imported machinery was taxed at lower rates than the materials required for local 
manufacturing (Wattanuchariya 1983). This was a challenge for the industry, though manufacturers 
were generally able to keep the cost of machines lower than imported brands, until the importation 
of second-hand tractors from Japan and cheap Chinese tractors from the 1970s. In 1981 the industry 
successfully lobbied government to increase the tax on imported tractors, harvesters, and 
                                               
24 BAAC was established in 1961 by the government with a specific mandate to lend to agricultural 
households.  
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transplanters from five to 30 per cent and set an import quota on two-wheel tractors, effectively 
stopping imports (Rijk 1989). Some argue this protective action was unnecessary; at the time local 
production of tractors was growing at 14 per cent per year, while import growth was below 7 per 
cent (Donovan et al. 1986, p.31).  
5.3.2 Impacts  
Mechanisation supported the expansion and intensification of Thai agriculture and a shift from rice-
based, subsistence agriculture to commercialised crop production (Kasem and Thapa 2012). 
Mechanisation, alongside the use of improved varieties, chemical fertiliser, irrigation, and 
pesticides, has contributed to a 12-fold increase in rice output per unit of labour (Rerkasem 2015). 
Use of tractors in land preparation can increase the area ploughed per day by 3–12 times compared 
with a buffalo-drawn plough, depending on the power of the engine (Rerkasem 2015).  
According to Rigg et al. (2016), it was expected that mechanisation would favour larger farmers 
and result in an increased average farm size. This has not occurred in Thailand for two reasons: (1) 
the development by the Japanese of ‘smallholder friendly’ machinery that was suitable for smaller 
land areas and which was further adapted by Thai manufacturers; and (2) the emergence of 
machine-hire services that allowed farmers who could not afford to purchase machines to access 
them. Thus it has been possible ‘for even small farms to harness the benefits of machines’ (Rigg et 
al. 2016, p.126).  
One of the significant and highly visible changes with mechanisation has been the significant 
decline in the number of buffaloes, traditionally kept for tasks such as land preparation and 
transportation (Cramb 2017). This has changed the networks of farming households; buffaloes were 
maintained within the household while tractors require connections beyond the household in terms 
of credit repayments, repairs and maintenance, and more broadly in the networks for hire services. 
Cowell (1977, p.12) describes the loss of independence expressed by one farmer: 
When he bought a buffalo, the farmer had no further need to communicate with or rely on 
the seller after purchase. The animal fed itself on straw and grass and rarely fell sick. By 
purchasing a tractor the farmer discovered he had entered into a continuing relationship with 
the dealer in that servicing, repairs, and fuel were all needed. And at the end of its useful life 
he could not eat it. 
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Much like the reflection of Lao rice farmers, disgruntled at having to purchase improved rice 
varieties in Chapter 4, this comment could also be interpreted as a farmer voicing his concerns at 
adjusting to a new environment. The comment also underplays the time saved in ploughing, 
grazing, and wallowing buffaloes.  
Some forms of mechanisation, such as water pumps for irrigation, provided greater control over 
water and therefore increased agricultural options to households. Though the trading of buffaloes 
for tractors may have brought new relationships and costs, this was wrapped up in much bigger 
transitions in labour and migration that were fundamentally reshaping households and their 
networks. 
In terms of farm labour, mechanisation reduced drudgery and helped address labour shortages. 
Farm labour that was ‘saved’ was initially re-absorbed by greater cropping intensity and expansion 
into new, high-value crops (Sukharomana 1983), and eventually drawn into other industries, such as 
manufacturing, contracting services, and repair workshops, further encouraging mechanisation to 
cope with labour shortages. Even in mechanised areas, Sukharomana (1983) found high wage rates 
and no evidence of unemployment. However, the impact of mechanisation on labour varied, 
depending on the context and the type of machinery.  
Rigg et al. (2004) describe changing labour dynamics in a case study in Northeast Thailand. As 
agricultural labour demands could no longer be met by family labour, farmers found it easier to hire 
organised groups of labourers rather than negotiate with a number of individuals. The introduction 
of threshers meant farmers wanted to complete the harvest in one day to limit the costs of machine 
hire. Only by contracting labour groups would farmers be able to harvest within the time required. 
Although this strengthened the position of labour groups, it marginalised those individuals who 
were unable to keep pace with, and therefore unable to be part of, the labour groups. In contrast, 
Rigg et al. (2004) describe the combine harvester and its impact as unambiguously destructive for 
hired labourers. Furthermore, combine harvesters mostly favour male labour, with machine 
operation, bagging, and carrying the rice designated as men’s work. 
5.4 Discussion  
This case is instructive in that it highlights a process of scale-out of machinery from industrialised 
countries, mostly Japan, to rural Thailand that was largely independent of direct government efforts, 
and where research focused on taking these generic models and developing specific adaptations to 
meet the preferences of Thai farmers. Extension and promotion of machinery mainly occurred 
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through private businesses. The intersection of enabling conditions, locally adapted technology, and 
an active, largely unhindered private sector helped to drive the promotion and use of farm 
machinery.  
Efforts to introduce machinery to Thai farming started decades before there was any measurable use 
by farmers. It is clear that a number of drivers, such as increasing intensity of production, labour 
shortages, and rising farm wages, supported the use and rapid spread of machinery (Binswanger 
1986). Alternatively expressed, mechanisation allowed farmers to take advantage of the opportunity 
presented by high-yielding varieties and irrigation access by speeding up concentrated, labour-
demanding tasks sufficiently to get in a second, and sometimes a third crop of rice (Jongsuwat 
1980). The popular Thai-designed and manufactured machines were made in basic facilities and 
therefore of generally lower quality than the imported models, but they were sufficient to meet the 
needs of farmers while still being relatively affordable. The design of two-wheel tractors was 
suitable for smaller fields, and two-wheel tractors in particular proved multi-functional, powering 
pumps and providing a means of rural transport when hooked up to small carts.  
There were strong connections between farmers and contractors (who were also farmers); between 
purchasers of machines, dealers, and manufacturers; and, in some cases, between the manufacturers 
and the researchers (in IRRI or AED). These strong connections and informal feedback mechanisms 
ensured that the needs and perspectives of different actors were incorporated into machinery design 
and development in a more comprehensive way than in linear, research-driven product 
development. Historically, many developments in agricultural engineering have come from farmers 
working with local blacksmiths or workshops to address specific problems they were facing 
(Starkey 1986). An absence of farmer involvement in design and testing of agricultural machinery 
has been linked to the outright rejection of technology that had been judged by engineers as 
performing efficiently. 
 Starkey (1986) provides a compelling analysis of this in the case of animal-drawn, wheeled tool-
carriers25 across India, and parts of Africa and Latin America, where successive projects over many 
years tested, designed, and refined tool-carriers that performed well on-station, but were abandoned 
or used as simple carts by farmers (Starkey 1986). Starkey concludes that, had farmers been 
involved and had the projects paused to learn from the projects that had preceded them, significant 
resources could have been saved.  
                                               
25 Animal-drawn tool-carriers are designed to carry out ploughing, seeding, weeding and transport, much like 
a tractor, but drawn by animal- rather than engine-power. 
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In contrast, in the Thai case, farmers were directly involved in the adaptation of machines by 
manufacturers, with support from formal research actors for more complex machines such as 
threshers and harvesters. Knowledge regarding design and adaptation of machines was shared 
across these farmers, manufacturers, AED and IRRI.  
Manufacturers, dealers, and machine-owners hiring out their services played a number of different 
and important roles in the scaling out of mechanisation. First, the manufacturers and dealers played 
a kind of brokering role, communicating the needs and priorities of farmers in terms of machine 
function and characteristics back to researchers in AED and IRRI, while also using this information 
to inform and refine their own designs. Both the researchers and these businesses had converging 
goals to increase the use of the machinery—researchers aiming to support improvements to 
production and labour efficiency and the private sector to gain market share and profit. 
As such, the second role played by these actors was in demonstrating and promoting the technology 
as part of a business plan to generate demand and increase sales or use of hire services. The tractor, 
thresher, and harvester hire services increased access to machinery, but also the trialability of the 
technology, allowing farmers to test and evaluate the benefit of machines without having to make 
any expensive or long-term commitments (Pannell et al. 2006).  
Third, manufacturers and dealers both provided access to machines on credit as a way of increasing 
the number of farmers who would be able to purchase their products, and as a way of generating 
additional income through interest charged. Though literature on scaling-out emphasises the need to 
take advantage of existing networks (Anyonge et al. 2001), in this case it was new networks and 
connections between actors that facilitated scale-out of agricultural machinery.  
The importance of the private sector in supporting the spread of mechanisation has also been 
observed in Bangladesh (Clark et al. 2003). In the case of a manually-powered treadle pump, the 
NGO, International Development Enterprise, actively fostered the establishment of a private sector 
in the form of manufacturers, traders, well-drillers, and mechanics to support ongoing access to, and 
use of, the pumps (Orr et al. 1991). In the Thai case, many of these actors were already present but 
had to adapt their businesses to accommodate new products and skills. In these examples, the role 
of the private sector was not just to disseminate new technology in lieu of the extension system (de 
Janvry et al. 2016b), but to act as a partner in the innovation process, where each actor brought 
skills, strengths, and resources that others lacked to support the process (Spielman and von Grebmer 
2006). This example provides an alternative viewpoint to Moseley’s (2017) criticism that private-
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sector-based models of scaling exclude local knowledge, as it was only through the incorporation of 
local knowledge that the business plans of manufacturers and traders could be successful. 
In many ways, the Thai case represents the ideal of the kind of private-sector engagement and 
partnership that is currently sought in agricultural research for development, where a diverse set of 
private-sector actors (manufacturers, dealers, banks, and hire services) support the development, 
wide-scale dissemination, and use of new technology (e.g., ACIAR 2015, Rajalahati et al. 2008). 
Until the IRRI-Thai mechanisation project began, the involvement of the private sector was largely 
independent of the formal research system, instead responding to the opportunity opened in the 
market by the import of Japanese machinery, and the local industry vying to compete with, and 
undercut, other local manufacturers in response to farmer demands. As such, the case highlights the 
role of actors outside formal research systems (universities, government agencies, international 
research organisations) in innovation, consistent with systems-based conceptualisations of how 
innovation happens. 
5.5 Summary and conclusion  
In this chapter I have shown how pumps, tractors, threshers, and harvesters were developed and 
came to be used across Thailand’s field-crop zone. The case has highlighted how the innovation in 
machinery that supported widespread use came from a range of actors, but was particularly aided by 
a vibrant and creative local manufacturing industry, in close contact with farmers and local 
researchers, which adapted imported machines and models for Thai conditions.  
The case demonstrates the potential for collaboration between the public-sector research and the 
private sector to improve the outcomes of research. Generic designs from AED and IRRI were 
modified and made more suitable for the specific conditions by local workshops and manufacturers 
in collaboration with farmers. The private sector then also facilitated greater scale-out of 
technology, both through manufacturers and traders promoting machinery and entrepreneurial 
farmer-owners hiring out tractors, threshers, and harvesters to help cover the cost of loans and 
diversify their livelihood activities. However, the successful spread of machinery was just as much 
to do with the enabling agricultural conditions that spurred farmer interest and sparked the 
opportunity for private-sector profit, aided by changes in the financing sector that made credit more 
accessible. Private sector collaboration may not always be the most appropriate or effective way to 
extend research impact—the context is, as always, crucial. 
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The case also demonstrates the close links between processes of research and design, in this case of 
machinery, and expansion of impact. The use of machinery expanded as improvements were 
ongoing. It was not a case of releasing a finished product and then scaling, but scaling occurred at 
the same time as farmers, manufacturers, and the AED were adapting and refining designs. The use 
of (unsuitable) machinery informed and guided these adaptations, which in turn encouraged further 
use and adaptation. 
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6 Scaling improved cattle management practices in eastern Indonesia 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I examine a series of projects that, over a period of 12 years, developed, tested, and 
then sought to scale out and scale up practices to support improved smallholder cattle production in 
eastern Indonesia (specifically in the provinces of West Nusa Tenggara and South Sulawesi). 
Strategies for achieving scale-out included expanding the geographic spread of projects, providing 
dedicated extension support to farmers, and using farmer-to-farmer communication. Scale-up 
strategies included indirectly building the capacity of livestock agencies and engagement with key 
policy actors with the aim of influencing government livestock programs and provincial cattle 
policy. Each of these strategies is explored in the chapter.  
Compared to the other cases described in Chapters 4 and 5, it is difficult to determine the outcomes 
of these projects, which are still relatively recent. Furthermore, the practices promoted by the 
projects are less easily transferrable than improved rice varieties or a two-wheeled tractor. 
However, the case provides insight into the serendipities and complexities of taking research 
outputs to scale. It demonstrates the role of organisational context in shaping research for 
development, with the project funder undergoing significant institutional change, without which 
some of the projects may not have gone ahead. The case also demonstrates the complexity of policy 
engagement. There are concrete examples—decrees and strategies—that the project teams directly 
informed, promoting the science and approaches demonstrated in the projects. However, in design 
and implementation of government programs, the approaches promoted by the projects have only 
been partially incorporated, having been adjusted to match government objectives, capacities, and 
resources.  
6.2 Brief history of politics and rural development in Indonesia 
With over 19,000 islands and over 200 major language groups (Vickers 2005), to say Indonesia has 
rich ethnic, linguistic, geographic, and cultural diversity seems somewhat of an understatement. It 
was colonised by the Dutch from 1600 until the Japanese occupation that began in 1942. Though 
independence was declared after the Japanese surrender in 1945, it took four years for the Dutch to 
recognise Indonesian sovereignty (Vickers 2005). Declaration of a ‘Unitary State of Indonesia’ 
unsettled many of the regions, suspicious of a Java-centric government and centre of power (Cribb 
and Brown 1995). Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, introduced a socialist-based ‘guided 
democracy’ in 1959 as a reaction against the ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Cribb and Brown 1995, 
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p.413). Sukarno’s rule was devastating and, after a failed coup attempt in 1965, General Suharto 
took control, assuming the presidency in 1967 with military backing. In the interim, there was a 
violent, orchestrated backlash against communists which spilled over into the brutal killing of an 
estimated 500,000 people (Falcon 2014).26 Indonesia was one of the world’s poorest nations at the 
time, with 60 per cent of the population in poverty (Falcon 2014).  
Under Suharto’s New Order, an authoritarian regime was maintained and the power of the state 
strengthened. Laws were introduced to standardise village governance and make local leaders 
accountable to the state rather than their constituents (Bebbington et al. 2006). Authoritarianism 
was considered the ‘price the country paid for development’ (Vickers 2005). Suharto recognised 
that Indonesia’s stability required rural growth and believed a centralised government with a strong 
military presence was required to manage unrest and insurgency (Falcon 2014). Surveillance and 
social control were tools to maintain local stability (Bebbington et al. 2006).  
According to Falcon (2014), a series of innovative (for the time) ‘pro-poor’ macroeconomic and 
agricultural development policies and programs were put into place under Suharto that substantially 
increased food security and lifted a vast number of households out of poverty. Suharto oversaw 
rural health and family planning programs, while other programs focused on increasing agricultural 
production, such as expansion of irrigation systems and the provision of packages of improved 
seed, fertiliser, and rural credit. Vickers (2005) notes that Indonesian farmers initially disliked the 
improved varieties for their blandness, and the associated dependence on purchased inputs locked 
farmers into credit schemes.  
Falcon describes Suharto as corrupt, but with ‘genuine concern’ for the rural peasant (Falcon 2014, 
p.37). Corruption, a growing disparity between rich and poor, and increasingly uneven development 
across the regions fanned discontent with Suharto, who used public wealth to maintain ties of 
patronage (Vickers 2005). When the Asian Financial Crisis hit, the economy in Indonesia was 
already destabilised and Suharto eventually resigned in 1998.  
Political reforms in the post-Suharto era (reformasi) set about reducing military power and 
decentralising government (Vickers 2005). Provincial (propinsi) and district (kabupaten) level 
governments were given more power, and greater freedoms were provided for local determination 
of village governance structures (Bebbington et al. 2006). However, Bebbington et al. (2006, 
                                               
26 Though portrayed as an ‘anti-communist’ purge, the violence was used to persecute communists and 
ethnic minorities (mostly Chinese), and ‘for the settlement of long-standing personal animosities in the 
countryside’ (Falcon 2014, p.36). 
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p.1962) note ‘changes have not come instantly. Some districts just copy the regulations from other 
places or follow guidelines from central government disregarding local context.’ 
In 2012, an estimated 38 per cent of Indonesia’s population (around 42 million people) were 
employed in agriculture (OECD 2012). Rice remains the staple crop, though cassava and maize are 
also significant food crops (Falcon 2014). National agricultural policy priorities in Indonesia are to 
achieve national self-sufficiency in key commodities, including rice, sugar, soybeans, maize, and 
beef; ensure distribution and affordability of key agricultural products; diversify national production 
and consumption to animal-based products, fruit, and vegetables; increase competitiveness of 
production and value-added processing; and increase the welfare of farmers through increasing 
incomes (OECD 2012).  
The Ministry of Agriculture has oversight of agricultural policy, with responsibility for policy 
formulation, implementation, and administration (Downs et al. 2013). There are six directorates 
under the Ministry, each with responsibility for a key area. The most relevant to this case study is 
the Directorate General of Livestock and Animal Health Services, which oversees the planning, 
implementation, and monitoring of national livestock production (Brown et al. 2012). Also under 
the Ministry is the Agricultural Agency for Research and Development, which is the Ministry’s 
main research arm.  
Responsibility for services, including extension, were transferred to the provincial and district 
levels under the decentralisation process (Herianto et al. 2010). The Department of Livestock 
Services (Dinas Peternakan) at the provincial and district levels has responsibility for 
implementation of livestock policy, including regulations on trade and slaughter (Brown et al. 
2012). Though it reports directly to the relevant local government, the Department of Livestock 
Services also has direct vertical links to the Directorate General of Livestock and Animal Health 
Services (Brown et al. 2012). The Agricultural Agency for Research and Development is 
represented at the provincial level by the Institute for Assessment of Agricultural Technology 
(Balai Pengkajian Teknologi Pertanian, BPTP), which supports provincial-level planning and 
priority-setting for agricultural research and development (Downs et al. 2013).  
In 2006, extension services, which were previously embedded within the relevant local-government 
departments (dinas), were integrated into one service under the Agency for Agricultural Extension 
and Human Resources Development (OECD 2012). The intention was to establish extension offices 
at provincial, district, sub-district, and village levels to increase the support available to farmers, but 
this has not occurred in all provinces or districts (OECD 2012). Agricultural extension (and 
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agricultural research and development more broadly) are poorly funded in Indonesia relative to 
agriculture’s role in the economy (Fuglie and Piggott 2006). Extension services are generally 
ineffective and poorly resourced (World Bank 2007a). Nevertheless, Brown et al. (2012) suggest 
that local government departments play a central role in providing extension services to farmers. 
6.3 Project origins  
The domestic beef production system in Indonesia, though an important part of provincial 
economies, has low productivity (Waldron et al. 2013). The growth in demand for beef has 
outpaced supply since the 1990s, with Indonesia increasingly reliant on imported beef and cattle 
(Quirke et al. 2003). The Indonesian Government had invested significantly in infrastructure (ports, 
commercial feedlots) to support live imports but the devaluation of the rupiah after the Asian 
Financial Crisis made live imports (temporarily) uneconomical. Many commercial feedlots were 
closed while local prices soared, leading to the slaughter of productive females and young bulls and 
a decline in domestic herd populations (Hadi et al. 2002). In 1999, the Government of Indonesia 
introduced a goal to become self-sufficient in beef production (Waldron et al. 2013). Smallholders 
play an important role in livestock production, with many millions of households keeping cattle as 
part of mixed crop-livestock farming systems. Smallholder households will often keep cattle as a 
form of savings, which are sold to cover large or unexpected expenses and are usually a lower 
priority than food (mostly rice) crops (Hadi et al. 2002, Waldron et al. 2013). In this context, the 
Government of Indonesia asked ACIAR to sponsor research that would help increase cattle 
numbers and beef production and ensure that smallholders were able to have a share of this market 
opportunity (Interview 17).  
At the time there were few ACIAR-funded livestock projects in Indonesia. Although projects had 
focused on animal health problems as the key cause of low productivity, there was seen to be 
significant potential for improved animal nutrition and husbandry practices to lift production 
(Interview 21). After some exploratory visits to understand the challenges for livestock production, 
the ACIAR Research Program Manager for the Livestock Production System Program drew up 
three project briefs and commissioned the University of Queensland (UQ) and CSIRO to put 
together projects based on these briefs (Interview 21). These initial small projects marked the start 
of what became a 12-year research program, from problem definition and experimentation, to 
piloting improved practices in villages, and, finally, scaling up and out of the resultant technical 
packages to increase impact.  
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6.4 Overview of projects in the case study 
An overview of the projects and organisations that are part of this case, whether directly (bold) or 
indirectly (greyed), is given in Figure 6.1 and brief descriptions are provided in Table 6.1. The 
projects were not part of a formal, pre-defined program but rather a collection of projects within a 
broader livestock research program that evolved as the projects built on each other over time. The 
projects were connected by: (a) shared aims to improve smallholder livelihoods and welfare by 
increasing Bali cattle production; (b) the continuity of organisations and individuals involved; and 
(c) the sharing and integration of science that informed the final package of recommendations. Bali 
cattle (Bos sondaicus) constitute the dominant breed across eastern Indonesia (Lisson et al. 2011). 
They are well adapted to Indonesian conditions, able to tolerate poor nutrition, and resistant to 
many diseases and parasites (McCool 1992). While the focus of the case study is on the scale-out 
and scale-up projects from mid-2007 onwards, an understanding of scaling efforts is only possible 
with an appreciation of the preceding projects. Without the initial projects, there would have been 
nothing to scale. Likewise, scaling was not limited to the final projects, with some scale-out 
occurring fortuitously in earlier projects.  
The development of the projects can be traced in two parallel streams—one led by CSIRO and the 
other by UQ. I provide a brief overview of these and how they link together, before looking in 
detail at scaling efforts in Section 6.5.  
6.4.1 UQ series of projects 
The initial UQ-led project (AS2/2000/103, or IVMS project) focused on reproduction management. 
The overall aim was to test whether principles of controlled mating and early weaning used 
effectively in northern Australian cattle management could be adapted to work for smallholder 
conditions on the islands of Lombok and Sumbawa in West Nusa Tenggara Province. The goal was 
to develop a simple system that could easily be applied within the existing constraints and seasonal 
conditions, such as climate, cropping, use of animals for draught power, and labour availability.  
The key output of this project was the ‘Integrated Village Management System’ (IVMS) which was 
tested in two villages—one in Lombok, in areas that were land-constrained and where animals were 
mostly tethered or penned, requiring farmers to cut and carry feed, and one in Sumbawa, where 
cattle were mostly grazed. In both study villages, cattle were housed in individual pens within a 
communal shed (kandang) overnight for security (Poppi et al. 2011). The key components of the 
IVMS were: (a) a village-managed bull to support natural mating; (b) mating timed so calves were 
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born in the wet season when feed was more abundant; (c) early weaning of calves at six months or 
less; (d) improved nutrition, including growing tree legumes for animal feed; and (e) composting of 
animal waste to improve sanitation in pens (Poppi et al. 2011). To facilitate access to a bull for 
mating, a bull was purchased and a keeper nominated by the village. Income generated from the 
subsequent mating service was used to cover costs and compensate the keeper for their effort. A 
simple technical extension package was developed. However, it was not part of the original 
research design to see that package implemented beyond the project villages. The focus rather was 
on development and testing (Interview 22). 
Use of the practices in the two villages led to significant benefits, including a reduction in calf 
mortality, improved weight and condition of calves, and reduced interval between calving and 
conception, with flow-on benefits in terms of income (Poppi et al. 2011). The degree of successful 
implementation differed markedly between the two villages. The team attributed success in the 
Lombok village to the ‘enthusiastic local person employed by the project working closely with 
villagers on a daily basis’ (Poppi et al. 2011, p.66). Different farming and social systems may also 
have played a part, with land constraints and problems with cattle theft in Lombok making it more 
suited to community-based interventions than the extensive systems of Sumbawa (Interview 17).  
The breeding and weaning management practices tested in this project would go on to inform the 
CSIRO-led projects in a number of ways: (a) animal management practices, especially early 
weaning and feeding of calves, would be trialled in the Phase 2 CSIRO project (LPS/2004/005) and 
incorporated into the Phase 3 Sulawesi project (SMAR/2008/061); (b) the strategy to provide shared 
access to a bull would be adapted to a farmer group context and become central to the Phase 3 
Lombok project (SMAR/2008/096); (c) the experiences regarding the effectiveness of locally-based 
project support would be integral to the development of the On-Ground Team which supported 
scale-out (and to a lesser extent, institutional capacity building) in Lombok and Sulawesi Phase 3 
projects.  
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Figure 6.1 Projects relevant to the case study 
Notes: Organisations listed are official project partners. Dashed lines connecting projects indicate 
informal links and information exchange. Solid lines indicate formal links. An asterisk against an 
organisation indicates the lead research agency. Circle with ellipsis indicates additional partners 
outside geographic focus of the case study have been omitted for clarity. The figure does not show 
all livestock-related ACIAR projects in the region. Projects on beef supply chains and market 
dynamics were linked informally to these projects but have been omitted for clarity. Codes in 
brackets indicate ACIAR program and project reference number. BPTP is Institute for Assessment 
of Agricultural Technology (Balai Pengkajian Teknologi Pertanian); DLS is Department of 
Livestock Services (Dinas Peternakan); UNRAM is University of Mataram, Lombok; UNHAS is 
Hasanuddin University, Makassar, South Sulawesi; UNDANA is University of Nusa Cendana, 
Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara; QDPI is Queensland Department of Primary Industries. Source: 
Adapted from Martin (2010, p.10) based on interviews and ACIAR project descriptions (available 
at aciar.gov.au). 
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Table 6.1 Brief overview of projects relevant to the case study 
Project no. and name (lead institute) Shorthand 
reference  
Aim Province(s) Budget 
(AUD) 
AS2/2000/103 
Developing an integrated production 
system for Bali cattle in the eastern 
Islands of Indonesia (UQ) 
IVMS project Develop a management system to improve reproduction 
rates of Bali cattle.  
NTB (Lombok 
and Sumbawa) 
NTT 
$450,857 
AS2/2000/124 
Prospects for improved integration of 
high-quality forages in the crop-livestock 
systems of Sulawesi, Indonesia (CSIRO)  
CSIRO Phase 
1 project, 
Sulawesi 
Investigate/quantify benefits of new forages to improve 
livestock production and develop a modelling tool that 
integrates crop-livestock-labour.  
South Sulawesi  $438,699 
AS2/2000/125 
Optimising crop-livestock systems in 
West Nusa Tenggara Province, Indonesia 
(CSIRO) 
CSIRO Phase 
1 project, 
Lombok 
Explore options for increasing productivity of livestock in 
Sumbawa through a farming systems approach.  
NTB (Lombok) $399,792 
AS2/2000/157  Improve cattle production through introduction and use of 
Leucaena.  
NTT $428,721 
LPS/2004/005 
Improving smallholder crop-livestock 
systems in eastern Indonesia (CSIRO) 
CSIRO Phase 
2 project, or 
the IAT project 
Develop, test and apply tools information, and knowledge-
sharing techniques to evaluate impacts of livestock 
management interventions.  
A second objective was to communicate outputs to 
smallholders, research and extension. 
South Sulawesi 
NTB (Lombok) 
$878,642 
LPS/2004/023 
Strategies to increase growth of the 
 Evaluate feeding strategies to increase the growth rate of 
early-weaned Bali calves.  
NTB (Lombok), 
NTT, East Java 
Central Sulawesi 
$466,682 
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weaned Bali cattle (UQ)  
SMAR/2006/061 
Building capacity in the knowledge and 
adoption of Bali cattle improvement 
technology in South Sulawesi (CSIRO) 
CSIRO Phase 
3 project 
(Sulawesi)  
Improve household welfare through adoption of better 
husbandry and feed management of Bali cattle; build 
capacity of local RD&E organisations and the community to 
support wider uptake; understand the socio-economic 
environment and constraints/catalysts of adoption.  
 South Sulawesi  $1,072,533 
SMAR/2006/096 
Scaling-up herd management strategies in 
crop-livestock systems in Lombok, 
Indonesia (UQ) 
CSIRO Phase 
3 project 
(Lombok) 
Improve household welfare through adoption of better 
husbandry and feed management of Bali cattle; build 
capacity of local RD&E organisations and the community to 
support wider uptake; understand the socio-economic 
environment and constraints/catalysts of adoption.  
NTB (Lombok) $1,102,976 
LPS/2008/038 
Improving reproductive performance of 
cows and performance of fattening cattle 
in low-input systems of Indonesia and 
northern Australia (UQ) 
 Devising improved feed system to support fattening of 
calves and maintenance of cows (Bali and Ongole breeds). 
 
NTB (Lombok)  
Southeast 
Sulawesi 
East Java  
$2,101,093 
Source: Based on ACIAR project descriptions (available at aciar.gov.au) and interviews.
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The IVMS project was built on by others, led by UQ in collaboration with UNRAM (Figure 6.1). 
The first project proved that calving could be increased and calving intervals reduced. The second 
project (drawing on other UQ research on use of tree legumes) sought to test feed options for the 
early-weaned calves to improve weight gain and condition. The project included feeding studies 
that were then evaluated on-farm in the concurrent CSIRO Phase 2 project (LPS/2004/005). At each 
step the teams developed and tested simple technical packages that would improve cattle production 
and, in the third project, included detailed economic analysis of different management options (e.g., 
showing that fattening calves was generally more profitable than selling them). Though the team 
had engaged with key stakeholders regarding the technical packages, their main focus had always 
been on developing and testing these packages rather than facilitating their widespread adoption. 27 
In the team’s view, this would have opened up an entirely new set of research questions and 
required a specific set of social science skills (Interview 22).  
6.4.2 CSIRO series of projects 
The CSIRO projects can be described in three phases. The first phase was about understanding the 
mixed crop-livestock systems in South Sulawesi and Sumbawa and developing a modelling tool to 
simulate benefits, trade-offs, and constraints with regard to planting and utilising forages. The 
second phase sought to develop and test the model further through a participatory process, including 
on-farm testing of forage options with a small number of farmers. The third phase aimed to scale 
out improved cattle feeding and breeding management practices to farming communities, and scale 
up the practices through key Indonesian agencies with a mandate for supporting livestock 
production.  
(a) Phase 1 (2000–2004). In contrast to the UQ stream of work, which took animal husbandry as a 
starting point, the CSIRO work focused on the use of forages to support improved animal nutrition. 
Past research had demonstrated the biophysical suitability of high-quality introduced forages in 
tropical areas and the potential for forages to contribute to improved livestock condition and 
production. However, widespread adoption of forages had not occurred, suggesting ‘serious flaws 
in the research community’s understanding of smallholder farming systems and of how farmers 
perceive forages’ (Pengelly et al. 2003, p.214). The Phase 1 projects (AS2/2000/124 and 125) 
aimed to address these flaws by developing a detailed understanding of the smallholder farming 
                                               
27 Adoption was the common terminology in the projects and is used in this chapter in that context. 
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systems, the inter-relationships between different activities, why cattle were kept, and how they 
were managed.  
The Phase 1 projects were located on the island of Sumbawa to the east of Lombok in West Nusa 
Tenggara Province and in South Sulawesi Province (Figure 6.2). The first project was located in a 
village in central Sumbawa. The village had sufficient land resources to grow forage, but was semi-
arid and animal feed was limited by a prolonged dry season (Lisson et al. 2008). The second project 
focused on three villages in Barru District, South Sulawesi, and considered the feasibility of forage 
introduction into high-rainfall, rice-based farming systems where there was limited land for forages 
(Lisson et al. 2008). In both areas, Bali cattle were mostly grazed on common land, fallow lands, or 
crop residues, with some cut-and-carry feeding. Land was not the major constraint in these systems, 
hence planting and utilising forages was seen as an appropriate entry point to improve cattle 
management. 
One interviewee described the projects as exploratory, noting there was no expectation that the 
problems would be ‘solved’ within three years but that they would gain an understanding of options 
that could be feasible within the constraints of the farming system (Interview 20). Interviewees 
from the project team suggested this was the first time a farming systems approach had been used in 
this context. Other projects had introduced forages, but none had taken a systematic approach to 
understand the mixed crop-livestock system as a way of identifying feasible, relevant, and 
sustainable forage interventions to support increased livestock production (Interview 17). 
The two projects shared similar goals and methods and functioned more as one project across two 
geographical areas with different production constraints. Data and capacity-building activities were 
shared and coordinated across projects and the major research output, the ‘Integrated Analysis 
Tool’ (IAT), was developed through the combined efforts of both projects. The IAT incorporates 
crop and soil models, Bali cattle growth models, and socio-economic (labour, income) models to 
explore interdependencies and trade-offs within the system.  
At the end of the two projects, a detailed systems understanding had been developed and the IAT 
was able to simulate different farm management options to explore the potential benefits and trade-
offs of practices such as using land for forage production. A series of potential interventions in 
terms of forage and feeding management had been identified and limited field tests had been 
conducted. 
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Figure 6.2 Map of eastern Indonesian islands.  
Notes: Projects in this case study were located in Lombok, Sumbawa (indicated, West Nusa 
Tenggara) and South Sulawesi. Source: Modified from CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, 
The Australian National University. 
 (b) Phase 2 (2005–2008). The second phase CSIRO project (LPS/2004/005 in Figure 6.1) further 
tested and refined the IAT as a tool for discussing livestock management options with farmers and 
extension services, and used farmer field sites as a centrepiece for promoting practices with other 
farmers (Lisson et al. 2008). The project continued partnerships with university and government 
agencies fostered under the previous CSIRO projects and retained most of the key individuals from 
earlier project teams. Work continued at the same sites in Sumbawa and South Sulawesi, but 
expanded to include Mertak village in Central Lombok District28 and three villages in Gowa 
District, South Sulawesi. As with the previous projects, all sites predominantly grazed Bali cattle, 
                                               
28 Mertak village, located to the south of Central Lombok, had sufficient land available to graze cattle.  
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with some cut-and-carry feeding when grazing was not an option (such as when crop residues had 
already been grazed).  
The IAT was used as a tool for communication and participatory research with farmers. Group 
meetings with villagers were used to discuss farming system constraints and opportunities, with a 
focus on cattle production. Options for improving production were modelled and results were 
discussed with farmers the next day with the aim of developing a shortlist of generic, feasible 
options. These were then discussed, adapted, and tested in field conditions with a number of 
farmers in each village. Options included those relating to forages (better use of existing forages, 
introduction of new forages, and feed budgeting) and cattle management (controlled mating, early 
weaning, and preferential feeding), drawing on the practices tested under the first UQ project 
(Lisson et al. 2011). 
Forty farmers participated in a trial of practices as part of the project, which also included 
participating in field days and cross-site visits. The final project report notes evidence of 
‘significant’ adoption of trialled practices beyond the initial 40 the project was working with 
(Lisson et al. 2008). Follow-up interviews in 2009 indicated continued application of practices by 
the ‘best-bet farmers’,29 dissemination and adoption by additional households, and the emergence of 
a modest market for forage cuttings (Lisson and Corfield 2010). However, it should be noted that 
formal, systematic quantification of adoption beyond these farmers was not undertaken; rather, 
estimates of adoption were based on interviews with key informants, such as the village head and 
best-bet farmers.  
The project provided a ‘proof of concept’ of how smallholders could be supported to adopt forages 
as part of improving their cattle production, without having a detrimental impact on crop production 
and providing broader labour-saving and economic benefits (Lisson et al. 2008, Lisson et al. 2010). 
With the concept shown to be feasible, focus turned to expanding the reach or dissemination of the 
impacts and understanding adoption processes. 
(c) Phase 3 (2007–2012). The final CSIRO project in this sequence brought together practices 
developed by the early CSIRO and UQ projects and tested by the Phase 2 project (Table 6.2). The 
                                               
29 ‘Best-bet farmer’ is the term the project team used to refer to the farmers who worked with the project to 
test ‘best-bet’ options in on-farm conditions, and promote practices to other farmers. The team deliberately 
chose not to use the term ‘champion’ as they felt it implied the top farmers (based on resources and skill). 
The team consciously sought farmers across the spectrum of ‘typical’ conditions to test the general 
adaptability of practices (Interview 17).  
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original proposal put forward by CSIRO for a follow-on project focused on the expansion and 
replication of Phase 2 activities in extensive farming systems in South Sulawesi and Lombok, 
where cattle were mostly grazed (Interview 17). However, ACIAR and Indonesian partners had a 
strong interest in expanding work done in the first UQ-IVMS project in areas that had intensive, 
cut-and-carry systems and where cattle are held in communally-managed cattle-sheds (kandang). 
The UQ team did not see their expertise fitting this goal. Having demonstrated that the technical 
package worked, they felt they did not have the skills or the organisational mandate within the 
university to do a scale-out or extension project. Hence CSIRO led both projects, despite some 
initial hesitation at expanding into areas with different livestock systems (Interview 16, Interview 
22).  
The final phase focused on (a) social science research to build an understanding of household 
decision-making, information spread, and adoption of practices; and (b) building local institutional 
and community capacity to support dissemination and adoption (CSIRO n.d. -a, n.d. -b). In 
Sulawesi and Lombok the same basic set of ‘best-bet practices’ was promoted, though the emphasis 
and mechanisms varied slightly to suit local conditions. The technology package for each site is 
outlined in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Ranking of recommended practices in each of the Phase 3 CSIRO projectsa 
Lombok (working with kandang groups) South Sulawesi (working with individual 
farmers) 
1. Controlled mating 
2. Early weaning 
3. Preferential feeding of pregnant and 
lactating cows 
4. Forage production and use 
5. Improved infrastructureb 
1. Making better use of existing forages 
2. Introducing new forages 
3. Seasonal (controlled) mating 
4. Early weaning and preferential feeding 
5. Feed budgeting and planning to meet 
forecast feed demands 
Note: a Order indicates priority or ‘entry points’ with farmers. b Not formally part of the technology 
package, this refers to improving sanitation and construction of a pen to house the bull and for 
mating. This was promoted by the project team and considered an important precondition for group 
involvement. Source: Van Wensveen et al. (2017a), Van Wensveen et al. (2017b) 
In Lombok, the project worked with farmers who were members of a group kandang. The project 
started working with 12 groups and progressively expanded to work with 36 farmer groups. By the 
end of the project, all farmers in the groups were applying at least one practice (controlled mating 
with a quality bull, Figure 6.3a). Application of other practices varied and tended to be 
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progressive—the longer a group had been involved, the more practices were adopted. There was no 
explicit aim to scale out beyond the project farmer groups in Lombok. 
In Sulawesi, cattle were grazed and there were no group-based pens as in Lombok, so the project 
worked with individual farmers rather than groups (Figure 6.3b). The project worked with 60 ‘best-
bet farmers’ to test the forage and/or cattle management practices in Table 6.2 on their own farms 
and share their experiences with other farmers. Best-bet farmers were selected to be broadly 
representative of the range of farming circumstances in their village, with the aim of exploring the 
adaptability of generic options to different farming and household conditions (Interview 17). 
Selection also took into consideration the farmers’ willingness to be involved and the availability of 
resources (e.g., cattle, land) to test practices on-farm.  
 
Figure 6.3 (a) Kandang in Lombok with bull pen; (b) Cows grazing rice stubble in Sulawesi  
Source: Supplied by M. van Wensveen.  
Research conducted during the third phase of projects showed that the implementation of practices 
in both projects was selective, reflecting local resource constraints and farmer priorities (Grünbühel 
and Williams 2016). This was particularly the case for scale-out farmers who had less intensive 
support than those working directly with the project. Small, rapid assessments conducted since have 
suggested scale-out farmers may have increased the number of practices they were applying after 
the projects finished (Corfield 2012, McDonald 2012).  
The project practices were shown to support improvements in cattle production. Establishment of 
forage banks and better use of available forages supported increased growth rates and improved 
condition of cattle, and saved labour previously used in cut-and-carry activities (Van Wensveen et 
al. 2017a, Van Wensveen et al. 2017b). In Lombok, animal management practices combined with 
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improved pen infrastructure contributed to decreased calf mortality and higher calving rates (Van 
Wensveen et al. 2017a, see Figure 6.3a).  
The higher-level goal of the projects to contribute to national beef self-sufficiency implies a shift in 
household livelihood strategies to place greater importance on cattle production—which was 
viewed as a shift from being cattle ‘keepers’ to cattle ‘producers’ (Winter and Doyle 2008).30 
Research conducted during the project found some households with very limited access to land 
were starting to shift towards becoming producer-households, but overall this was a slow process of 
change (Williams et al. 2012). The culture and identity of being ‘rice farmers’ was often 
predominant, even where benefits of increased cattle production were evident to farmers (Williams 
et al. 2012, Grünbühel and Williams 2016). Reflecting on visits to former Phase 2 project sites in 
2012, one team member suggested that the process of shifting from rice to cattle was more evident 
in sites where farmers had been implementing practices over a longer period: ‘So it doesn’t happen 
overnight, but it does happen!’ (Interview 17).  
Both project teams had positive relationships with key stakeholders in the Department of Livestock 
Services, the Regional Body for Planning and Development (Badan Perencana Pembangunan 
Daerah, Bappeda), and district and provincial governments. However, when the projects finished in 
2012, the teams were uncertain whether key agencies would continue to support the practices 
promoted by the projects, especially in South Sulawesi. In the next section I look in detail at the 
different mechanisms the projects used to scale out and scale up and provide an indication of how 
effective they were. In the subsequent section, I examine the influence of different actors and 
relationships on the scaling process. 
6.5 Scaling out and up—comparing Central Lombok and South Sulawesi  
Having given an overview of the projects that structured the interactions and activities in this case 
study, I now focus on the culmination of those efforts—how the project teams in Phase 3 attempted 
to scale out the technical package to more farmers and scale up by influencing extension systems 
and government programs supporting smallholder cattle production. I begin with a brief overview 
of the advisory committees designed for stakeholder engagement, which were intended as the key 
                                               
30 The distinction between cattle ‘keepers’, who keep animals to accumulate capital, and ‘producers’, who 
manage animals to generate income, was embraced by the ACIAR Research Program Manager and featured 
throughout the projects (Interview 21, MacLeod et al. 2011, Lisson et al. 2011). A more significant contrast, 
especially in many developing countries, is likely to be the use of cattle for draught compared to producing 
income. 
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vehicles for policy influence in both projects, and the ‘On-Ground Teams’, a network of recent 
graduates employed by the projects to foster farmer learning, adoption, and scale out. I then trace 
the different ways in which the scale-out and scale-up processes unfolded in each location.  
It is worth noting that the two Phase 3 projects operated in very different geographical contexts and 
this, according to some interviewees, was a big influence on how effective they were. In South 
Sulawesi, the project sites were more dispersed, which diluted the efforts of the project team at 
Hasanuddin University.  
… the Sulawesi project operated over a much larger geographic scale, 16 villages 
across three kabupaten [districts] scattered across hundreds of kilometres, compared 
to the Lombok project which operated essentially in one kabupaten, less than 40 km 
across and less than 30 km from [the] team [office]. That, more than anything else, 
influenced results here in my view (Interview 17). 
6.5.1 Stakeholder engagement and policy influence through advisory committees 
Stakeholder engagement occurred formally through committees established for each project. 
Committees consisted of representatives from provincial and district-level Department of Livestock 
Services, Bappeda, senior administrators from partner universities, and CSIRO. In Lombok, the 
committee also included representatives from provincial extension services (which, at the time, 
were separate from the Department of Livestock Services), non-government organisations, and 
cattle traders (Van Wensveen et al. 2017a, Van Wensveen et al. 2017b).  
Committees provided overall guidance and advice on the project but also formed the basis of the 
project teams’ broader stakeholder engagement. The committees met regularly, with the aim of 
sharing project progress and ensuring relevance of the project to provincial and district priorities. 
They provided a platform for promoting the success of the project package among key government 
stakeholders and especially promoting the expertise of key Indonesian researchers. The project 
teams hoped these committees, the relationships built, and the knowledge shared would lead to the 
incorporation of elements of the project into relevant livestock policies and organisations. Project 
progress, relevant regional initiatives, and possible complementary activities or synergies were all 
discussed at the meetings.  
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6.5.2 Supporting farmer learning and long-term institutional change through On Ground 
Teams 
Local extension services did not have the resources, technical capacity, or motivation to provide the 
in-depth, ongoing support to farmers the project needed to foster adoption of practices (Interview 
20). Drawing on the insights of the IVMS project (Table 6.1), each project employed 12 recent 
university graduates (24 in total) to act as project officers, referred to as the On-Ground Team. The 
teams were based locally and their role was to support adoption and adaptation of the practices by 
farmers and collect data on adoption and impact. 
When possible, the project also provided training to village-based extension officers (Penyuluh 
Pertanian Lapangan) and livestock services staff on farming systems, project methods, and 
practices. On-Ground Team members often collaborated closely with village extension officers, 
seeking to foster informal partnerships and learning. In some areas of South Sulawesi, dynamic and 
motivated village extension officers applied for land from the Department of Livestock Services 
after the training so they could establish forage banks to support farmer use of practices (Van 
Wensveen et al. 2017b). In other cases, engagement and motivation of village extension officers 
was limited, largely due to a lack of departmental incentives to improve performance. 
The On-Ground Teams were fundamental to use of practices by farmers and scale-out. By the end 
of the projects, team members were highly-experienced, highly-trained experts, skilled in the 
technical aspects of cattle management but also in negotiation, relationship-building, and problem-
solving to support farmer learning (Van Wensveen et al. 2017a, Van Wensveen et al. 2017b). After 
the project finished, it was hoped that they would be employed by the Department of Livestock 
Services or in the government extension system, providing an indirect way of building skills and 
capacity within the Indonesian agencies and changing some of their approaches to extension and 
farmer engagement. Team members reflected that not enough consideration was given to how this 
would happen: ‘[W]hen it came to the end of the project, we had just assumed that the [On-Ground 
Team members]  would then go into the [extension or livestock] system ... so we would get policy 
influence that way, and you know, farmers would just keep adopting and just keep doing what they 
do’ (Interview 15).  
Follow-up discussions with some of the Lombok On-Ground Team members in 2017 confirmed 
that many of them had gone on to government roles, in the Department of Livestock Services or 
other government agencies, while others had jobs in NGOs, with the University, or in the private 
sector (Van Wensveen et al. 2017c). Though their skills—technical knowledge of cattle and 
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facilitating or brokering groups—were proving valuable in their current roles, it is less clear to what 
extent they had been able to use their positions to directly influence or contribute to change within 
the Department of Livestock Services or extension services.  
6.5.3 The South Sulawesi story 
I turn now to the specific processes used to support scaling up and out in the Sulawesi-based 
project. The CSIRO team collaborated with the University of Hasanuddin and BPTP in South 
Sulawesi Province. Cattle management in South Sulawesi was strictly a household concern, not 
linked to group-based cattle housing as in Central Lombok. As such, individual farmers were the 
target for extension and scale-out activities, and farmer-to-farmer communication and learning was 
prioritised as the most effective strategy to support scale-out (Interview 17). 
(a) Scaling out. Each On-Ground Team member looked after a specific village and each of the 
best-bet farmers in that village. The teams lived locally (four team members lived in each district) 
and therefore were able to develop strong relationships of trust with the farmers. The team members 
also provided information and support to scale-out farmers. Field days, cross-site visits between 
participating villages, and other formal activities supported promotion of the practices to other 
farmers.  
Five best-bet farmers were selected in each village (60 in total) to work with the project. In each 
village, workshops and interviews with these farmers were held to discuss production constraints. 
Different management options were modelled in IAT and discussed with the farmers before a 
tailored set of options was recommended based on each farmer’s circumstances and preferences. 
Best-bet farmers were at the centre of the team’s scale-out strategy in Sulawesi. As part of their 
participation, best-bet farmers committed to pass information and resources relating to the practices 
to at least five other farmers, though in practice the numbers varied from one to 14 ‘scale-out 
farmers’ per best-bet farmer (Van Wensveen et al. 2017b, p.51).  
The project team defined ‘scale-out’ as the ‘expansion of project practices, resources and/or 
information as the starting point for adoption’ (Van Wensveen et al. 2017b, p.23). At the end of the 
project, 445 scale-out farmers had been recorded, with best-bet farmers passing information and 
resources on to farmers within and outside their villages (Van Wensveen et al. 2017b). Analysis 
conducted as part of the project highlighted the role of best-bet farmers as key sources of 
information, but also as gate keepers, filtering out information that was more difficult or that they 
had not yet implemented themselves (usually the cattle management practices) (Van Wensveen et 
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al. 2017b). Events such as field days and cross-site visits to farmers who had been implementing 
practices for longer were effective at promoting awareness of the practices, but additional support 
was usually necessary for farmers to do more than plant new varieties of forage. Scale-out farmers 
outside the ‘project’ villages were less likely to have implemented more than one practice 
(Grünbühel and Williams 2016). 
There was strong engagement with local government leaders (the heads of sub-districts or 
kecamatan), who interacted regularly with the On-Ground Teams and were often farmers 
themselves (Interview 15). However, despite the local support and perceived success of the project 
at the village and sub-district levels, there was less support at higher administrative levels 
(Interview 15; Interview 20).  
(b) Scaling up. In Sulawesi, the effectiveness of the advisory committee in affecting policy at 
provincial and district levels was limited when compared to the Lombok project. Despite one 
Indonesian team member being well-connected in policy circles and perceived to be able to ‘get 
people on board’ (Interview 20), connections and influence at higher levels were limited (Interview 
15; Interview 17).  
The final project report suggests two main reasons for the limited traction at district and provincial 
levels (Van Wensveen et al. 2017b). First, a high turnover of key senior officials, especially within 
the district-level Department of Livestock Services, meant the team had to continually develop new 
relationships. Second, it was suggested the team could or should have engaged with different actors, 
particularly the District Head (Bupati) in each of the three districts. Interviews for the thesis 
suggested a third reason: that the effort of project teams in Sulawesi was fragmented over three 
districts, covering a large geographical area. Concentration and depth of relationships to support 
policy influence did not seem as feasible compared to the concentrated efforts in Lombok 
(Interview 15).  
The Sulawesi team had better traction at the sub-district (kecamatan) level, as noted above. Key 
leaders of the sub-district were closely linked with project activities, could see the benefits, and at 
times took on the role of best-bet farmer. Sub-district livestock offices allocated state-owned land to 
establish forage nurseries, and extension offices hosted field days (Van Wensveen et al. 2017b). 
One interviewee described how attending successful field days and seeing ‘happy farmers’ 
convinced the sceptical head of the local extension office that the practices were worthwhile and the 
project was doing good work. They went on to note, however, that ‘it can’t drive [support] all the 
way up. It can drive it locally and [you get support] and then someone else gets elected … [You 
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need] farmers to vote with their feet, in large enough numbers [so] whoever stands for and gets 
elected just can’t ignore it’ (Interview 17).  
(c) Sustainability of project impacts. No formal follow-up study has occurred for the Phase 3 
project in Sulawesi. A small impact study was conducted in villages involved in the Phase 2 project 
in 2009, almost two years after the project had finished, which had more-or-less the same approach 
and can be considered indicative of the final project results. Based on interviews with best-bet 
farmers, the study found significant evidence that both the adoption of practices and benefits of 
adoption could be sustained after formal project activities had ceased (Lisson and Corfield 2010). 
Though the impact study focused on best-bet farmers, there was evidence of continued scale-out to 
other farmers. A further rapid assessment in 2012 indicated continued scale-out and adaptation of 
practices linked to increasing farmer confidence (Corfield 2012, McDonald 2012).  
Some Australian team members have kept in touch with their Sulawesi counterparts. One 
interviewee reported that, in 2013, farmers in the former project sites were still growing forages but 
this had not translated into increased cattle production. This was partially due to labour shortages, 
which meant farmers already had as many cattle as they could manage, and partially due to lack of 
financial incentive to expand their production (Interview 17).  
6.5.4 The Lombok story 
Lombok provides a very different picture compared to Sulawesi. The population density where the 
Phase 3 project worked in Central Lombok was high (709 people per square kilometre) and 
landlessness was common (Grünbühel and Williams 2016). As the risk of cattle being stolen was 
high, farmers had responded by forming groups with large sheds (kandang) in which cattle were 
housed in separate pens overnight and members took turns guarding the animals. Members had to 
pay a small fee and be available to undertake guard duty, but otherwise animal management 
remained the responsibility of the owner (Van Wensveen et al. 2017a). The team in Lombok took 
these groups as the starting point for project activities. The approach to working within the group 
kandang system brought together the UNRAM team’s experience working in both the CSIRO and 
UQ projects (Interview 18; Interview 19). Groups existed prior to the projects but their purpose had 
been to protect against theft and, in some cases, access government schemes for inputs like 
fertiliser. Through their involvement with the project, more group-based activities, such as 
microfinance, were established. 
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(a) Scaling out. The emphasis in Lombok was on cattle management practices (Table 6.2), with 
less emphasis on planting of forages due to the limited land available. To facilitate controlled 
mating, kandang groups were provided with funds to purchase a ‘quality’ bull and team members 
provided advice to the groups to choose and purchase the bull. This approach was deliberate, 
aiming to build farmer capacity and confidence rather than simply providing a bull purchased by the 
team (Dahlanuddin et al. 2016). The bull was kept for the duration of the mating period (June to 
December) and then sold. A modest fee was charged for each successful mating and fees from the 
bull service were distributed between the bull-keeper and the kandang group. Money from the sale 
was used to purchase a new bull the following season and, in some cases, to fund a microfinance 
system for group members.  
The Lombok project had modest scale-out ambitions. The focus was to progressively include 
additional kandang groups in the project—up to 36 in three years. The original project proposal 
planned for expansion to 80 kandang groups over five years, which would have represented 
approximately 10 per cent of the kandang groups in Lombok (CSIRO n.d. -b, p.12). However, the 
program through which the Phase 3 projects were funded was cut. Though ACIAR funded a small 
extension to the projects, the expansion to 80 kandang groups was never implemented.  
Kandang groups that had been involved in earlier UQ projects were used as demonstration sites for 
new groups. An On-Ground Team member was assigned to support each farmer group. In the first 
year, the project worked with 24 farmer groups and expanded to work with another 12 groups in 
2009. By the end of the project, all group members in the 36 kandang had adopted at least one 
project practice (1,144 members in total). Each On-Ground Team  member supported farmers in 
three kandang groups to adapt the practices as relevant for their situation. There was no aim to scale 
out beyond the project farmer groups in Lombok. However, an estimated 400 to 500 farmers from 
outside the groups (on average from 1 km away but up to 3 km) used the bull service (Van 
Wensveen et al. 2017a, p.31, p.56). The mating service was an effective means to promote the 
project practices outside the kandang group, with non-members usually receiving information about 
other practices when they visited (Grünbühel and Williams 2016). Use of additional practices by 
non-members was limited, unless they had strong ties (e.g., family) or lived close to kandang 
members and were able to receive ongoing information (Grünbühel and Williams 2016). 
(b) Scaling up. The project team considered that policy and program influence in Lombok was 
relatively successful at the close of the project (Table 6.3). The formal advisory committee was 
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considered to have given the local project team validation, reputation, and room to leverage 
influence (Interview 20). 
There were several opportunities to influence policy at the provincial and district levels. In 2008 the 
Provincial Governor announced an initiative to make West Nusa Tenggara the ‘Land of a Million 
Cattle’ (Bumi Sejuta Sapi). Three staff associated with the Lombok series of projects were asked to 
be part of a taskforce that would develop a ‘Blueprint Strategy’ to implement the Land of a Million 
Cattle Program. At the same time, the Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID)31 funded UNRAM to work with the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Department 
of Livestock Services to develop breeding programs and regulations based on the findings of the 
Phase 3 project (referred to as the ANTARA project, Table 6.3). Over a period of seven months, 
Indonesian team members worked with government staff to draft and workshop a strategy and 
supporting decrees to implement cattle breeding programs based on project findings (Dahlanuddin 
2010). Furthermore, BPTP drew on project practices as part of their ‘Prima Tani’ program, which 
used selected farmer groups as demonstration sites to promote improved practices for cattle 
management (Corfield 2012, McDonald 2012).32  
The Provincial Department of Livestock Services expanded its livestock programs to include 
provision of bulls to farmer groups to facilitate natural mating. (Previously artificial insemination 
programs, which had low success rates, had been the main focus.) The Department of Livestock 
Services also began purchasing animals for breeding programs from kandang groups participating 
in the project at a premium price, recognising the good condition of these animals (Dahlanuddin et 
al. 2016). Influence also extended to non-government actors, with the Bank of Indonesia agreeing to 
fund training of departmental staff and farmers to allow expansion into other districts. Another key 
outcome was the development and signing of a Governor’s Decree on pricing, which set prices for 
animals based on quality and condition. The ANTARA team members thought this would help 
provide a greater incentive for use of practices by sending a clearer price signal to farmers. 
(c) Sustainability of project impacts. A survey of all 36 kandang groups involved in the project 
was conducted in 2015 (Dahlanuddin et al. 2016). All except three of the original groups were still 
                                               
31 AusAID was abolished, and its functions merged into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 
2013.  
32 It is worth noting that influence on the Prima Tani Program was not raised by Indonesian team members as 
part of discussions in 2017 (van Wensveen et al. 2017c). This may be because this was an impact of the 
Phase 2 work, while the focus on the 2017 study was impacts of the Phase 3 project. 
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operating in 2015. A majority of farmers in all groups still practised some components of the 
technical package, but in most cases use of the project’s recommended practices had decreased 
(Table 6.4). The measured decrease would likely have been greater if the three groups that had 
ceased functioning were included. Some of the decrease actually reflected adaptations to the 
farmers’ post-project situation, such as the replacement of the communally-owned and managed 
bull with a bull owned outright by an individual group member, or placing small barriers between 
cow and calf rather than physical separation in separate pens (VanWensveen et al. 2017c). 
However, some of the decrease was due to the lack of ongoing support and facilitation by the On-
Ground Team members, who had supported groups to navigate more complex group decision-
making processes (Dahlanuddin et al. 2016).  
Table 6.3 Summary of policy and institutional influence of Lombok projects 
Administrat-
ive level 
Institution or 
group 
Selected examples of influence in key stakeholder programs and 
capacity 
NTB Province  Provincial 
Governor’s 
Office  
Project Leader and Coordinator on Task Force for ‘Land of a 
Million Cattle’ initiative to develop implementation strategies. 
Governor’s Decree on Bali Cattle Breeding (via ANTARA project) 
to provide support for purchase and distribution of quality bulls and 
identification system to record progeny. 
Governor’s Decree on Grading and Price Incentives (via ANTARA 
project) to provide price incentive for farmers producing high-
quality animals.  
 Department of 
Livestock 
Services 
Development of Strategic Plan and Action Plan to support how the 
Department of Livestock Services will implement the Land of a 
Million Cattle program (via ANTARA project). 
Broadening of programs to include promotion of controlled natural 
mating in addition to artificial insemination. 
Bulls purchased for distribution to farmer groups, for mating rather 
than fattening. 
Project kandangs used as model for Village Breeding Centres. 
Shift in Provincial Government preference from cross-breeds to 
Bali cattle. 
 Extension 
Office 
Project kandangs used as learning sites for village extension 
officers. 
Village extension officer training as part of Bank of Indonesia 
initiative. 
Central 
Lombok 
District Head’s 
Office 
District Head’s Decree on Collective Housing to support continued 
collectively-managed animal pens (via ANTARA). 
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District  Central Lombok declared source of Bali cattle breeding stock. 
 Department of 
Livestock 
Services 
Village extension officer training conducted by project team. 
Purchase of 40 bulls for farmer groups in Central Lombok. 
 Extension 
Office 
Implementation of technology package in 10 villages. 
Village extension officer training conducted by project team. 
On-Ground Team facilitation of farmer training as part of 
subsequent Farmer Managed Extension Activities program (World 
Bank). 
Source: Modified by author based on VanWensveen et al. (2017c, p.23). Some events (e.g., one-off 
events or preparation of proposals where outcomes were not known) have been omitted for brevity.  
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Table 6.4 Adoption of practices by farmers in project farmer groups in Lombok 
Project practice Adoption during 
project (2009) 
(n=785 farmersa) 
Adoption post-project 
(2015) 
(n=928 farmersc) 
Using quality bulls for natural 
mating 
100% 82% 
Mating cows at 40–60 days after 
calving 
70% 56% 
Weaning calves at 6 months 56% 23% 
Preferentially feeding pregnant and 
lactating cows 
52% 53% 
Planting and using improved 
forages  
39% grew new forages;  
51% expanded existing 
foragesb 
92% 
Notes a Only data from the first 24 farmer groups (n=785 farmers) are included as the last 12 groups 
(n=359 farmers) had only been participating in the project for six months at the time of data 
collection. b Figures are not mutually exclusive. c Calculation excludes three farmer groups that had 
ceased to function since the end of the project. Source: VanWensveen et al. (2017c, p.19). 
In terms of policy sustainability, many of the initiatives and decrees in Table 6.3 that had been 
informed by the project were ongoing at the time of my research. However, their effectiveness had 
been undermined by policies and programs from the central government that conflicted with 
provincial and district programs, such as an emphasis on artificial insemination programs (Interview 
18; Interview 19; group discussion with Indonesian researchers). Decentralisation in Indonesia has 
devolved funding and autonomy to provincial and district governments, but they are still bound to 
implement directives from the central government, regardless of whether they compete with local 
initiatives (Interview 18). Furthermore, project team members were frustrated that many of the on-
going government programs had selected some of the project practices, usually the tangible and 
simple aspects such as providing a bull, without also providing the information on feeding and 
breeding management that makes use of the bull effective (Interview 18).  
6.6 Actors, roles and institutional context 
Having provided a broad sketch of how the projects were designed and implemented to support 
scale-out and scale-up, I now explore the broader dynamics and the diverse views and roles of the 
key actors and organisations involved—ACIAR, the Indonesian research partners, the Indonesian 
Government, the Australian research partners, and the participating farmers.  
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6.6.1 ACIAR 
ACIAR funded all the research analysed in this case study. ACIAR is a non-statutory agency 
established by the Australian Government in 1982 with a mandate to fund research to increase 
agricultural production and build research capacity in developing countries (Currie-Alder 2015). 
ACIAR’s funding model follows a ‘partnership approach’ where ACIAR Research Program 
Managers (RPMs) act as brokers, linking Australian scientists with in-country counterparts to solve 
agricultural problems with ‘mutual benefit’ for the countries involved (Currie-Alder 2015). The 
development of the projects in this case study coincided with significant organisational changes and 
shifting priorities in ACIAR. 
From the 1990s, the organisation was drawn into Australian diplomatic efforts, responding to 
requests from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade to fund projects in specific regions or areas 
of strategic interest to Australia. According to Currie-Alder (2015, p.107), ‘such efforts were seen 
[by staff in ACIAR] as special projects, something outside the regular portfolio, motivated more by 
politics than by science … [S]uch efforts enhanced ACIAR’s standing with the minister, and helped 
secure the funding needed to do what ACIAR saw as its main work.’ ACIAR was not just a 
research agency but reflected the priorities of Australian international relations. Part of the impetus 
for developing and funding the projects described here was that the ACIAR investment in 
Indonesia, particularly in livestock, had declined ‘at a time when the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship was on the up. We needed to get in there and do something’ (Interview 21). In other 
words, the investment needed to reflect the renewed importance of the Australian-Indonesian 
relationship.  
ACIAR’s aims for project impact changed over the span of these projects. In ACIAR’s first ten 
years, project evaluations focused on science-based calculations of agricultural production increases 
or cost reductions as a result of ACIAR research outputs (Currie-Alder 2015). From 1992 onwards, 
Australia’s foreign aid focused specifically on poverty reduction. ACIAR likewise sought to 
articulate a link between agricultural production increases, increased income, and reductions in 
poverty, which meant the organisation needed to focus on the practical use of project outputs 
(Currie-Alder 2015). In a revised policy statement, ACIAR committed to ‘intensify its efforts to 
ensure delivery of benefits to partner countries, and commit resources to the research-extension 
interface’ as a strategy to support increased adoption of research outputs (ACIAR 1999, p.15). Such 
a shift contributed to ACIAR’s ability to fund the Phase 2 CSIRO project, which was essentially 
about testing participatory modelling as a communication and extension tool.  
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In 2004, the Chief Executive Officer of ACIAR announced three categories of project based on the 
expected time to impact (Table 6.5, Interview 21). RPMs have always played a strong role in 
shaping ACIAR projects, commissioning research based either on proposals received from 
Australian organisations and individuals or on high-level engagement with foreign governments 
(Currie-Alder 2015). The change to an impact focus was a significant shift in how ACIAR operated, 
and many RPMs struggled with the change (Interview 21). The 2003–04 Director’s Review notes 
‘vigorous debate’ within ACIAR about ‘getting the right direction’ (ACIAR 2004, p.6). A core 
team of RPMs who ‘got it’, and were described as ‘gate keepers’ by one interviewee, worked to 
institutionalise the changes and bring other RPMs on board (Interview 21). 
Table 6.5 ACIAR project categories based on expected time to impact 
Category Example characteristicsa  % of new projects 
funded 
Category 1:  
Impact likely within 5 
years of conclusion  
High chance of achieving impact. 
Proven technology in similar environments. 
Focus on local adaptation of technology. 
Strong market demand for technology; clear link 
between market demand and poverty alleviation. 
40 
Category 2:  
Impact within 5–10 years 
of conclusion 
Likelihood of achieving objectives is high. 
Technology has been proven elsewhere or is in an 
advanced stage of development.  
An extension or follow-on project is likely to expand 
outputs to a wider audience. 
In-country policy and regulations are not considered a 
constraint to adoption, but some work may be needed 
to confirm the situation.  
40 
Category 3:  
Impact in 10 years or more 
Limited likelihood of achieving scientific objectives in 
the near-term but, if achieved, benefits are very high.  
Projects are oriented to science-push rather than 
demand-pull. 
Policy and economic environment in-country are not 
currently conducive to adoption of outputs.  
Impacts likely to develop over the long term and may 
not be immediately obvious; initial negative impacts 
for some communities or individuals. 
20 
Notes: a Projects are not expected to meet all characteristics; not all characteristics provided by 
ACIAR are listed. Source: Modified from ACIAR (2004, p.7) and ACIAR (2013, pp. 8–9).  
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The Research Program Manager under whom the Indonesian cattle and forages projects fell was 
one of the key actors within ACIAR championing the shift to more impact-focused research 
(Interview 21). Many team members interviewed emphasised the role of the Research Program 
Manager in getting projects through the ACIAR in-house review process: 
You can’t underplay the role that ACIAR and [the Research Program Manager] had 
here … he was absolutely supportive. So if we had gone with [the project proposals] 
to an ACIAR in-house-review without [him] being absolutely sold on it, we would 
have come away with nothing. But he got it through, and I can still remember how 
amazed I was when he rang up and said “it’s got through the in-house-review” 
because I was sure they were going to come back and say “a more traditional project 
please” (Interview 20).  
The Phase 3 projects were funded through AusAID’s Smallholder Agribusiness Development 
Initiative (SADI), for which ACIAR was administering funds under Sub-program 3—‘Support to 
Market-Driven Adaptive Research’. According to one interviewee, there were two elements to this 
that supported funding of the scaling projects which would otherwise not have happened (Interview 
20). First, SADI was concerned with upscaling and adoption—if the fund had been made available 
any earlier, the technology package would not have been at a stage where this would have been 
feasible. Second, it allowed funding of the salaries for the on-ground-teams, which would be 
difficult to get through the normal ACIAR approval processes: ‘[SADI] was part of the reason we 
could go to ACIAR and have this … weird budget, because we were having a budget apparently 
which was around [On-Ground Teams] and employing them. And without the SADI money, that 
might not have happened’ (Interview 20).  
In putting the projects together, ACIAR sought to change perceptions within the Australian research 
community that it was a club with exclusive members, hence it deliberately invited researchers with 
limited prior involvement with ACIAR to become involved (Interview 21). Projects also brought in 
new university partners within Indonesia and limited the involvement of some traditional partners 
(Interview 20, Interview 21). From here, the work developed into a series of intersecting projects 
bringing together a network of researchers, farmers, and government officials, many of whom had 
never met prior to the project development but who have developed strong partnerships since. Many 
interviewees described a degree of luck in this outcome (Interview 17, Interview 20, Interview 21, 
and, Interview 22). 
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ACIAR, as the funder, had considerable power in shaping projects and shifting the focus from 
technology development to extension and practical impact. Teams putting together proposals must 
address the requirements and aims set out by ACIAR (Interview 22). The Phase 3 projects were 
some of the first ACIAR projects to focus to such a large extent on extension and policy influence 
(Interview 21). The role of the Chief Executive Officer in pushing ACIAR’s focus towards impact, 
and of the coalition of RPMs who ‘got it’, were significant in enabling these changes (Interview 
21).  
6.6.2 Australian partner institutions  
Australian scientists who led the projects were operating in different organisational environments: 
UQ, one of Australia’s top-ranking universities, and CSIRO, Australia’s national science agency. 
Senior researchers in the two organisations had different approaches to the research. The UQ-led 
projects33 prioritised the development of technical packages, while the CSIRO-led projects sought 
to address a more diverse set of science questions. 
 One interviewee from UQ saw their primary concern as delivering a set of proven technical 
packages in response to identified production constraints or challenges. While it was hoped that, at 
some point, a department such as the Department of Livestock Services would use the package, 
little effort was put into actively trying to scale out the work, ‘[b]ecause the [main] thing was to 
think about the final output of your project and what you want to sell is “here’s a package of either 
feed these things or do this or do that [and] this is what the output will be”’ (Interview 22).  
For the UQ interviewee, trying to support the uptake of these technical packages required an 
entirely different approach and warranted an additional project: 
You need to get a team around with expertise in scaling out. They need to have a 
technical package that they know can work and that they can still draw on people 
doing things technically, or having technical input to make sure it is working. But 
the emphasis [between a scaling out and a technical project] is quite different … It 
is difficult to get scale out in a normal ACIAR research project. The team does not 
have the people resources and also in prioritising time to develop the technical 
output there is little time left for any scaling out activities. It is better to have scaling 
out as the focus of a separate project but this relies on a suite of technical packages 
                                               
33 It should be noted this relates to UQ-led projects as part of this case. Not all UQ-led ACIAR projects take 
this approach, with examples of ACIAR projects with social science involvement since the 1990s. 
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that are useful for scaling out being available … Not everything needs to be scaled 
out, but the issue was how could you do the scaling out and what were the 
advantages and disadvantages of different approaches? As I understand it that is 
what the scaling out project did, and to me, that’s a better model if you’re looking 
for a real big impact because the objective of a project like that is scaling out 
(Interview 22). 
The UQ researcher did not see the same opportunity to lead a project on scaling of technologies 
which is, in part, why CSIRO ended up leading both projects. CSIRO had a longer history of social 
and agricultural sciences working together, and could see the value to CSIRO in the social science 
questions and, beyond that, the contribution to sustainability of impact: 
[What the social science could provide] is the evidence that the sort of approach 
from [the first to the third phase] works. Because if we don’t have that end element 
we end up with just a lot of hot air and fluff at the end. And so we need the evidence 
to say that a long-term investment by the right people, and continuity, and 
understanding … a biophysical understanding of the system and what elements have 
to change if you want to make change, and then how that information flows so that 
people adopt those bits that suit them, and how they adapt the bits that suit them, 
and how that scales out and how persistent that is, how sustainable that is once 
everyone goes home. So I guess … the rest of it is all a lovely decade but it’s to do 
with the sustainability of that and whether we have made the changes in practice 
and policy. If we don’t have that, then we don’t have a story. All we do is we have a 
lot of happy memories of weekends in downtown Sulawesi (Interview 20). 
However, without pressure from ACIAR and Indonesian partners, CSIRO would have been 
unlikely to work in the collective systems of Lombok (Interview 15, Interview 17, and Interview 
20). Had this been the case, aspects of the UQ work linked to the kandang groups, like 
microfinance or group-managed bulls, would not have featured as they would have been less 
feasible in extensive cattle systems (though bulls were provided in the second phase projects in the 
extensive systems of Sumbawa (Interview 17)). 
CSIRO has a recent history of strengthening the integration of social and biophysical sciences 
through various divisional and flagship structures (Syme 2005). In 2008, all the social and 
economic scientists, who had been largely dispersed across different thematic areas of the 
organisation, were brought together into one research program, with the aim of consolidating and 
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strengthening the social and economic science capacity in CSIRO. CSIRO saw one of its selling 
points as its ability to furnish multi-disciplinary teams to tackle complex problems. As the science 
questions changed over the three phases of CSIRO work, their internal organisational processes 
gave the team the ability to balance continuity of technical expertise alongside additional social 
science skills. However, one team member recalled ‘fighting’ management to get an adequate 
allocation of time of a suitably senior social scientist to support the final phase of work; another 
recalled that it seemed like an ‘uphill battle’ to get social scientists on the team and that, in 
hindsight, they should have been included since Phase 1 (Interview 20; Interview 17).  
When the two social scientists did join (myself included), there was some tension initially with the 
team. It took time and effort to find a ‘common language’ between the social and agricultural 
scientists, as is often the case in multi-disciplinary work (Stock and Burton 2011). Though the 
scientists in the team were welcoming, my own recollection of the time was of treading carefully, 
challenging established narratives around adoption of practices, and defending our methodology. I 
was conscious of being a newcomer in a team34 that had a six-year history and connection to the 
work. One team member recalled:  
[W]e had different project experiences. And the other guys, the [agricultural] guys 
… they had their ways of doing things, they had worked together before, and they 
were set in their ways in terms of how they were going to go about it … and also 
it’s something they identified as a need, they wanted, sort of an external look, that’s 
why they invited us to come in in the first place. I mean they said adoption isn’t 
going that good, perhaps need ideas to jumpstart that a little bit. And we said “aah 
first we need to look at the system” because that’s how we do things. So in those 
terms it’s a clash of cultures (Interview 16).  
This was, of course, experienced differently by different team members. Another interviewee (not a 
social scientist) preferred to describe the process as a ‘healthy exchange of ideas’ and, while 
acknowledging they had some different perspectives, emphasised how much had been learned by 
the inclusion of social science into the project (Interview 17).  
                                               
34 In the first two phases of the work, the team consisted of CSIRO research staff with expertise in farming 
systems and agronomy, livestock production and economics. The third phase substituted social science for 
economics.  
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According to another interviewee, the CSIRO team never properly reconciled different perspectives 
between the social and agricultural scientists as to what was the focus of the projects, each 
emphasising a view from their own disciplinary perspective: 
I think given [the Phase 2 project] was successful … some of the people from [the 
Phase 2 project] were just taking the same practices that had been proven, and were 
just proving them in a different place … which is great but not the sole purpose of 
[the Phase 3 projects]. The other thing I think maybe wasn’t as obvious to the 
people who’d come through [all of the projects] was that one of the things we could 
have done was to look at adaptation as well as adoption. I think we controlled the 
set of practices a little bit too much (Interview 15).  
Again, this view was not shared:  
… [A]daptation was the key to on-farm testing of generic best-bet options derived 
from IAT scenarios which were in turn developed with farmers. As I said earlier, 
the whole idea of the best-bet program was to test the biophysical adaptability of 
generic forage, feeding, and management options in a diversity of real-farm 
situations, together with farmers’ own ability to adapt individual best-bet options 
(e.g., new forages) to their specific conditions, or which components within the 
overall “package of options” best suited their situations. Indeed, adaptation was the 
essence to the on-farm best-bet program because we all understood that a 3-year 
project was too short to obtain strong evidence of real adoption outcomes 
(Interview 17). 
These two quotes emphasise the different viewpoints held by team members. The quote from 
Interview 15 is referring to the missed opportunity of researching the process of adaptation in the 
same way the team considered adoption processes, including adaptation beyond recommended 
practices. The quote from Interview 17 refers to the adaptation of practices within the farmer-
scientist trial, i.e., occurring within the project experimentation process.  
6.6.3 Indonesian partner institutions 
The local project teams were fundamental to the success of the projects in several ways—informing 
design, taking the lead in implementation and getting things done, and managing relationships. In 
this section, however, I focus in particular on their role in leveraging networks and connections to 
 150 
support engagement with government officials from extension, the livestock service, and the 
provincial government.  
The advisory committees provided a formal setting in which to promote awareness of the projects’ 
approaches to improving cattle production and to develop relationships with influential actors. In 
itself, however, they were probably not sufficient to facilitate policy impact:  
I think probably the biggest influence in policy was in Lombok, and I still think that 
was rather to do with the efforts of [the project leader] and [UNRAM] rather than 
the influence of the committee. But [the project leader] and his crew wouldn’t have 
been able to have the influence unless we had the committee structure (Interview 
20).  
Reflecting on the degree of policy engagement in Lombok, Indonesian researchers emphasised the 
importance of informal engagement and networking outside the formal structure of the advisory 
committee as part of their success (Group interview with Indonesian researchers). One interviewee 
expanded on this, explaining:  
[You have to find] the most effective person … not the boss himself or herself, but 
[you] have to go through somebody who can provide the right inputs to the boss … 
[the person who] will quietly talk to the Head of [Department of Livestock 
Services] … [They don’t] have the time to understand whether [it] is useful or not, 
so if you go to somebody below, they will have more time to understand and can 
find a way to formulate it into a language that can be understood by their boss 
(Interview 18). 
Finding this person at times engaged the Lombok team’s extensive networks across the province: 
‘[B]etween the project lead and the project coordinator, they knew just about everybody’ (Interview 
15). Many of the key people in district and provincial government positions relating to livestock 
either went to school with someone on the project team (e.g., the Provincial Governor) or they were 
graduates from UNRAM who were taught by members of the project team (Interview 15, Interview 
18, and Interview 19).  
Sitting behind the serendipitous announcement of the provincial ‘Land of a Million Cattle’  
initiative were strong connections between UNRAM and the Governor’s Office. From 2008 to 
2010, an UNRAM livestock lecturer was employed by the Provincial Governor to act as an ‘expert 
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advisor’ for natural resources, environment, and food security. It was this expert advisor who 
initially proposed the Land of a Million Cattle program as part of provincial planning processes and 
who sought advice on the initiative from team members at the university. Of course, there were 
many other factors that influenced how this process unfolded, including the priority given to the 
beef industry at the national level and the enhanced reputations of team members through their 
involvement in the ACIAR projects. However, strong relationships enabled a voice for the 
researchers, providing an initial contact point and a degree of familiarity and trust on both sides to 
facilitate discussions. ‘It [makes] it easier [to] keep communicating, talking to them’ (Interview 19).  
Compared to the Lombok team, the Sulawesi team did not have the same networks with different 
levels of government agencies, and their efforts were dispersed across a larger area. One 
interviewee felt this ‘tyranny of distance’ significantly influenced the outcomes in Sulawesi:  
… [T]he issue of distance played a key role here with both the study sites (and thus 
the impacts) and the team leadership and [On-Ground Teams] all in close proximity 
and thus accessible to those on the advisory committee and also local politicians and 
policy makers. All in all, it was just so much easier to work on Lombok than South 
Sulawesi. The on-going close relationship between key players [in] BPTP and 
UNRAM really helped as well, compared with South Sulawesi where the equivalent 
relationship[s] were more tenuous due to personnel changes (Interview 17). 
The other role that the in-country teams were able to play was to build on and connect across 
multiple projects in a way that the Australian teams were less able to do. The team of researchers in 
UNRAM had established a strong reputation based on careers carved out through a series of 
projects. They were able to blur boundaries between ‘projects’, such that farmer groups involved in 
early projects were still connected to subsequent work, and experimental projects formed a basis for 
subsequent extension-oriented projects, regardless of the funder (Figure 6.4). As one team member 
expressed it:  
That’s my style of working. I don’t want to do this for that purpose and do this for 
this purpose because you will not achieve anything. Because I realised a lot of 
things we do are going to the same direction, actually (Interview 18). 
Projects involving BPTP and UNRAM since the completion of the scale-up and scale-out project 
are shown in Figure 6.4. Connections in this case show where interviewees indicated they were 
taking lessons or approaches (as well as technical outputs) from one project to another (Interview 
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18; Interview 22). The use of specially hired and trained staff (the On-Ground Teams) was one 
approach that has been replicated extensively in other projects. However, learning from the 
difficulties in getting team members employed in government agencies in the past, in an upcoming 
project UNRAM has arranged to second agency staff to On-Ground Team roles, guaranteeing they 
will go back into ‘the system’. Likewise, they are now seeking to extend policy engagement up to 
the central government level.  
 
Figure 6.4 Influence of case study projects in subsequent project work  
Note: Work funded by ACIAR unless otherwise stated. Source: Based on Interview 18, group 
discussion with Indonesian team members, and ACIAR project descriptions (available at 
aciar.gov.au). OGT refers to On-Ground Team. 
6.6.4 The Indonesian Government  
‘The Indonesian Government’ can appear as both a hulking bureaucracy with inflexible rules and 
regulations and an organisation full of dynamic individuals (if only you can find the right one). 
Here the term is used as shorthand for the range of government departments and levels of 
government that the project teams were engaging with. Technically, universities are also 
government agencies, with university staff employees of the government, but for this analysis the 
two are discussed separately.  
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At the national level, central government priorities for beef self-sufficiency and smallholder-
oriented rural development, which were reflected in provincial and district priorities, provided the 
policy justification for the projects. The goals of the government at different levels and those of the 
universities were broadly aligned to support working with farmers: ‘[University and Government] 
want to see the farmer [with a] better living, earning more money through increasing production of 
their livestock’ (Interview 19). However, in terms of the influence the projects were able to have on 
policy, the researchers and government officers had different approaches to program design and 
implementation.  
The Lombok team in particular tried to encourage farmer learning and participation as part of the 
Phase 3 project. However, the government programs that were implemented as a result of the 
project’s influence focused on hand-outs—providing animals and building pens and other 
infrastructure funded by third parties that ignored the participatory processes encouraged by the 
project. As explained by one researcher: 
For example, when we said “ok you have to provide a good bull ... blah blah blah” 
and then [the Government goes] “ok, ok bull is good, ok let’s do that.” That’s the 
situation. They don’t really want to know: how do you buy the bull, how do you  
distribute [it], and how to manage that within the group, and how do you sustain 
that. They don’t have time for that ... Of course, when the bull is there and nobody 
is telling [the group] … how best to manage it … then they will have a different 
result (Interview 18). 
Where the project supported farmer groups with the skills and knowledge to go and purchase their 
own bull from the cattle market, the Department of Livestock Services introduced programs to 
provide animals to groups with no involvement or investment by the group, which gave limited 
long-term benefits to farmers or incentives to improve cattle productivity (Dahlanuddin et al. 2016). 
Indeed, conflict over how to distribute cows provided under the Department of Livestock Services 
programs was thought to be a contributing factor in the cases where kandang groups formerly 
involved in the project had dissolved (VanWensveen et al. 2017c). 
There were several suggested reasons for the differences in approach. First, there was a hand-out 
mentality within government agencies, ‘a fundamental belief that dropping extra cows, extra bulls, 
extra gifts on top of farmers was how you were going to change things’ (Interview 20). Second, 
government agencies were (and still are) driven by output-based rather than outcome-based 
performance measures (Interview 18). Third, the government agencies simply did not have the 
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resources and capacity to take on the intensive extension methods promoted by the project (Group 
interview with Indonesian researchers). For example, extension officers serviced multiple villages 
and provided information on a range of activities, including livestock, forestry, and cropping. They 
did not have the resources to provide detailed support and guidance to farmer groups in the way the 
On-Ground Teams did: 
More than 70 per cent their budget is for their own [operational costs]; [there is] 
only a small portion of the money that they use for what we call the program. So 
this [puts] them in difficult situation to really apply all the technology we build 
because, in our budget, we are integrated, we work all together, and really supported 
all aspects in order to achieve our goal. Or to apply the strategy that we applied in 
our project. But as I said, [the department] because of the limitation, they could not 
do so (Interview 19). 
However, team members felt that even where they had been able to influence district and provincial 
programs, for example, to promote natural mating alongside artificial insemination, central 
government directives prioritising artificial insemination were the overriding influence: 
Most of the money for the activity, for the program is from central government 
money. And then [they] just put it or drop and apply it in the provincial—through 
the provincial government, but apply at the [district] level … [S]o central 
government will have their own requirement with their own technology or strategy 
that they developed (Interview 19). 
Clearly, the people and agencies responsible for the design and implementation of programs and 
policies were responding to a diverse range of competing demands, goals, and interests. At the same 
time as these projects were running, there was a policy focus on the research and promotion of 
‘twinning’ (that is, for cows to carry twins as a way of increasing production). One interviewee 
pointed out that this occurred ‘at a time when the greatest challenge was just achieving one calf per 
year’ (Interview 17).  
At a national level, implementation of government policy aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in 
beef has been problematic, with policy trying to find a balance between keeping prices low for 
consumers and ensuring reasonable returns to farmers (OECD 2012). The result has often 
undermined the overall goal for self-sufficiency. For example, the calculation of import quotas for 
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beef routinely overestimates domestic supply relative to demand, resulting in price increases that 
trigger slaughter of cows, reducing the national herd and its reproductive capacity (OECD 2012). 
6.6.5 ‘The farmer’  
Interviewees were aware that researchers and government actors had ideas on what was good for 
‘the farmer’ and what the farmers ‘should’ do to realise the potential of the opportunities around 
them. But ‘sometimes [the] farmer thinks differently than us’ (Interview 19).  
The motivations of farmers, or indeed farm-households, for keeping cattle were diverse. For 
example, cattle raising could be (a) a complementary (but lower priority) activity to cropping; (b) a 
strategy to enable a reduction of rice area grown, while ensuring income in ageing households who 
were struggling with the labour-requirements of rice production; or (c) a central livelihood strategy, 
especially for households with insufficient land for cropping (Grünbühel and Williams 2016, 
Williams et al. 2012). Household goals were not necessarily about maximising the number of 
animals produced or sold. Many households may have implemented the practices developed in the 
project and experienced benefits, but this would not necessarily have linked to the policy goal of 
national beef self-sufficiency. 
Government programs, too, were viewed differently by farm-households. Researchers were 
dismayed at the resurgence of government artificial insemination programs, believing it undermined 
the goals of the project. Some farmers were frustrated by these programs because of their cost and 
because they had to pay regardless of whether the cow became pregnant, while others valued the 
opportunity provided through artificial insemination to cross-breed their cows and get a higher-
value calf, as cross-bred animals were larger and generally fetched a higher price (farmer 
interviews). In one farmer group visited, farmers had integrated artificial insemination into the 
broader set of project practices, switching between natural mating and artificial insemination. In 
another group, where farmers were unsatisfied with artificial insemination services, they were 
switching back to controlled mating with a group-managed bull. Each of these examples 
demonstrates ongoing experimentation and adaptation by farmers as they tested, adapted, and 
integrated options from a range of programs and information sources.  
From a narrowly scientific perspective, these adaptations may be seen to have negative impacts on 
cattle production. For example, cross-bred calves required more feed resources, which one 
interviewee noted created problems in land- and feed-constrained areas. However, from the 
 156 
household perspective, it may have balanced a number of additional needs and priorities that 
changed over time.  
6.7 Discussion 
The case study presented in this chapter provides an account of how researchers responded to a 
change in the institutional environment that emphasised the need to take research outputs to scale. 
While ACIAR may not have started with the explicit intention of building a 12-year research 
program, the consistency of their support for successive projects was essential to enabling increased 
impacts from the research. Organisational changes in ACIAR forced RPMs and commissioned 
researchers to consider the impact of their work more deeply, including how it could be expanded to 
reach thousands of farmers. The ability of researchers to respond to this was shaped by their 
organisational context. CSIRO had a stronger institutional mandate to tackle such questions and 
greater managerial ability to assemble the required teams. This is consistent with innovations 
systems theories which highlight the role of organisational incentives and cultures in shaping what 
kind of innovation is pursued (Hall 2002). In this case, leadership within ACIAR pushed for an 
increased scope and greater emphasis on project impact and instituted new project guidelines to 
encourage ‘impact’ as a key consideration of project proposals.  
The case study demonstrates several strategies for scaling of research outputs. The On-Ground 
Teams supported intensive learning with farmers who were then asked to further promote and 
support use of the practices. The team members themselves were also part of a strategy to build 
capacity within, and influence, key Indonesian agencies. Scaling up was formally pursued through 
advisory committees, which provided a forum to promote and discuss project activities alongside 
district and provincial priorities. Finally, while not a formal strategy, scaling was supported by 
ACIAR’s openness to ‘follow-on’ projects, enabling learning, gradual expansion of activities and 
geographical areas, contraction from other areas (e.g. Sumbawa), and development of networks to 
influence policy. The strategies of the project were closely interlinked, with scale-out and 
demonstration of the benefits of the package the key to influencing government officers.  
The Phase 3 projects were classified as Category 1 ACIAR projects, meaning there was an 
expectation of significant impact within five years. One interviewee suggested this meant a notional 
target in each project for increased incomes for 10,000 households in five years (Interview 21). It is 
unlikely that this target has been reached, either in Lombok or Sulawesi. But measuring success 
against this target is fraught, given that technology change is not a one-off decision by farmers but a 
process of learning and adaptation (Pannell et al. 2006). Assessments of adoption have been a 
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traditional measure for projects; however they are limited in their ability to consider dynamic 
processes that underpin social change, such as the broader context of the research (Hall et al. 2003).  
The evidence from Lombok suggests declining use of the practices recommended by the project, 
except for the use of improved forages, which continues. Discussions with farmers highlighted the 
inadequacy of a binary classification of farmer practices as ‘adoption’ or ‘non-adoption’. While 
scientists had a strong conviction, based on the evidence they had obtained, of the best practices to 
achieve certain outcomes for cattle production, farm-households re-interpreted35 these 
recommendations to suit their own goals, priorities, resource constraints, and other sources of 
information. As outlined by Pannell et al. (2006, p.1408), ‘[a]ll options are continuously open to 
question and review as new information is obtained or circumstances change.’ Household 
adjustment of practices, away from the recommended package, is precisely a response to changing 
circumstances (e.g., withdrawal of project support). How ACIAR would contend with adaptation 
and ‘merging’ of project practices is unclear. However, from a social science perspective, this 
merging would indicate a positive impact, with households continuing to innovate based on project 
outputs. Others, such as Hall (2005) or Douthwaite et al. (2017a), would perhaps consider this an 
example of building innovation capacity within the farmer groups.  
Though data are lacking, it is unlikely that the use of the practices has spread far beyond original 
project sites, despite the team’s efforts to engage government officials with policy influence, and 
the apparent alignment of the project with national and provincial goals. Broad-scale alignment or 
agreement of vision can hide important differences in how different actors understand and 
conceptualise the best pathways to achieve particular goals. The projects in this case study were 
well aligned to Indonesian Government objectives at the national and provincial levels, especially 
in Lombok with the announcement of the ‘Land of a Million Cattle’ goal for West Nusa Tenggara. 
There were also positive responses from different levels of government to the project results. 
However, the support generated was not visibly translated into actual policy change in the ways 
anticipated by the project team. Broad alignment of the vision (e.g., to increase cattle production) 
concealed important differences in how actors understood and conceptualised the best pathways to 
achieve the vision (e.g., hand-outs versus participation). The science-based practices promoted by 
the project actors were re-interpreted by government actors to suit their own interests, objectives, 
and capacities, and re-interpreted by farm-households to suit their own capacities and aspirations. 
Spilsbury and Nasi (2006) suggest it is common for researchers and policy makers to have different 
                                               
35 Rogers (1995) uses the term re-invention to describe the modifications and adjustments made by farmers.  
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views of how to reach a goal, even if that goal is agreed, and argue that researchers need to have a 
better understanding of the needs of their end-users, including policy makers.  
Though the case study spans 12 years, the objective to go to scale was only articulated and funded 
in the final three years. Literature on policy engagement suggests this is an unrealistic timeframe to 
build relationships and find appropriate mechanisms to influence policy (Marshall et al. 2017). The 
Australian team had little experience in trying to influence policy within Indonesia, and limited 
understanding of the Indonesian policy process. Though Indonesian team members were well-
connected, skills available on the team at the time of project design did not fully reflect the skills 
and expertise required for the project aims. This in part reflects the ACIAR model of project design 
which is driven by technical expertise, with social science often an add-on, despite its importance to 
achieving many of ACIAR’s outcomes.  
There were tangible examples of policy influence within the timeframe of the project through a mix 
of formal interactions and personal networks, e.g., the Governor’s Decrees to support breeding 
programs and set pricing structures that reflected the quality of the animal. However, the effect of 
the decrees and initiatives, as interpreted by many in the research team, was limited due to the 
partial application of project recommendations and the presence of competing programs. Though 
they were able to influence local actors within the system, these actors did not have the agency to 
change broader structures within the Indonesian Government. Several interviewees indicated that 
there was a role for ACIAR to engage with the Indonesian Government to advocate for policy 
change across its portfolio of research projects (Interview 18, Interview 21, and Interview 22). It is 
doubtful whether ACIAR as a foreign agency can play a legitimate role in influencing Indonesian 
policy, though it could play a role in supporting policy research that explores the impact of different 
policy options.  
6.8 Summary and conclusions  
What started as projects to address particular constraints to increased cattle productivity evolved 
into a program of research culminating with the aim to scale-out and scale-up approaches to support 
improved cattle production. The research teams used a number of strategies to achieve their aim: 
provision of intensive support to farmers and farmer groups; contributing to capacity building of 
extension staff and the Department of Livestock Services by training young graduates who, it was 
hoped, would eventually get jobs in these departments; and influencing policy and programs by 
regular discussions with key government actors.  
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The effectiveness of these strategies was mixed. However, the strategies themselves are of less 
interest than what they highlight about the assumptions and expectations held by actors in 
‘agricultural research for development’ in regard to taking research to scale. At the household level, 
there were demonstrable and clearly visible benefits for households and groups involved in the 
project that had taken on aspects of the project package. There was evidence to suggest ongoing use 
of practices and further scale-out beyond initial project sites. In many cases, farmers had re-
interpreted practices, integrating them with other programs and sources of information, often in 
ways which were considered less-than-optimal by project team members. The projects can be seen 
to have been successful in building farmer confidence and capacity in animal breeding, but this is 
difficult to capture in a binary classification of adoption or non-adoption.  
In the Lombok case, close personal networks, a clearly defined and targeted administrative area of 
influence, and alignment with provincial policy goals supported direct policy influence. However, 
the policy impacts were undermined (in the view of the researchers) in their implementation, which 
was output-focused and could not absorb the more nuanced messages around farmer capacity 
building and confidence (e.g., provision of bulls to groups compared to working with groups to 
select and purchase a bull). Furthermore, provinces and districts had to balance directives from 
central government alongside local priorities, which resulted in some competing policy and 
program agendas.  
The case shows how the organisational context of actors involved has a significant influence on 
what is possible, such as the way ACIAR’s turn to impact-focused research pushed the researchers 
out of their comfort zone to contend with unfamiliar processes of policy engagement. But it also 
highlights how shared goals, such as increasing cattle production, can obscure different values and 
pathways for how to get there, even within different levels of the same government agency.  
Impact, in this case, has been knitted together across a series of projects by key individuals in 
Lombok who continue to build on these projects. A fragmented view of projects that are each 
required in their own way to influence change and have impact is not helpful to understand or try to 
shape processes of change, particularly not at the scale of impact that many of these projects hope 
to achieve.   
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7 Discussion 
In the preceding chapters I have provided in-depth analysis of the actors, networks, and processes 
involved in the scaling out and up of agricultural research in three case studies. In this chapter, I 
compare and discuss findings from the three case studies and reflect on some of the implications for 
researchers, donors, governments, and others with an interest in development-focused, applied 
agricultural research.  
Reflecting across the cases, it is clear that several elements come together to translate research into 
impact: the research approach, the nature of the technology, planned and unplanned events, and the 
motivations of diverse actors, giving rise to a series of alignments or a ‘complex conjuncture’ 
(Cramb 2000b, p.12). Many of these elements sit outside the possibilities of careful planning, but it 
would be a mistake to put the outcomes of scaling research purely down to chance. It is also 
difficult to separate the elements—for example, the nature of the technology, the methods and 
approaches used in development, and the actors involved are tightly interconnected with the 
processes and outcomes of scaling. 
The sections that follow consider some of these elements in the context of the case studies and other 
examples from the literature. As a collective, the case studies highlight scaling out and scaling up as 
closely connected strategies that are difficult to separate from the research and innovation processes 
that both precede and follow them. For example, the spread of mechanisation in Thailand is closely 
connected to the process of experimentation involving multiple actors, while the post-project 
persistence of cattle management practices in Indonesia is related to the research approach and the 
focus on building the capacity of farmers, which supported them to continue to experiment and 
adapt practices. As such, a continuing emphasis on adoption as a measure of technology use 
becomes problematic, unable to properly address the adaptations and learning processes of ‘end 
users’ that are an inevitable part of the scaling process in agricultural research for development.  
7.1 Who and how? The process of taking research to scale 
In this section I consider how the different characteristics of each case study have shaped whether 
and how research was scaled, such as the duration of projects and the depth of relationships that 
were developed. I then compare the role of different actors in the processes of taking research to 
scale. The case studies in this thesis have highlighted different actions and contributions of the 
private sector, farmers, researchers, funders and government officials, though it is important to note 
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that this is not an exhaustive list of potential actors and that the roles will be different from case to 
case.  
7.1.1 A time and place—project and program structures for expanding impact 
The Lao and Indonesian cases provide examples of agricultural development through formal 
research processes, compared to the Thai case, in which international research played a contributory 
role, collaborating with the private sector and farmers who were at the centre of the process of 
adaptation and diffusion. This section compares the cases in terms of the degree of ‘design’ or the 
extent to which they were driven by the formal research sector, and, within this, the different 
degrees of interaction, from being locally embedded with in-country offices to frequent short visits 
by international research teams. 
In the Thai case, there was no formal project as such but a history of experimentation by the AED 
and an in-house research capability that fed into a much more diffuse process of experimentation 
and innovation. The efforts of the AED in importing and experimenting with tractors and other 
machines began decades before tractors and harvesters became ubiquitous across the Thai 
landscape. This process was characterised by innovative manufacturers and farmers, while the 
formal research sector (AED and IRRI) provided generalised designs. This is an example of the 
kind of formal-informal research synergies promoted by Reece and Sumberg (2003), who argue for 
the release of nascent technology to then be refined to specific conditions by farmers or end users, 
thus maximising the potential relevance of numerous models of adaptation for different 
circumstances. Two points are worth highlighting here. First, the processes of technical and socio-
economic change unfolded over decades, well beyond short, project-based timelines. Second, much 
of the research capacity was ‘in-house’, with support provided by IRRI at key points.  
Consider these points in the Lao case. At the outset, the Lao-IRRI Project was a long-term 
commitment from IRRI, the Government of Laos, and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation. International researchers were based in the country for many years, which allowed 
them to gain a deep understanding of the systems they were intervening in and supported ongoing 
capacity development and mentoring of Lao researchers. It is unlikely that the goals of the Lao-
IRRI Project, particularly as they related to a national rice research program, could have been met 
without the stability of a long-term commitment or locally-based research teams. This allowed for 
an embedded and ongoing process of learning and development, which supported relevant, 
sustainable capacity development (Horton 2002) and the ability to build trust, understanding, and 
ownership of the program’s outcomes within the Government of Laos and the Lao research system. 
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In contrast, the Indonesian case was not designed as a program of work. As the end of each 3–4 
year project approached, a process of developing proposals was undertaken to define and secure 
funding for the next phase of work. The consecutive projects followed a series of steps from 
problem definition and understanding, to identifying solutions, piloting, and finally scaling up and 
out. This process was necessary to understand the system and to test and adapt the proposed 
packages with a number of farmers. Would the final project have been designed differently, or 
would the end result have been more successful, if the teams had considered the possibility of 
scaling from the beginning and developed the required understanding of processes and relationships 
over 12 years instead of three? It is likely that a longer timeframe for policy influence in the 
Indonesia case would have provided greater ability to develop a depth of understanding of where, 
how, and on whom in the policy process the teams needed to focus, as well as to develop a sense of 
ownership and understanding within the Indonesian Government at different levels, creating the 
opportunity to inform and influence policy if the research results warranted it.  
The other significant difference in the Indonesian case is the ‘fly-in, fly-out’ model of overseas 
scientists visiting for a week or so at a time, several times a year, in close collaboration with local 
researchers who oversaw the project on a day-to-day basis. In CSIRO, this model is compounded by 
fragmentation of staff time across numerous projects and countries. According to one interviewee, 
the ability to have ‘big chunks of time’ of CSIRO scientists allocated to the first two projects in 
Indonesia was critical to the project outcomes, in contrast to later projects where staff would 
effectively have 20 per cent of their time for the project yet similar outcomes were expected. In a 
review of the impact of CGIAR-funded policy-oriented research, Walker et al. (2010) found a long-
term, in-country presence was a key factor to support policy influence. Being in-country allowed 
researchers to establish relationships with government and civil society actors engaged in policy 
dialogue and to advocate for change. For the projects in the Indonesian case, the consistency and 
long-term nature of relationships built with the Indonesian teams were part of a strategy of the 
Australian researchers, who were aware of their own limitations within this model. It was also more 
appropriate and effective for Indonesian researchers to play a role in policy engagement.  
Jakimow (2015) has reflected on the limitations and risks of the fly-in-fly-out model of 
international research in CSIRO, arguing that, without the time and capabilities to dig underneath 
the short inspections of demonstration sites and orchestrated village meetings, field visits become 
‘rituals of verification’ designed to promote the image of a successful project. Jakimow (2015, 
p.154) further argues that these rituals support researcher ideas of ‘doing good in far-off places’, 
thus it can become difficult to critically reflect on or challenge these ideas. Of course, not all 
 163 
research in development needs to be long-term and locally embedded, but these conditions give rise 
to different advantages and challenges and, depending on the nature of the change sought, different 
research models are likely to be needed (Stone-Jovicich et al. 2015).  
The nature of ‘international’ research projects can create space for local research institutions to 
experiment with new technology or approaches that may otherwise not be attempted. Goodrich et 
al. (2008) suggest international research agencies can provide a degree of cover or take on risk for 
local research and government partners. However, international projects are guided by a set of 
actors in the formal research system—researchers, funding agencies, and governments—who 
invariably define the problems, scope, and resourcing of agricultural research for development 
efforts, as well as how the stories of success are recorded and retold. However, the case studies 
have demonstrated the significant role played by other actors—farmers, government officers, 
manufacturers—both in the development and adaptation of technology outside formal research and 
in adapting, reshaping, and redefining agricultural technology. This is consistent with systems-
based understandings of innovation that highlight the diverse actors who contribute to innovation, 
and with Long’s (2001) framing of interventions as part of a chain of events, interconnected with 
the activities of a range of actors including the state, communities, and others.  
7.1.2 Scaling out 
Strategies for scale-out aim to leverage other actors or processes to promote, explain, and encourage 
the use of a new technology. In Chapter 2, I discussed the links between the qualities of the 
technology (trialability, relative advantage, complexity, compatibility, and observability) and the 
success of local efforts to promote the technology (for example, field schools or demonstration 
plots). In this section I consider the role of the private sector and farmers as key actors who adapt 
and contribute to innovation as part of the scale-out of technology.  
(a) The role of the private sector. The private sector, in the form of manufacturers, machine 
owners-cum-hire service providers, and credit providers, was instrumental in supporting scale-out 
in the mechanisation case but absent in the other cases. Government actors set enabling contexts 
rather than playing a central role in driving the spread of machinery. The AED contributed to this 
enabling context with early efforts in importing, designing, and testing machinery. Their role was in 
the provision of prototypes, collaboration with IRRI and manufacturers in refining designs, and 
technical support to manufacturers as they adapted and refined designs to meet farmer needs. Local 
manufacturers acted as brokers, translating the imported designs into something that incorporated 
the ideas and met the needs of their customers. Machinery was often of lower quality than imported 
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models but met more immediate farmer priorities (such as cost and suitability to field conditions). 
The machines were part of an ongoing process of refinement, while farmers who bought machines 
early promoted and supported the trial of machines by others.  
The opportunity to sell machines and machine services gave the private sector an incentive to scale-
out the technology. This worked because the local manufacturers could make money while farmers 
(with some support) could take advantage of opportunities to increase production and reduce labour 
and production costs. It was then in the manufacturers’ interest to set up mechanisms (e.g., traders, 
dealers) to promote the technology as widely as possible to increase sales, and for contractors to 
promote hire services widely to spread the cost of their machinery acquisitions.  
The central involvement of the private sector was positive in this case. However, given current 
official excitement36 regarding the potential for the private sector to catalyse research and 
development impact, it is worth reflecting more broadly on the role of the private sector in 
agricultural research for development. Moseley (2017, p. 89) details how business-led models of 
agricultural extension in Africa risk excluding local knowledge and returning to transfer-of-
technology approaches as there is ‘no money to be made in leveraging local knowledge.’ In the 
Thai case, the only way businesses could make money was to leverage local knowledge and be 
involved in a process of innovation, rather than taking ‘finished’ products and trying to sell them. 
However, Moseley (2017) also makes the point that, to make money, businesses must expand their 
coverage and increase sales, and in doing so cannot necessarily afford to account for the 
particularities of place and culture in their business model. The private sector is not a panacea to the 
problem of increasing impact but, in some circumstances, may be an effective mechanism to 
support it.  
There are also tensions to be resolved regarding the best allocation of roles between private and 
public enterprises in different circumstances to ensure access to all households, especially the poor 
(DFID and SDC 2008, Rajalahati et al. 2008). In the Lao case, research centred on rice, which is the 
country’s staple crop and thus intimately tied with food security and poverty reduction. Research 
efforts to develop improved varieties built on insights from past failures, testing varieties that would 
be broadly applicable to Lao field conditions and meet household preferences for quality and taste. 
                                               
36 In 2015 the Australian Government identified partnership with the private sector as a key strategy to 
increase the impact of foreign aid and development, with the aim of ‘mainstreaming’ private sector 
engagement across the aid program. It is now a requirement that ‘All new investments will explore 
innovative ways to promote private sector growth or engage the private sector in achieving development 
outcomes’ (Commonwealth of Australia and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015, p.3). 
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The technology was embodied in the rice seeds, but also required new knowledge in the form of 
management practices to ‘unlock’ the full potential of the technology. Initial scale-out strategies 
leveraged existing practices to observe results of other farmers and swap seeds among existing 
networks (for example with neighbours or family). Further scale-out relied on international research 
projects and programs to fund seed multiplication and act as distributors. A comprehensive system 
for seed multiplication and distribution is still lacking.  
Mechanisms for seed production and distribution, and for agricultural inputs more generally, have 
become a key constraint to the ongoing use of varieties promoted by the Lao-IRRI Project. The 
absence of private-sector actors in the Lao case to ensure supply of key inputs could therefore be 
interpreted as a higher-level institutional constraint that is inhibiting innovation (Hounkonnou et al. 
2012). However, it is unlikely that a private-sector pathway would have been viable at the time of 
the program, given (a) the limited market development at the time; (b) deeply embedded processes 
of saving and swapping (i.e., free) seed; and (c) the public investment in rice research as a public 
good, hence seed production was seen as something that would naturally be in the public domain. 
This indicates that the nature of the technology within its cultural and socio-political context makes 
some strategies more suitable than others (DFID and SDC 2008). Not all technologies easily lend 
themselves to private-sector involvement. Reflecting on the potential for collaborations between 
IRRI and local private companies in the development of farm machinery, Bell et al. (1998) 
highlight the potential for tension in relation to intellectual property rights, with the international 
research community’s role often framed as providing an international public good, with an 
emphasis on free distribution, compared with the private sector’s interest in private property rights 
for commercial gain.  
(b) The role of farmers. The role of farmers in continuously adapting and refining technology as 
part of a process of innovation has long been acknowledged, either as key players in multiple- 
source innovation frameworks (Biggs 1990) or as actors who continually evaluate and adapt new 
information and technology to meet diverse individual goals (Pannell et al. 2006). These three cases 
further demonstrate the role of farmers in adapting, refining, and reshaping technologies. In the 
Thai case, farmers helped design the modifications of the machines and established the contract 
services to promote and provide greater access to tractors, threshers, and harvesters. In the rice case, 
farmers reduced the fertiliser and inputs applied to suit their conditions once project subsidies were 
unavailable, and incorporated the new varieties into traditional practices of seed exchange. In the 
cattle case, among the small sample of farmers interviewed, some had adjusted the practices to 
compensate for the loss of group facilitation, some had blended the practices with other government 
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programs for artificial insemination, and some had continued largely as promoted in the project. It 
is this adaptation and adjustment over time that supports sustainable integration of research outputs 
or other innovations at scale.  
The aspirations, goals, and livelihood strategies of households may match, complement, or 
contradict the goals of research and development actors, such as government and international 
research agencies. Farmers in the Indonesian case were largely interested in saving labour and 
improving their income from cattle, rather than contributing to an overall increase in herd size or 
national goals for beef self-sufficiency. In the rice case, households and government shared a goal 
for increased rice production, but farmers were not prepared to increase production at any cost. As 
Pannell et al. (2006) argue, interventions must speak to the goals of farmers while also meeting any 
additional goals. If and how goals of different actors align is an important factor in how technology 
becomes embedded in a society or not.  
Though acknowledged in the literature, these points are worth restating here, given the tendency for 
some of the narratives around project scale-out to imply that adaptation stops with a participatory 
project that has developed and tested a ‘proven’ technology, and that a fixed, identifiable 
technology is disseminated, the use or ‘adoption’ of which is able to be quantified. This issue will 
be discussed further in Section 7.2.  
7.1.3 Scaling up  
Scaling up implies influencing key actors to embrace research recommendations and incorporate 
them into their processes, programs, or policies, that is, it is above the level of individual or 
household decision-making implied by scaling out, referring instead to higher-level institutional 
conditions to encourage broader scale-out. In this section I focus, first, on influencing policy and 
the role of government and, second, on building the capacity of key actors. Though separated here 
for clarity, they are closely related, as influencing policy often involves a process of capacity 
building with key government officials to enable them to understand what they are trying to 
implement. 
(a) Influencing policy. The Lao and Indonesian cases both feature different degrees of engagement 
with government officials to embed research approaches and findings into policy and programs. In 
the Lao case, engagement centred on the development of a national research program and the 
capabilities of Lao research staff to support it. The Government of Laos was instrumental, allowing 
the Lao-IRRI Project to establish itself in the country when few other international research projects 
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were allowed access. Furthermore, the government had provided the program with a mandate to 
develop a national (i.e., at-scale) system for rice research and improvement. Recognising its own 
lack of capacity, partnering with an international research organisation such as IRRI can be 
interpreted as the government’s strategy to ensure the scale-out and scale-up of improved varieties. 
In the Indonesian case, the role of government was less as an instigator and more as a participant or 
targeted end-user. Initial development of the projects in late 1999 was largely driven by the funder 
(ACIAR), though subsequent projects were developed with more collaboration between Australian 
and Indonesian research organisations and government agencies. Government involvement 
expanded with the successive phases of work, from co-researcher (BPTP) in the early stages, which 
focused on trialling technology, to advisor and key audience (via advisory committees) in Phase 3 
as the interest in scaling became central.  
The Australian team in the Indonesian case had a limited understanding of government structures 
for policy making in Indonesia and largely relied on Indonesian partners and advisory committee 
members to guide the process. The presence of Australian researchers and the formal structure of 
the advisory committee were seen as creating the space for Indonesian colleagues to find 
opportunities to influence policy. Relying on in-country researchers to guide policy processes was 
reasonably effective in Lombok as many of the policy makers were within the personal networks of 
the academics involved in the project, but was insufficient in Sulawesi, with the team reflecting that 
they had not targeted the right levels of government. It was assumed that, by engaging through the 
advisory committees, sufficient opportunity would exist to influence policy.  
In Lombok, where the team had relative success and could directly inform provincial decrees, the 
process of ‘policy making’ resulted in a partial application or re-interpretation of the recommended 
practices to suit the needs of government. Though the ‘best-bet’ practices became the catch-all for 
what the project was trying to scale out, the researchers were equally concerned to promote the 
underlying approach to building farmer knowledge and capacity in cattle management. A focus on 
the practices, such as use of a quality bull for mating, was misleading as it simplified what made 
this practice effective—farmer learning, farmer-group capacity, and confidence. Scaling up the 
project’s approach into provincial government programs did not result in an expansion of what the 
project was already doing. The government reframed the project’s approach to fit its institutional 
culture and resource constraints. In the process, it fundamentally changed the package promoted by 
the project, substituting resource provision for intensive farmer capacity building. Hermans et al. 
(2016) argue that scaling up of local innovation will almost inevitably change the nature and 
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characteristics of the intervention. In part this is because the specific nature of a local innovation is 
generalised to be more broadly relevant, and in part because actors involved with scaling will have 
diverse views about how and what to scale, which can result in parallel coalitions with competing 
(or complementary) strategies. In the Indonesian case, these competing coalitions occurred within 
the project (researcher views versus government views) but also outside the project, with 
‘competing’ programs promoting their interpretations of how to increase cattle production, such as 
whether to use artificial insemination.  
The agricultural innovation systems literature emphasises the importance of having key 
stakeholders throughout the research process, in part to have them ‘on board’ to facilitate the kind 
of enabling institutional environment required to ‘incentivise’ more widespread change at the local 
level (Hounkonnou et al. 2012). The scaling literature likewise emphasises the need to demonstrate 
alignment with government policy and to involve government actors as part of a strategy to ensure 
government ‘buy-in’, facilitating the sustainability and wider reach of projects. What is missing in 
both these literatures, and in evaluation and impact assessment, is an understanding of the 
complexity and timeframes required to ‘influence policy makers.’ As Long (2015) highlights, there 
is not one unified government deciding and implementing coherent and rational policies but an 
array of powerful actors with competing demands and values making compromises and forming 
coalitions.  
Butler et al. (2016) detail similar challenges in trying to influence climate adaptation policy in 
Indonesia. In contrast to the cattle projects, influencing climate adaptation policy was a goal at the 
outset. It was assumed that project activities would open windows of opportunity to influence 
climate adaptation planning at a range of administrative levels. These did not eventuate to the 
degree expected due to redeployment of key government officials, a reluctance of government 
officials to change existing processes, and a mismatch between the timing of local planning 
processes and research timeframes. Importantly, part of the project’s approach had been to develop 
the skills and ability of researchers from within the Indonesian partner organisations to become 
‘policy entrepreneurs’, such that they would be positioned to take advantage of opportunities to 
influence policy even after the project had finished (Butler et al. 2016). In this sense, scaling up 
becomes more about building local capacity to support long-term change than instituting policy 
change within the often short timeframe of a project. 
(b) Developing capacity. Building skills and knowledge was deeply embedded in each case study. 
In the Lao case it was front and centre in supporting a national capacity to conduct rice research, but 
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more subtly in supporting farmers to understand the new varieties, where they were suited, and how 
to grow them to realise their potential (regardless of whether this was followed). In the Thai case, 
scaling required local manufacturers to learn, experiment with, and refine machinery based on 
farmer input, while IRRI and AED had to learn to better integrate the needs of farmers and 
manufacturers in proposed designs. In Indonesia, the emphasis was on farmer capacity and 
understanding in cattle management and in supporting provincial policy makers to develop 
programs based on the research.  
However, in the Indonesian case, a large component of what has contributed to ongoing impact has 
been the capacity of key project staff to turn a series of projects into a program of work where each 
project builds on and leverages off its predecessors—the kind of project or policy entrepreneur role 
envisaged by Butler et al. (2016). Recognising that the ultimate goal of scaling research findings is 
to increase the realisation of benefits, independent of project timeframes, and that this involves 
continuous adaptation, experimentation, and adjustment, technical capacity becomes less of a focus 
than the development of innovation capacity. This includes the skills needed to produce knowledge, 
but also encompasses the development of networks, relationships, and institutional conditions to 
‘put that knowledge into use’ (Hall 2005, pp.611–612).  
7.2 Understanding impact 
In this section I do not intend to quantify the development impacts of scaling research in the case 
studies, such as increased production or income, but rather to reflect, first, on the dynamics of 
scaling in terms of how knowledge is created and shared and who holds knowledge and, second, on 
the deficiencies of conventional approaches to measuring the impacts of research.  
7.2.1 Who holds knowledge? 
In Chapter 2, I outlined different theories of how innovation occurs, contrasting transfer-of-
technology and systems approaches. In transfer-of-technology or central-source models of 
innovation, new knowledge is conceptualised as being transferred from experts (researchers) to 
non-experts (extension officers, farmers). Multiple-source or systems-based models conceptualise 
this as a dynamic exchange, with information, ideas, and knowledge constantly shared, debated, and 
evaluated between diverse actors, resulting in innovation in farm practices, whether led by 
researchers or not.  
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In the case studies, the dynamics of knowledge creation and sharing were intricately linked with 
scaling efforts. In the Lao case, knowledge and skills from international agencies were shared with 
the Government of Laos and its research system, helping to empower local researchers who had 
previously depended on evaluating rice varieties that were developed in other countries but could 
now breed varieties in-country. From the farmers’ perspective, the program represented a shift from 
traditional practices of varietal development, known and understood by farmers and embodied in 
ritual and custom, to scientifically-developed varieties and practices. This required a process to 
build knowledge and information systems that accounted for the new technology (in this case, seed 
distribution, extension services, and input markets). Though farmers continued their processes of 
selecting and sharing new and traditional varieties, decisions around the development of improved 
varieties were made by scientists. Farmers’ agency to use or not use the new varieties drove a sort 
of accountability to develop varieties that met their needs, but there was a general loss of the close 
knowledge that farmers held in the past about which varieties did best in specific parts of their 
fields.  
In the Indonesian case, as discussed earlier, the project team sought to build farmer and farmer-
group knowledge of cattle management practices, equipping them with a better understanding of 
cattle production systems. This was a slow and intensive process, hence scaling it out would have 
been challenging, requiring new arrangements (e.g., changes in extension approaches or alternative 
models such as contract-based cattle production) to support wider replication.  
In the Thai case, local manufacturers took the role of knowledge broker in terms of translating 
farmer needs and knowledge of what was required and the features of imported machines and 
machinery designs into a specific technology that farmers used widely. It was a process of dialogue 
and exchange between multiple actors, conforming well to the multiple-source model (Biggs 1990).  
7.2.2 Measuring research impact  
The extent to which technology continues to be modified and adapted by end users has been 
discussed throughout this thesis. The decision to use a new technology, rather than being a static 
all-or-nothing decision, is an ongoing process of learning and adjustment, revised as circumstances 
and information change (Pannell et al. 2006). Yet the basic goals of taking research to scale and the 
common frameworks for how we measure this are not always able to acknowledge the nuances of 
this process. The challenges and limitations of conducting economic impact assessments to measure 
the impacts of research projects have been discussed at length (e.g., Horton and Mackay 2003). 
Here I want to focus particularly on the disconnection between the discourse relating to expanding 
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research impact and common practices for promoting and measuring impact. While interviewees 
(and, indeed, many of my colleagues, myself included) recognise that understanding and measuring 
these processes is complicated, there is a tendency, for the sake of expediency and to meet funding 
requirements, to translate complex impact stories into quantitative measurements of production.  
In the Indonesian case, studies have been funded to evaluate the impact of individual projects or a 
body of research commissioned by the funder, ACIAR (Martin 2010, Van Wensveen et al. 2017c). 
The full complexity of how research has contributed to impact is narrowed into stories bounded by 
the funding source and the project timeline rather than the reality of the researchers’ and others’ 
efforts before, during, and after the project. In this case, the Indonesian researchers continued to 
promote and build on the initial impacts over time through a number of projects and other activities. 
In some cases, the Australian-based researchers would only find out about these linkages by chance.  
Evaluations or impact assessments that occurred during or at the end of a project tended to give an 
idealised picture of impact. In the rice case, use of improved varieties without other recommended 
practices (such as fertiliser use or plant spacing) resulted in lower yields compared to the use of 
varieties under recommended conditions. Farmers stated that after the project finished they adapted 
the practices to their normal conditions, that is, without project support for fertiliser. Similarly, in 
the cattle case, farmer groups struggled to manage group-based decision-making without external 
facilitation provided by the On-Ground Teams and have adapted recommended practices in 
response. This in itself is an important outcome for funders, project leaders, and researchers to 
recognise, and though the outcomes in terms of cattle production may not be optimal from the 
researchers’ perspectives, it demonstrates an ongoing, adaptive use of research outputs.  
Evaluation of impact is not a neutral task; funders and researchers have a strong influence on how 
impact is defined and measured. Evaluation and impact assessments favour the classification of 
farmers’ use of a technology as a binary decision (adoption or non-adoption) rather than as an 
ongoing process of learning and adaptation. For example, the CGIAR’s current strategy links 
achievement of outcomes, such as reduced poverty, to the adoption of improved varieties, with a 
target of 350 million more households globally using improved seed varieties, animal breeds, or 
trees by 2030 (CGIAR 2016, p.6). The Australian-Indonesia Partnership for Rural Economic 
Development has a goal to improve the incomes of 300,000 smallholder farmers by 30 per cent by 
2018 (AIP-Rural 2017). The Partnership’s homepage features a rolling counter of achievements, 
including how many households have adopted new practices and estimations of income increases as 
a result of market changes. It is difficult to fit adaptations of technology or changes in capacity into 
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such frameworks, so they are often simplified or excluded, even where the changes have been 
observed. Narratives are told to meet the needs and priorities of funders (‘accountability’) and the 
researchers themselves (e.g., the researchers’ need to believe they are doing good, as highlighted by 
Jakimow (2015) in her observations of CSIRO researchers in India). Such narratives tend to gloss 
over the nuances of struggle, mishap, and serendipity, missing an opportunity for institutional 
learning. Analysing the failure of long-term of investment in the development of animal-drawn 
wheeled tool-carriers, Starkey (1986) argues that the reluctance to critically reflect on project 
success and take lessons from one program to the next results in a needless waste of resources.  
Attribution is another challenge, especially where projects are seeking to contribute to long-term, 
systemic change, such as is required to meet development goals. Spilsbury and Nasi (2006) argue 
that non-linear and ‘not entirely rational’ decision-making processes make it difficult to discern the 
influence of research on policy. Walker et al. (2010) argue that any single project is unlikely to have 
an identifiable impact on policy as policy is developed within a much wider context. There is a 
range of influences that shape policy, including public opinion, re-election concerns, party pressure, 
and diverse groups that lobby and advocate for competing interests, yet it is not unusual for projects 
to aim to influence or contribute to policy in the short term, with limited acknowledgement of this 
complexity (e.g., Roth and Grünbühel 2012, Anyonge et al. 2001).  
7.3 Implications 
Although the complexity of change processes, such as farmer decisions around the use of new 
technology or processes to influence policy makers, are acknowledged in the literature and apparent 
in these case studies, the impact and scaling narratives still tend to pre-suppose the dominance of 
project-defined packages of technology. For example, in the Indonesian case, the use of 
individually-managed as opposed to group-managed bulls was seen as a negative due to the ‘lost’ 
benefits of group management, such as access to microfinance and the taking of group decisions on 
bull quality and purchase. Changing how we think about this requires a subtle reframing that asks 
researchers to consider the alternative goals and values within the communities with which they are 
working, and the alternative benefits attained from adaptation, rather than aiming for optimal 
production systems as viewed by researchers. 
In terms of how to plan for increasing the impact of research, the case studies have shown that 
scaling of research, at its most basic level, involves learning processes between multiple actors, 
hence it is difficult to anticipate how processes of scaling will unfold. Furthermore, the processes of 
social change that underpin changes in rural livelihoods and reduction in poverty are most often 
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slow-moving. They will occur long after the project has finished and, most often, not as a result of 
one project or technology but of a cumulative process of change to which a range of actors, 
projects, and other interventions have contributed.  
The notion of expanding the impact of research findings—of scaling out to ever more farmers or 
scaling up to embed beneficial innovations in government and non-government development 
programs and policies—relies to some extent on the assumption that knowledge exists in a stable 
and measurable state, that technology packages can be defined and traced as they move, unchanged, 
through rural communities. While few researchers would, when pressed, see the process in these 
simplistic terms, many are nevertheless drawn into this discourse as they engage with senior 
management and external funders, who appreciate such persuasive accounts. The deployment of 
this discourse starts with the project proposal, which Long (2015, p.36) aptly describes as ‘a bid for 
political support and involves translating a range of different perspectives and interests into one 
(apparently) coherent whole or container of many notions and texts.’ The discourse continues to 
hold sway throughout the project review and evaluation processes, as per the example given by 
Douthwaite et al. (2017b) which I outline below.  
The counter point to these simple accounts focuses on understanding research and research impact 
through the lens of institutional learning and change. Though such ideas are not new, learning-
based approaches to impact assessment are often seen in policy and funding circles as less 
legitimate than conventional economic approaches (Hall et al. 2003). A focus on learning in impact 
assessment gives more attention to the questions of how and why research activities have 
contributed to positive change and what lessons can be drawn to inform future activities (Horton 
and Mackay 2003).  
Douthwaite et al. (2017a) have called for a ‘new professionalism’ in agricultural development, 
proposing a pluralistic, participatory, action-research focused paradigm in which impact is defined 
in terms of the capacity built rather than change in practices per se. They propose that ‘adoption’ 
should no longer be taken as a marker of impact, arguing instead for building the capacity of people 
within the system (whether farmers, government officials, traders, or researchers) to innovate. This 
in turn supports increasing innovation and impact over time. Such a notion fundamentally 
challenges the concept of taking research to scale as it shifts attention from the technology or 
research outcome and how this is promoted through a region or population to the processes of 
innovation and social change within a society, that is, to ‘empowerment’ rather than ‘intervention’. 
This view explicitly decentres the formal research sector from the process of innovation to include 
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the large diversity of actors involved. The idea of intervening in order to ‘empower’ actors is, in 
itself, a concept in need of critical reflection. Li (2007) argues that many well-intentioned 
development interventions have done more harm than good due to development actors failing to 
reflect on their own role and effects in the process, positioning themselves separately from the 
targets of their interventions, presupposing they have the power and correct solutions to fix the 
problem.  
Though there is momentum behind approaches that seek to account for complexity and encourage 
learning-based approaches within agricultural research organisations (Douthwaite and Hoffecker 
2017, Thornton et al. 2017), it can be an uncomfortable and risky strategy in a competitive funding 
environment. Douthwaite et al. (2017b) demonstrate this through their experience in the CGIAR 
Research Program on Aquatic Agricultural Systems, which unconventionally focused on 
developing innovation capacity to speed innovation and contribute to development outcomes and 
impacts (compared to other research programs that focused on use of new technology). The 
CGIAR’s oversight organisation viewed the approach as ‘an excessive shift away from bio-
technical innovation’ and, since the program performed poorly against conventional metrics in a 
context of declining funding to the CGIAR, the program was closed (Douthwaite et al. 2017b, 
p.298).  
Wigboldus et al. (2016) argue that linear, adoption-focused concepts have dominated in the theories 
of scaling, and my research supports that criticism. As agricultural research has positioned itself 
‘for development’, the complexity of change sought has gone from increasing yield to contributing 
to processes of social change such as those that seek to reduce poverty. Expectations for research 
impact need to be adjusted to reflect this complexity and uncertainty, and the scale of change 
sought. This implies that ‘scaling of research’ is a much broader program or portfolio responsibility, 
not just that of researchers, requiring a coordinated effort or coalitions between actors within the 
agricultural innovation system, with less focus on attribution of impact to specific organisations or 
projects.  
Thornton et al. (2017) suggest that an adaptive, learning-based approach to project management, 
guided by a theory of change, may be one mechanism to support a more nuanced understanding of, 
and contribution to, complex processes of change. However, Thornton et al. (2017) also highlight 
the change this represents for many researchers, and the capacity building within research 
organisations that is required to support it, such as building skills in working in trans-disciplinary 
teams or collaboration with non-research partners for impact. Hermans et al. (2013) argue that 
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scaling requires knowledge co-creation, political lobbying, and brokering or knowledge translation. 
These roles can be contentious or sensitive, as in political lobbying, or simply not valued or 
rewarded in research institutions. Either coalitions need to be made with actors who are effective in 
these roles, or these skills need to be acknowledged and fostered within research institutions, along 
with an acknowledgement of the tensions and conflicts that aligning research to these roles may 
bring.  
Acknowledging the complexity that lies behind processes of ‘taking research to scale’ is vitally 
important, both in terms of bringing in appropriate actors and skills to support such strategies, but 
also for having reasonable expectations about what is possible within individual projects. This 
would require new and different ways of considering impact that look beyond the boundaries of 
research institutions, funders, and projects to acknowledge the complex interactions that contribute 
to processes of rural development and social change.  
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8 Conclusion 
The impetus to ensure significant impact from agricultural research for development has led to a 
preoccupation with taking research to scale. However, a critical analysis of the principles, methods, 
and processes to support scaling of research outcomes against the broader understanding of 
innovation as a dynamic process—influenced by individual, institutional, and political 
circumstances—has been lacking. My contention in this thesis has been that simplistic, linear 
narratives of planned scaling-up or scaling-out hide a dynamic and complex process in which many 
factors, including the values, interests, and power of different actors, along with serendipitous 
events, have a significant influence on what, and how, research goes to scale.  
This research was framed within the context of ‘agricultural research for development’ projects. 
There is a bias in such research and its interpretations that favours projects and innovations that 
stem from the formal research system, rather than the richness of everyday exploration and 
innovation that is undertaken by farmers, government officials, and others, irrespective of formal 
‘projects’. The Thai case, in particular, provided a counterpoint to the bias toward formal research 
projects, and the Lao and Indonesian cases also demonstrated the richness of non-formal research 
contributions to processes of agricultural innovation.  
Though the cases have been rich in detail, they necessarily lack a nuanced picture of how change is 
experienced diversely within local communities. Farmers are referred to generically, as a 
convenient shorthand, when in reality different types of farmer exist as members of dynamic and 
varied household units and local communities. Further scope exists to explore issues of research 
impact and strategies from diverse local viewpoints, considering the extent to which the expansion 
of research impacts has been inclusive of the poorest households or has had differential impacts on 
men and women. Though these case studies have been useful in drawing out key themes and issues, 
they are context-specific. Additional case studies could confirm or challenge the findings, and 
would certainly throw up additional nuances and insights.  
Nonetheless, this thesis has highlighted a rich diversity of actors involved in scaling up and out. 
Farmers played a consistent role across the case studies in testing, adapting, and adjusting the 
technologies to fit their circumstances and, in some cases, developing new institutions to support 
this adaptation process. Government actors took recommendations based on research and adapted 
them to suit their own resources and institutional contexts; likewise, entrepreneurs adapted and 
brokered knowledge to leverage business opportunities. Funding organisations played a significant 
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role in shaping how success was defined and what research activities and approaches were 
supported. 
Common across all cases was a continuous process of learning and adaptation, as the various actors 
involved integrated new knowledge and responded to broader changes, such as the availability of 
inputs or external (project) support. Thus it is difficult to separate the process of scaling from the 
broader context of innovation. Though linear notions of testing or piloting new practices as proof of 
concept, and then applying these at larger scales, are still common, the successes of scaling efforts 
in these case studies were closely intertwined with much broader dynamics, and nudged by chance 
events, networks, and coalitions. The factors that prompted the research and innovations that sit at 
the core of these case studies were highly contextual in all three cases, and highly political in the 
Lao and Indonesian cases. The adaptation of technology and its spread were propelled by personal 
networks, design, chance, politics, and the exertions of individuals and organisations.  
The terminology of scaling up and out is thus in itself unhelpful to understand this innovation 
process, as it implies a discrete ‘thing’ to be scaled and a start and end point of scaling. This is 
compounded by a close association with terminology such as ‘adoption’, which further reinforces 
time-bound, measurable, binary decisions for ease of measurement and impact assessment. If 
scaling is conceptualised instead as a process of learning and evaluation, in which multiple values 
and sources of information are compared, evaluated, and integrated, a much more complex and 
nuanced process emerges. In this conceptualisation, simple tools and mechanisms to support 
scaling, such as influencing policy makers through workshops or regular meetings, are placed 
within the broader processes and politics of policy making that stretch well beyond project 
timeframes and capacities. Even where goals for outcomes may be shared or overlapping, actors are 
likely to have different interpretations about the best pathway to achieve them. 
These conclusions call into question the practicality and validity of our expectations and claims 
around scaling. An emphasis on accountability and positive success stories by funding agencies 
may be useful to draw attention to larger development goals and how research efforts can contribute 
to them, but can also reinforce narratives of success that simplify complex processes of social 
change. While scaling out is tied to evolving processes of experimentation and learning at local 
levels, scaling up equates to processes of institutional change which are often slow moving and for 
the most part not well suited to project timeframes, except by serendipity. Agricultural research 
projects may have a catalytic role in supporting developmental change, but invariably a confluence 
of actors, events, and circumstances is needed to achieve meaningful impacts.  
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10.3 Example interview schedule: Lao case 
Example interview schedule [Varietal improvement research] 
 
1. Introductions:  
 Introduce yourself, research, purpose of research 
 Re-affirm informed consent (verbal; refer verbal consent checklist) 
 Check if interviewee has any questions 
 
2. Background and experience 
I understand you were leading much of the varietal improvement program at the National Agricultural 
Research Centre in the 1990s, can you tell me a bit about that?  
What were the improvements / traits you were trying to breed?  
What was the process of deciding which traits, developing, selecting, releasing etc?  
What is the process from varietal development through to release to the farmer?  
How do you encourage farmers to adopt the improved varieties?  
 
3. Project aims, goals 
Do you think the traits / aims of the project were different for researchers, farmers and government?  
Was the government involved or connected to the program? How?  
 
4. Project impact 
What do you think were some of the main impacts of the program?  
How successful do you think the program has been in terms of taking the research to farmers and policy?  
What do you think worked well / could have been done better?  
 
5. Expansion 
In the southern and central regions there has been high adoption of improved varieties – can you comment on 
how this was achieved? How did you take the research outputs to the farmers?  
Has adoption of improved varieties enabled other changes in the farming system or in farmer livelihoods 
more broadly?  
What has changed as more households adopt improvements in the farm system?  
What about households that don’t adopt or who are slow to adopt?  
Was there anything that resulted from the project that you didn’t expect?  
What sort of changes did you see as more farmers adopted the recommendations? 
 
6. Now and the future 
Have the government priorities in rice / agricultural production changed since the Lao-IRRI project?  
How do you see rice improvement and agricultural research now in Laos?  
What are the links between research and policy?  
How effectively is research taken onboard by policy and government programs?  
What are some of the constraints that make it difficult?  
What are some of the opportunities or things that work well?  
 
7. Interview close 
 Thank interviewee, advise interview coming to close 
 Check if they have any questions 
 Discuss interest/process for sharing results
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10.4 Lao modern varieties developed through the Lao-IRRI Project and released for use 1993–2005 
Year 
released 
Variety 
namea 
Origin Growth 
duration 
(days) 
Characteristics Conditions suited 
1993 TDK1 Thai-IRRI 
cross 
135–140 High-yielding variety (HYV); photoperiod non-sensitive 
(PNS); resistance to brown plant hopper (BPH); 
moderate resistance to blast and bacterial leaf blight 
(BLB); high nitrogen response.  
Susceptible to neck blast, bakanae disease, and green leaf 
hopper (GLH); poor milling quality in dry season.  
Can be grown in wet and dry season; 
wide adaptability.  
1993 TDK2 Thai cross 135–140 HYV; PNS; good eating quality; moderate resistance to 
blast and BLB.  
Susceptible to BPH and GLH.  
Can be grown in wet and dry season. 
1993 PNG1 Thai-IRRI 
cross 
125–130 HYV; PNS; good eating and milling quality; resistance to 
GLH and blast; moderate resistance to BLB.  
Susceptible to neck blast and BLH.  
Suitable to wet and dry season; good 
adaptability to drought prone areas of 
central region.  
1995 PNG2  Thai-IRRI 
cross 
Mid-October 
flowering 
Photoperiod-sensitive; tall plant type; good eating and 
milling quality. 
Susceptible to neck blast, leaf blast, BPH and GLH.  
Good adaptability to drought prone 
areas of central and southern regions. 
1997 TDK3 Vietnam 130–135 HYV; PNS; good eating quality; good milling quality in 
dry season; moderate resistance to blast, good resistance 
to BLB. 
Susceptible to BPH, gall midge, and bakanae disease.  
Can be grown in wet and dry season. 
1998 TDK4 Thai-IRRI 
cross 
Mid-October 
flowering 
Photoperiod-sensitive; intermediate plant type; good 
eating and milling quality; resistance to blast and BLB; 
Suitable for fertile soils; susceptible to 
acidic soils.  
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moderate resistance to BPH. 
Susceptible to GLH and gall midge.  
1998 TSN1 Thai-IRRI 
cross 
140–145 HYV; PNS; good eating and milling quality; moderate 
resistance to blast and BLB.  
Moderately susceptible to BPH, GLH, and gall midge. 
Suitable for wet season; not suitable 
for dry season; tolerance of acidic 
soils.  
1998 NTN1  Thai-IRRI 
cross 
130–135 HYV; PNS; good eating quality; good milling quality in 
the dry season; moderate resistance to blast. 
Moderately susceptible to BLB, BPH, and GLH.  
Can be grown in wet and dry season; 
good adaptability in drought-prone 
areas of central and southern regions.  
2000 TDK5 Lao cross 125–130 HYV; PNS; short growth duration; good eating quality; 
good milling quality in the dry season; moderate 
resistance to blight and BLB. 
Moderately susceptible to BPH and GLH, easy to shatter.  
Can be grown in wet and dry season; 
good adaptability to high elevation in 
northern Laos.  
2003 TDK6 IRRI 
cross 
135–140 HYV; PNS; good eating quality; good milling quality in 
the dry season; moderate resistance to blight and BLB. 
Moderately susceptible to neck blast, BPH, GLH, and 
gall midge.  
Suitable for wet and dry season; good 
adaptability to high elevation in 
northern Laos. 
2003 TDK7 IRRI 
cross 
135–140 HYV; PNS ; good eating quality; good milling quality in 
the dry season; moderate resistance to blight and BLB.  
Very susceptible to neck blast; moderate susceptibility to 
BPH, GLH and gall midge.  
Suitable for wet and dry season; 
tolerance of acidic soils.  
2004 TSN2  Lao cross 130–135 HYV; PNS; good eating and milling quality; moderate 
resistance to blight and BLB. 
Susceptible to BPH, GLH, and gall midge.  
Suitable for wet season; tolerance of 
drought.  
2004 TSN3 Lao cross 135–140 HYV; PNS; good eating and milling quality; resistance to 
BLB.  
Suitable for wet and dry season. 
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Susceptible to blast, BPH, GLH, and gall midge.  
2004 TSN4 Lao cross 125–130 HYV; PNS; good eating and milling quality.  
Susceptible to blight, BLB, BPH, GLH, and gall midge.  
Suitable for wet and dry season; 
drought tolerance. 
2005 PNG3  IRRI 
cross 
130–135 HYV; PNS; resistance to blight.  
Susceptible to BLB, GLH, and gall midge.  
Suitable for wet season; tolerance of 
acidic soils, suitable for drought prone 
areas of central and southern regions. 
Susceptible to low temperature; not 
suitable for dry season.  
2005 PNG5 IRRI 
cross 
125–130 HYV; PNS good eating and milling quality; moderate 
resistance to BLB; suitable for direct seeding.  
Susceptible to blast, BPH, GLH and gall midge. 
Suitable for wet and dry season; 
tolerance of acidic soils; suitable for 
drought prone areas of central and 
southern regions. 
2005 PNG6 IRRI 
cross 
130–135 HYV; PNS; good eating and milling quality; moderate 
resistance to BLB.  
Susceptible to blast, BPH, GLH, and gall midge.  
Suitable for wet season; suitable for 
drought prone areas of central and 
southern regions. 
Susceptible to low temperature; not 
suitable for dry season.  
Notes: aNaming indicates the research station where breeding lines were developed. National Agricultural Research Centre in Thadokkham village, 
Saythany District, Vientiane Municupality (TDK); Phone Ngam Rice Research and Seed Multiplication Centre, Pakse, Champasak (PNG); Thasano 
Rice Research and Seed Multiplication Centre, Savannakhet (TSN); 30-ha Rice Research and Seed Multiplication Centre in Namthane, Phiange 
District, Sayabouly (NTN). 
Not all varieties are still recommended, including PNG2 and TDK7 due to susceptibility to disease (Inthapanya et al., 2006).  
Source: Modified slightly from Inthapanya et al., 2006, pp.341–344.  
 208 
10.5 Chronology of key events relating to mechanisation in Thailand 1890–2000 
Year Event 
1891 Steam powered tractor and rotary hoe imported by Thai Government. It was not suited to 
field conditions and expensive. 
1907 Australian engine plough introduced. Too heavy in wet-season fields. 
1910 First Bangkok Agricultural Show displays imported equipment. Austrian engine plough 
introduced.  
1911 Second Bangkok Agricultural Show compares performance of farm implements.  
1919  Rice Experiment Station established in Rangsit—experiments include machinery.  
1941 Low-lift, axial-flow pump developed. 
1947 Import of single axle tractor with rotary hoe. Unsuitable for fields.  
1950s Rangsit Rice Experiment Station tries to introduce four-wheel tractor via contracting 
service. It is not financially viable.  
1953 Rice Department is established. Initiates research into mechanisation under engineering 
section. 
1955 Axial-flow pump designs modified and refined.  
Small tractors imported from numerous countries. Japanese tillers most popular—local 
workshops start to copy/adapt design.  
1956 Import of 1,000 Japanese pedal threshers by Government. No adoption.  
1957 Agricultural engineering department (AED) established under Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives.  
Design of the axial-flow pump shared with manufacturers. The pump is popular.  
1958 AED releases design for small (25hp) four-wheel tractor ‘iron buffalo.’ The model cannot 
compete with cheaper imported tractors and production stops.  
First prototype of rice combine harvester developed but is not commercially produced. 
1960 Ford establishes production line for four-wheel tractors in Thailand.  
Continued rapid spread of axial flow pump and emergence of regional design differences, 
design is modified to work with a two-wheel tractor. 
IRRI enters into formal partnership with Thailand to support increased rice production. 
1963 High-yielding rice varieties released.  
1964 
 
Massey Ferguson establishes production line for four wheel tractors in Thailand. 
Local manufacturers simplify gearbox of imported tillers.  
1966 Modified power tillers manufactured by a local firms.  
1967  
1967–9 
IRRI small farm machinery development program starts.  
Simple four-wheel tractor developed by a local manufacturer based on modification of 
2WT (gearbox, added two wheels and seat). 
1968  Thai Industrial Standards Institute, Ministry of Industry established. Responsible for 
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setting of machinery standards.  
1971 Cooperative project for the development of farm machinery between Thailand (AED) and 
IRRI—providing access to additional designs. 
1974 AED sell left over pedal threshers from 1956. The machines are affordable and relevant to 
current farmer challenges/needs.  
1975 Commercial banks asked to provide loans to farming households.  
Prototype axial-flow rice thresher designed by Ag Engineering Division based on 
blueprint from IRRI. A small number are produced by local firms but do not perform 
well. Design is modified and re-released later in the year. Manufacturers produce thresher 
with own modifications for local conditions. Rapidly adopted.  
Japanese harvester introduced but is not popular due to expense and inefficiency. 
1976 Ongoing modification and refinement of IRRI thresher by IRRI/AED and by private 
firms.  
Massey Ferguson introduce sugar cane harvesters. 
Thai Society of Engineers established. 
1977 Regional Network for Agricultural Machinery established.  
Small portable thresher designs released by IRRI-AED but are not popular due to low 
threshing capacity. 
Japanese combine harvesters (head feed type) demonstrated but not adopted 
1978 Rice transplanter imported from China. Not widely used initially. Eventually becomes 
popular in Central Plain. 
Mametora reaper introduced by RNAM exchange program. Cannot compete with earlier 
Chinese model.  
1979 Board of investment approves promotional privilege to three diesel engine manufacturers. 
National Committee for Agricultural Mechanisation established.  
National Agricultural Machinery Centre (NAMC) established to test machinery. 
Combine harvesters from EU, US and Japan introduced—not adopted, not suitable for 
Thai conditions & rice varieties. 
BAAC changes loan scheme, providing machines as ‘in-kind’ loans to farmers. Only 
BAAC approved machines are eligible for the scheme. 
1980 
 
1980–1 
Local diesel engine manufacture starts.  
Rapid increase in popularity and import of small second-hand tractors from Japan. 
IRRI thresher model TH8 blueprints sent. Tested well but no manufacturers were 
interested in producing because older model had already been accepted / adopted.  
Chinese reapers imported — unsuitable for long stem rice variety so abandoned. 
1981 Department of Agricultural Extension establish Farm Mechanisation Promotion Centre.  
1982 Higher tariff rates for imported machinery and engines introduced as well as import quota 
for tillers.  
1984 AED changes strategy for promotion of machinery from nation-wide to specially selected 
pilot areas.  
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1985 Manufacturers near Bangkok start to make rice combine harvester. 
1986 Kubota reaper introduced which had been made lighter for the Thai market. Not widely 
adopted due to cost and shortage of labour to collect and bundle rice straw.  
1990s Thai made rice combine harvesters adopted in Central Plain. 
1995–
2000 
Sun-drying of rice becomes impractical for millers dealing with high volume from 
farmers. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative subsidise dryers for cooperatives and 
farmer groups in key areas. Ministry of Commerce gives soft loans to millers to buy 
dryers.  
1997 Development of cyclonic rice husk burner by Agricultural Engineering Research Institute 
–popular for millers. 
Source: Compiled by author based on IRRI 1986; Soni 2016; Thepent 2015 
 
 
